Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T23:10:40.143Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Ad hoc coalitions in the U.S. energy sector: Case studies in the gas, oil, and coal industries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 September 2018

Christian Downie Open the ORCID record for Christian Downie [Opens in a new window]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In the field of business and politics, research on the role of business actors in individual fossil fuel industries that contribute to climate change has been sparse. At the same time theorising the role of ad hoc coalitions has been limited even though they appear to be an important vehicle for business actors seeking to shape contemporary policy contests. This paper attempts to address these understudied areas by drawing on a rich empirical dataset to examine the role of three ad hoc coalitions in the U.S. energy sector. In doing so, it builds on the existing literature to establish a theoretical basis for identifying the defining elements of ad hoc coalitions and the conditions under which business actors decide to establish them. Further, it sheds light on how business actors use ad hoc coalitions in three key fossil fuel industries—gas, oil, and coal—to shape policy outcomes, and in turn shape the path to a clean energy transition.

Keywords

ad hoc coalitionsbusiness actorsUnited Statesenergyclimate
Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 20 , Special Issue 4: Clean energy transitions in a global economy , December 2018 , pp. 643 - 668
Copyright
Copyright © V.K. Aggarwal 2018 and published under exclusive license to Cambridge University Press 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

Acknowledgements: Thank you to the editors and three anonymous reviewers for their very thoughtful comments on the paper. I would also like to acknowledge feedback from colleagues at the International Studies Association Annual Conference 2018 and I am grateful to the participants who agreed to be interviewed for this project. Alexis Farr provided helpful research assistance.

