The form of state bailouts of banks can vary widely. Some are highly interventionist, expanding state control and pushing losses onto private actors, while others insulate private actors from losses. This paper demonstrates that the nature of national financial systems is a key determinant of the form of state intervention, through a statistical analysis of state responses to financial crises in the upper middle-income and upper-income states from 1974 to 2009. States that rely on private banks for most capital needs generally adopt more generous terms than states where capital markets play a significant role. These effects are both statistically significant and large. States with capital market-based financial systems are one and a half times more likely to nationalize banks and over twice as likely to recover state bailout funds. Moreover, other seemingly important variables, such as party ideology, do not produce significant effects.

This study researches how the arbitrariness and pervasiveness of corruption affect the decision-making process and subsequent operations of firms investing in highly corrupt host locations. The results of the analysis demonstrate that firms headquartered in countries where corruption is high have an advantage when operating in a foreign country with a similar institutional environment. The reason for this advantage is that these firms possess knowledge of how to cope with the arbitrary and pervasive dimensions of corruption. Firms from countries with lower corruption levels than the host country, however, are more affected by corruption in a highly corrupt host country. Finally, though this study finds evidence that all firms operating in a highly corrupt country might participate in corrupt deals, those headquartered in highly corrupt countries are more likely to be willing to do so. This claim is based on 12 in-depth interviews with managers with FDI allocation responsibilities of firms operating in a highly corrupt host country. The results show that firms from less corrupt countries face stronger pressures from their headquarters to not engage in corrupt deals, whereas firms from more corrupt countries do not encounter such pressures.

This article examines the “technology, information, and news corporations” (TINCs), a group of under-studied non-state actors to enhance understanding of the interplay between forms of private authority in times of crisis. Three interrelated arguments regarding the shifting private authority of leading UK- and US-based TINCs are presented. First, contributions to the period of economic instability that began in 2007 have destabilized the long-standing authority of Anglo-American firms including Bloomberg, Dow Jones, and Thomson Reuters. Second, through their involvement in two overtly normative niches of global finance, environmental and Islamic finance, these private actors have responded to contestations of their authority with an enhanced stress on moral authority since 2007. Third, a mere tinkering around with pre-crisis technical knowledge and a persistent reliance on liberal market values is likely to perpetuate rather than resolve the unstable authority of the leading TINCs. Based on an original analysis of primary documents and interviews undertaken with industry participants, this article contributes to existing literature analyzing the changing nature of private authority by revealing limits to shifts and combinations between its moral and technical forms.

Since the enactment of economic liberalization in India in the early 1990s, variation in investment climate and labor market reforms across sub-national states has been linked to the increasing relevance of business in policy making. This article argues that the influence of business on policy is conditioned by wider political dynamics. We argue that the reform orientation of states correspond to the position of business classes and caste-based groups within the support base of political parties. We show that caste identification plays an important role on the position of political parties towards business liberalization policies. Thus, we conclude that the relative power of business across the states appears to vary due to the relation between business and government, which in turn is structured by the salience of business castes as an electorally relevant group.