The auto industry is usually considered to be a global industry. Yet the majority of passenger cars are still manufactured and sold in industrialised states where its largest firms are headquartered. The central claim made is that despite the auto industry being comprised of multinational corporations, there are clear national differences in the motivations firms cite for environmental initiatives. US firms are more focused on traditional material factors, especially market forces. However, German and Japanese firms are more focused on social concerns and internally-driven strategies. They have more normative, non-market rationales for their environmental initiatives. By analysing what firms themselves say motivates them to improve the environmental performance of their products, via a qualitative analysis of recent environmental reports by German, US and Japanese firms, as well as interviews conducted with key personnel, the conclusion reached is as follows. While the question of ‘greenwashing’ versus real commitment to reduce the environmental impact of the industry's products remains relevant, the institutional basis of capitalist relations in their home state (i.e. their home state's variety of capitalism) suggests different nationally appropriate and conducive paths to environmental commitments.

Environmental policies of providers of international finance – namely the World Bank, export credit agencies, and Equator Principles banks – provide interesting cases within which to study the power of business not as only an input to the political process or as a constraint on politics, but also as a conduit for both state and non-state actors.

This paper shows how targeting financial actors has allowed NGOs to transform their rather weak discursive power base into instrumental power over business actors in other sectors. NGOs have channeled their power through states, consumers, and financial institutions; this has allowed them to augment discursive power over their targets with additional indirect, yet more immediate, forms of structural and instrumental power. As a consequence of both direct and indirect NGO pressure, financial institutions have adopted environmental policies. This article posits a theoretical explanation of the underspecified power relationships in NGO strategies that allow NGOs to exploit weak links in commodity chains for their campaigns.

This paper argues that financial institutions wield considerable structural power through their ability to control access to finance. It is particularly this power base which has made them prime targets for NGOs campaigning for the greening of infrastructure development projects. As a consequence of NGO pressure, financial institutions have adopted environmental policies which in turn have provided the World Bank and Equator banks with additional sources of discursive power.

Recent work suggests that the most fruitful approach to accounting for variations in interest system diversity of any type lies in understanding variations in interest system density (Lowery, Gray and Fellowes 2005). We build on this insight by examining the sources of variation in the substantive diversity of health interests in the American states, focusing on how the densities of several sub-guilds of health interest organizations vary in their responses to changes in the sizes of the constituencies that give rise to them and variations in the policy and political energy supporting their mobilization. We discuss the concept of interest system diversity in the first section of the paper, highlighting its multiple meanings and the limits of prior research. This is followed by a close empirical examination of 14 sub-guilds of state health interest organizations. We conclude by discussing the inherent difficulties of understanding interest system diversity.

This paper applies the insights of obsolescing bargaining theory to a situation in which a host country interacted with both multinational corporations and an international organization, the World Bank. Drawing on resource curse literature and the Rubinstein bargaining model, we demonstrate the continued usefulness of obsolescing bargaining theory by explaining why the World Bank had to renegotiate its initial bargain with Chad in the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project. The paper explores how specific bargaining parameters changed over time in this case and suggests how resource curse dynamics and their impact on domestic politics might be particularly relevant for bargaining between host countries and international actors. The case study serves as a warning to international financial institutions and corporations alike with regard to the ways in which obsolescing bargains can arise in the contemporary global political-economy.

This investigation of accounting standard setting as a case of business power in global governance links together three facets of power. First we examine the discursive power of international accounting standards in the ongoing process of financialization, which we break into two dynamics centered on profit and control. We argue that the selection of accounting paradigms does not concern measurement accuracy but is rather a choice of perspectives between finance and production when presenting economic reality as numbers. Drawing on evidence from the contestation between Rhenish capitalism and the financial perspective, we then explain why, despite the overwhelming structural power of finance, instrumental power exercised in political lobbying over accounting standards can still have considerable success.

Both policymakers and scholars have expressed concern that trade has increased inequality in advanced industrialized countries (AICs). We argue that the impact of trade on inequality depends on the availability of public goods, such as educational opportunities, that allow displaced workers to upgrade their skills and adjust to trade. The provision of public goods, in turn, depends on political institutions: institutions that unify budgetary powers promote public-good spending while institutions that separate budgetary powers discourage it. Trade should thus increase inequality more (reduce inequality less) in countries with a high separation of budgetary powers. We test and find support for these hypotheses with a cross-sectional time-series analysis of fourteen AICs. Our results imply that trade can improve aggregate welfare without worsening economic inequities, but only if governments adopt complementary policies that facilitate human capital formation and labor-market adjustment.