References

AFPM. 2013. Letter to U.S. Department of Energy Re: 2012 LNG Export Study. American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers. (Accessed on 30 August 2018) https://fossil.energy.gov/ng_regulation/sites/default/files/programs/gasregulation/authorizations/export_study/drevna.pdf.Google Scholar
AFPM. 2014. “The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975: Are We Positioning America for Success in Era of Energy Abundance?” Submission to the Energy and Power Subcommittee Hearing, American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers. (Accessed on 30 August 2018) http://www.afpm.org/uploadedfiles/Content/News/News_Releases/Attachments/AFPM-Letter to-House-EC on-Crude-Exports.pdf.Google Scholar
ALEC. 2015. “Act requiring approval of state plan implement EPA's carbon guidelines.” American Legislative Exchange Council.Google Scholar
Barley, Stephen R. 2010. “Building an Institutional Field to Corral a Government: A Case to Set an Agenda for Organization Studies.” Organization Studies 31 (6): 777–805.Google Scholar
Baumgartner, Frank R., Berry, Jeffrey M., Hojnacki, Marie, Kimball, David, and Leech, Beth. 2009. Lobbying and Policy Change: Who win, who loses, and why. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Berry, Jeffrey M. 1984. The Interest Group Society. Boston: Little Brown.Google Scholar
Berry, Jeffrey M. 2002. “Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing.” PS: Political Science and Politics 35 (6): 679–82.Google Scholar
Betsill, Michele, and Bulkeley, Harriet. 2004. “Transnational Networks and Global Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program.” International Studies Quarterly 48 (2): 471–93.Google Scholar
Boddewyn, Jean J., and Brewer, Thomas L.. 1994. “International-Business Political Behavior: New Theoretical Directions.” The Academy of Management Review 19 (1): 119–43.Google Scholar
Bombardini, Matilde, and Trebbi, Francesco. 2012. “Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy?” Journal of International Economics 87 (1): 18–26.Google Scholar
Burris, Scott, Drahos, Peter, and Shearing, Clifford. 2005. “Nodal Governance.” Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 30: 30–58.Google Scholar
Castells, Manuel. 2000. “Materials for an exploratory theory of the network society.” The British Journal of Sociology 51 (1): 5–24.Google Scholar
Dempsey, Linda. 2013. “Banning LNG Exports Will Hurt Jobs and Economy National Association of Manufacturers.” (Accessed on 30 August 2018) http://www.shopfloor.org/2013/01/banning-lng-exports-will-hurt-jobs-and-economy/27328/.Google Scholar
Dow Chemical Company. 2013. “Statement for the Record to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Hearing on Opportunities and Challenges for Natural Gas.” http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=100c46f6-fac8-4b9f-85cf-bd5c6683992eGoogle Scholar
Downie, Christian. 2017. “Fighting for King Coal's Crown: Business Actors in the US Coal and Utility Industries.” Global Environmental Politics 17 (1): 21–39.Google Scholar
Ebinger, Charles K., and Avasarala, Govindra. 2013. “The case for U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Exports.” Brookings Institute.Google Scholar
EEI. 2014. “Stock Perfomance: Q4 2014 Financial Update. Quarterly Report of the U.S. Shareholder-Owned Electric Utility Industry.” Edison Electric Institute.Google Scholar
EIA. 2011. “Global Natural Gas Prices Vary Considerably.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Energy Information Administration. (Accessed 25 August 2016) https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?Id=3310.Google Scholar
EIA. 2015. “Annual Coal Report 2013.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Energy Information Administration.Google Scholar
EIA. 2016. “Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Energy Information Administration. (Accessed 25 August 2016) https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm.Google Scholar
EIA. 2017. “International Energy Statistics” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Energy Information Administration. (Accessed 20 June 2018) https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/.Google Scholar
EPA. 2015. “Clean Power Plan Final Rule.” Washington, D.C.: Environmental Protection Agency, 3 August.Google Scholar
Figueiredo, John M., and Tiller, Emerson H.. 2001. “The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission.” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 10 (1): 91–122.Google Scholar
Figueiredo, John M., and Richter, Brian Kelleher. 2014. “Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying.” Annual Review of Political Science 17 (1): 163–85.Google Scholar
GAO. 2014. “Changing crude oil markets: Allowing exports could reduce consumer fuel prices, and the size of the strategic reserves should be reexamined.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office.Google Scholar
Gerard, Jack. 2014. “Jack Gerard delivers State of American Energy address.” American Petroleum Institute. (Accessed on 10 January 2015) http://www.api.org/news-and-media/testimony-speeches/2014/jack-gerard-delivers-soae-address.Google Scholar
Gray, V., and Lowery, D.. 1998. “To lobby alone or in a flock – foraging behavior amongst organized interests” American Politics Quarterly 26: 5–34.Google Scholar
Hajer, Maarten. 1993. “Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalisation of Practice.” In The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, edited by Fischer, Frank and John, F. Foreseter. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.Google Scholar
