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The Effects of Interest Groups' Ideology on Their PAC and Lobbying Expenditures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Amy McKay
Amy McKay*
Affiliation:
Georgia State University
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Abstract

While the literature on political action committees' (PACs) contributions to congressional campaigns is substantial, one key variable has been missing: the ideology of the PAC. Such a measure is needed to evaluate a normatively important yet unanswered question: to what extent do PACs give to candidates with whom they agree ideologically, as opposed to candidates they may want to influence after the election? This study shows that many interest groups' preferences for an electoral strategy or an access strategy can be predicted by their left-right ideology and their level of ideological extremism. The analysis finds that more ideologically extreme groups and more liberal groups spend more money on PAC contributions relative to lobbying. Further, groups' underlying left-right ideology is also highly predictive of their allocation of PAC contributions between the two parties—even controlling for group type.

Keywords

interest groupsPACslobbyingpolitical spendingideology
Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , August 2010 , pp. 1 - 21
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2010 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

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