In this paper we analyze the distribution of pay and changing trends of inequality in Argentina and Brazil, illuminating the specific winners and losers, by region and by economic activity (sector). In both countries we find that inequality rose in the neoliberal period, but that it declined following the severe crises of neoliberal policy, in 1993 in Brazil and in late 2001 in Argentina. This period of post-neoliberalism is characterized in both countries by a decline in the economic weight of the financial sector and a recovery of the position of the civil service. In both countries, the rise in inequality leading to the crisis produced an increase in the relative position of the major metropolitan centers; this positional advantage also declined modestly in the post-crisis recovery period.

Research on conflict in resource-rich countries suggests that resource extraction companies contribute to tension but not development. In recent times, public-private partnerships (PPPs) have flourished, in which set up regulation is not against business but in joint cooperation with corporate actors. Yet PPPs are criticized for serving business self-interest and increasing business power rather than the common good. The paper takes the Kimberley Process and the diamond industry as an example to examine the multi-faceted nature of business power when this PPP was negotiated. The core of the argument is that realist-informed perspectives about business power in PPPs and constructivist accounts emphasizing socialization and social learning processes only tell one part of the story. While demonstrating that the diamond industry acted as a both a socializing and socialized agent, the analysis of the different facets of power shows that structural and discursive power were crucial elements in making socialization happen in the first place.

A prominent variant of the compensation hypothesis rests on the premise that increased trade exposure heightens domestic economic volatility, prompting demands for compensation via generous systems of transfers and services. Economic theory suggests that because the expansion of international trade entails integration into larger, deeper, more stable markets, and may entail risk diversification, it may actually promote rather than reduce stability. By the same token, however, economic theory also suggests that smaller economies should experience greater levels of volatility than larger economies, and thus also greater levels of insecurity. The evidence presented here suggests that the level of domestic economic volatility in the developed economies, during the latter half of the twentieth century, may indeed have been driven by the size and depth of markets. And critically, for these countries international trade integration may have eased rather than accentuated domestic economic volatility.

The concluding article to the special issue critically reflects on arguments and analysis presented in the preceding articles. It argues that globalisation, new forms of private authority and the increased power of transnational business have not generally weakened the state, but rather advanced a business-oriented transformation of statehood. To understand this transformation the article first provides a very short overview of the state-globalisation debate. Subsequently, it deals more explicitly with the state theoretical debate. In particular, it brings together neo-Marxist and post-Weberian conceptualisations in order to address both the social nature of the state and the particular forms and processes by which it is interactively embedded in the economy and society. After an outline of the transformation of statehood and the strategic options for non-state actors, the article concludes with some critical remarks on the future of democratic politics.

Jiangsu and Zhejiang are of two of China's most prosperous and dynamic provinces. This paper first presents a factual account of two empirical phenomena: 1) FDI has played a more substantial role in the economic development of Jiangsu than in Zhejiang, and 2) ownership biases against domestic private firms in Jiangsu were more substantial than in Zhejiang. The paper hypothesizes that there is a connection between these two empirical phenomena. Specifically, ownership biases against domestic private firms increase preferences for FDI because FDI provides a measure of relative property rights security. Thus a biased domestic private firm has an incentive to move its assets and/or future growth opportunities to the foreign sector. The paper uses two private-sector surveys—one conducted in 1993 and the other in 2002—to provide an empirical test of this hypothesis. Our analysis shows, controlling for a variety of firm-level attributes and industry and regional characteristics, those private firms which perceive ownership biases to be more severe are more likely to form joint ventures with foreign firms.

By analyzing the interaction between a business firm and multiple government institutions (including a regulatory agency, an executive and a bicameral legislature), we develop predictions about how firms target their political strategies at different branches of government when seeking more favorable public policies. The core of our argument is that firms will target their resources at the institution that is ‘pivotal’ in the policy-making process. We develop a simple framework, drawing on the political science literature, which identifies pivotal institutions in different types of political environments. We find empirical support for our thesis in an analysis of how U.S. accounting firms shifted their political campaign contributions between the House and Senate in response to the threat of new regulations governing auditor independence during the 1990s.

The introduction to the special issue develops a systematic and theoretically grounded framework for assessing business power in global governance. It is shown that power is said to have shifted from the world of states to the world of business. However, in order to evaluate such a claim first a differentiation of power in its instrumental, structural, and discursive facets is necessary. It is furthermore explained that the strength of such a three-dimensional assessment is that it combines different levels of analysis and considers actor-specific and structural dimensions and their material and ideational sources. Following a short introduction to the more empirical articles is provided summarizing their commonalities and differences.