Hansen, Wendy L., Mitchell, Neil J., and Drope, Jeffrey M.. 2005. “The Logic of Private and Collective Action.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (1): 150–67.Google Scholar
Hart, David M. 2004. “‘Business’ Is Not an Interest Group: On the Study of Companies in American National Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 7 (1): 47–69.Google Scholar
Heede, Richard. 2014. “Tracing anthropogenic carbon dioxide and methane emissions to fossil fuel and cement producers, 1854–2010.” Climatic Change 122 (1): 229–41.Google Scholar
Hervé, Adrienne. 2014. “Roles of brokerage networks in transnational advocacy networks.” Environmental Politics 23 (3): 395–416.Google Scholar
Hillman, Amy, and Hitt, M.. 1999. “Corporate political strategy formulation: A model of approach, participation and strategy decisions.” Academy of Management Review 24 (6): 825–42.Google Scholar
Hillman, Amy, Keim, Gerald D., and Schuler, Douglas. 2004. “Corporate Political Activity: A Review and Research Agenda.” Journal of Management 30: 837–57.Google Scholar
Kauffman, Craig. 2017. “Grassroots Global Governance: Local watershed management experiments and the evolution of sustainable development.” Oxford Scholarship Online. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Keck, Margaret, and Sikkink, Kathryn. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Keohane, Nathaniel, Revesz, Richard, and Stavins, Robert. 1998. “The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy.” Harvard Environmental Law Review 22 (2): 313–67.Google Scholar
Khan, Faisel. 2013. Testimony to U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources by Faisel Khan, Managing Director, Citi Research.Google Scholar
Kim, Sung E., Urpelainen, Johannes, and Yang, Joonseok. 2016. “Electric utilities and American climate policy: lobbying by expected winners and losers.” Journal of Public Policy 36 (2): 251–75.Google Scholar
Klesse, William R. 2013. Testimony of William R. Klesse, Chairman of the Board and CEO, Valero Energy Corporation before the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.Google Scholar
Levy, David, and Kolk, Ans. 2002. “Strategic Responses to Global Climate Change: Conflicting Pressures on Multinationals in the Oil Industry.” Business and Politics 4 (3): 275–300.Google Scholar
Mahoney, Christine. 2007. “Networking vs. Allying: the decision of interest groups to join coalitions in the US and the EU.” Journal of European Public Policy 14 (3): 366–83.Google Scholar
Martin, Cathie J. and Swank, Duane. 2012. The Political Construction of Business Interests: Coordination, Growth, and Equality. Cambridge, United Kingodm: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Meckling, Jonas. 2011. Carbon Coalitions: Business, Climate Politics, and the Rise of Emissions Trading. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Newell, Peter, and Paterson, Matthew. 1998. “A climate for business: global warming, the state and capital.” Review of International Political Economy 5 (4): 679–703.Google Scholar
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
PBEF. 2015. “Reliable and Affordable Energy.” Partner for a Better Energy Future. (Accessed 7 September 2015) http://www.betterenergyfuture.org/.Google Scholar
Pijnenburg, Bert. 1998. “EU lobbying by ad hoc coalitions: an exploratory case study.” Journal of European Public Policy 5 (2): 303–21.Google Scholar
Sabatier, Peter. 1988. “An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein.” Policy Sciences 21 (2–3): 129–68.Google Scholar
Sampson, Anthony. 1975. The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped. New York: Viking Press.Google Scholar
Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1960. The Semisoveriegn People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.Google Scholar
Shaffer, Brian. 1995. “Firm-level responses to government regulation: Theoretical and research approaches.” Journal of Management 21 (3): 495–514.Google Scholar
Shell. 2015. “Annual Report 2015: Selected Financial Data.” (Accessed 25 August 2016) http://reports.shell.com/annual-report/2015/strategic-report/selected-financial-data.php.Google Scholar
Skjaerseth, Jon B., and Skodovin, Tara. 2003. Climate Change and the Oil Industry: Common problem, varying strategies. Manchester, United Kingdom: Manchester University Press.Google Scholar
Smith, Mark. 2000. American Business and Political Power: Public opinion, elections and democracy. Chicago: Chicago University Press.Google Scholar
Stigler, George. 1975. The Theory of Economic Regulation: Citizen and the State. Chicago, IL: University Chicago Press.Google Scholar
The White House. 2013. “Presidential Memorandum: Power sector carbon pollution standards.” Washington D.C.: Office fo the Press Secretary.Google Scholar
USCC. 2013. “State of American Business, Remarks by Thomas J. Donohue President and CEO, U.S. Chamber of Commerce.” (Accessed 25 August 2016) https://www.uschamber.com/speech/state-american-business-remarks-thomas-j-donohue-president-and-ceo-us-chamber-commerce.Google Scholar
Vogel, David. 1989. Fluctuating Fortunes. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Warmann, Jeffrey. 2015. “Testimony of Jeffrey Warmann, CEO Munroe Energy Inc, on behalf of the CRUDE coalition to the U.S. Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Crude Export Policy Hearing.”Google Scholar
Witter, David. 2015a. “IBIS World Industry Report 21111: Oil drilling and gas extraction in the US.” Melbourne: IBIS World.Google Scholar
Witter, David. 2015b. “IBIS World Industry Report 32411: Petroleum refining in the US.” Melbourne: IBIS World.Google Scholar
Woll, Cornelia. 2008. Firm Interests: How governments shape business lobbying on global trade. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar