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The UNGPs in the European Union: The Open Coordination of Business and Human Rights?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 February 2018

Daniel AUGENSTEIN ,
Mark DAWSON  and
Pierre THIELBÖRGER
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Abstract

The article examines the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in the European Union via National Action Plans (NAPs). We argue that some of the shortcomings currently observed in the implementation process could effectively be addressed through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) – a governance instrument already used by the European Union (EU) in other policy domains. The article sketches out the polycentric global governance approach envisaged by the UNGPs and discusses the institutional and policy background of their implementation in the EU. It provides an assessment of EU member states’ NAPs on business and human rights, as benchmarked against international NAP guidance, before relating experiences with the existing NAP process to the policy background and rationale of the OMC and considering the conditions for employing the OMC in the business and human rights domain. Building on a recent opinion of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, the article concludes with a concrete proposal for developing an OMC on business and human rights in the EU.

Keywords

business and human rightsEuropean UnionNational Action Planopen method of coordinationUN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
Type
Scholarly Article
Information
Business and Human Rights Journal , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , January 2018 , pp. 1 - 22
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 

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Footnotes

*

Associate Professor, Department of European and International Public Law, Tilburg Law School. Email: [email protected]

**

Professor of European Law and Governance, Hertie School of Governance. Email: [email protected]

***

Professor for German Public Law and International Law, Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict and Law Faculty, Ruhr University Bochum. Email: [email protected].

References

1 Council of the EU, ‘Council Conclusions on Business and Human Rights’, 3477th meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council, 10254/16 (20 June 2016).

2 Human Rights Council, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations’ “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011).

3 For a more detailed account of the evolution of the UNGPs, see Thielbörger, Pierre and Ackermann, Tobias, ‘A Treaty on Enforcing Human Rights Against Business: Closing the Loophole or Getting Stuck in a Loop?’ (2017) 24:1 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 43, 46–53 Google Scholar.

4 Human Rights Council, ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Entities’, A/HRC/RES/17/4 (6 July 2011).

5 UN Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Working Group on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises’, A/69/263 (6 August 2014).

6 See Council of the EU, note 1, para 6.

7 Ibid, para 5. A peer review process was already established to promote the development of NAPs on CSR, which led to the publication of a CSR Compendium in 2014, see European Commission, Corporate Social Responsibility: National Public Policies in the European Union: Compendium 2014 (Luxembourg: EU, 2014)Google Scholar. The European Commission has furthermore organized pilot peer reviews on business and human rights in seven EU member states. The reports are available at the European Commission’s webpage, see http://ec.europa.eu/social/keyDocuments.jsp?advSearchKey=CSRprreport&mode=advancedSubmit&langId=en&policyArea=&type=0&country=0&year=0 (accessed 13 April 2017).

8 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A renewed EU strategy 2011–14 for Corporate Social Responsibility’, COM(2011) 681 final (25 October 2011).

9 Council of the EU, ‘EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy’, 11855/12 (25 June 2012); Council of the EU, ‘Council Conclusions on the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015–2019’, 10897/15 (20 July 2015).

10 UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights (UNWG), ‘Guidance on National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights’ (December 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/UNWG_%20NAPGuidance.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017); revised versions of the Guidance were published in November 2015 and November 2016.

11 Within the EU, Scotland will develop its own NAP. Of the European countries without EU membership, Norway published its NAP in 2015 and Switzerland in December 2016. For a global overview, see Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, ‘National Action Plans’, https://business-humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles/implementation-tools-examples/implementation-by-governments/by-type-of-initiative/national-action-plans (accessed 13 April 2017).

12 See European Commission, note 7.

13 EU Fundamental Rights Agency, ‘Improving Access to Remedy in the Area of Business and Human Rights at the EU Level’, FRA Opinion 1/2017 (10 April 2017).

14 Ibid, 66–7.

15 See UNWG, note 10.

16 Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) and International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR), ‘National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights: A Toolkit for the Development, Implementation, and Review of State Commitments to Business and Human Rights Frameworks’ (June 2014), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/583f3fca725e25fcd45aa446/t/5865d59fe6f2e17f4f0cb629/1483068841826/DIHR-ICAR-National-Action-Plans-NAPs-Report3.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017).

17 UNWG, note 10, 3–5.

18 Ibid, 5–6; DIHR and ICAR, note 14, 41–2.

19 UNWG, note 10, 7–8; DIHR and ICAR, note 14, 43–4.

20 UNWG, note 10, 9; DIHR and ICAR, note 14, 44–5.

21 UNWG, note 10, 13.

22 DIHR and ICAR, note 14, 45.

23 Ibid, 46.

24 UNWG, note 10, 9–10; DIHR and ICAR, note 14, 47.

25 UNWG, note 10, 10; DIHR and ICAR, note 14, 49.

26 ICAR and European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ), ‘Assessments of Existing National Action Plans (NAPs) on Business and Human Rights’ (November 2015), 3–5, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/583f3fca725e25fcd45aa446/t/58d2bdb63a0411eedc66af79/1490206143625/ICAR-ECCJ-Assessments-of-Existing-NAPs-2015-Update.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017).

27 European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI), ‘Recommendations for the next EU Strategy on CSR’ (April 2015), 2, https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/EU%20CSR%20Communication%20ENNHRI%20Final%20Apr%202015%20(2).pdf (accessed 13 April 2017).

28 Ibid, 2–3. In a similar vein, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has called upon states to ‘share plans on the national implementation of the [UNGPs], including revised National Action Plans and best practice concerning [their] development … ’; see Council of Europe, ‘Recommendation on human rights and business’, CM/Rec(2016)3 (2 March 2016), para 4.

29 European Parliament, ‘Study: Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (2017), 39–42, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578031/EXPO_STU(2017)578031_EN.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017).

30 According to the ICAR/ECCJ Guidance, SMART actions are those that are ‘specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-specific’. ICAR and ECCJ, note 26, 46.

31 The UNWG recommends that in developing NAPs, ‘Governments should adopt an evidence-based approach, gathering data and assessing what may be required to align existing laws, regulation and policies with the Guiding Principles’. In particular, governments should consider ‘attaching clear objectives, time frames and indicators to guide the implementation of the various measures.’ UN General Assembly, ‘Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises: Note by the Secretary-General’, A/69/263 (5 August 2014), paras 20, 73.

32 German Government, ‘Nationaler Aktionsplan: Umsetzung der VN-Leitprinzipien für Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte 2016-2020‘ (21 December 2016), 12, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/754690/publicationFile/222786/161221-NAP-DL.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017).

33 Ibid. While observers have welcomed this target, critique has been voiced concerning the unassertive nature of the government’s response should the target be missed, rendering the benchmark a toothless tiger; see Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, ‘Stellungnahme: “Zögerliche Umsetzung”: Der politische Wille reicht nicht weiter: Deutschland setzt die VN-Leitprinzipien um – mit kleinen Schritten’ (21 December 2016), http://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Publikationen/Stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme_Verabschiedung_NAP_Wirtschaft_und_Menschenrechte.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017) .

34 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights’ (April 2014), https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/publicaties/2014/01/30/national-action-plan-on-business-and-human-rights (accessed 13 April 2017); Danish Government, ‘Danish National Action Plan: Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (March 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/NationalPlans/Denmark_NationalPlanBHR.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017); Italian Government, ‘Italian National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights 2016-2021’ (1 December 2016), http://www.cidu.esteri.it/resource/2016/07/48254_f_NAPBHRENGOpenConsultation.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017).

35 ‘The Netherlands pursues an active policy of encouraging social reporting through the transparency benchmark. This benchmark is carried out every year on the instructions of the Ministry of Economic Affairs to give the 500 largest Dutch companies a rating for transparency on sustainability and CSR.’ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, note 34, 29.

36 Government Offices of Sweden, ‘Action Plan for Business and Human Rights’ (August 2015), 17, http://www.government.se/4a84f5/contentassets/822dc47952124734b60daf1865e39343/action-plan-for-business-and-human-rights.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017).

37 Government of the Republic of Lithuania, ‘Lithuania’s Action Plan on the Implementation of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (March 2015), 7, https://www.urm.lt/uploads/default/documents/uzienio_politika/zmogaus_teises/zmogaus_teises_EN/14_EN.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017).

38 Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy, ‘National Action Plan for the Implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (October 2014), 29, https://tem.fi/documents/1410877/3437254/National+Action+Plan+for+the+implementation+of+the+UN+guiding+principles+21102014.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017).

39 Ibid, 26.

40 See German Government, note 32, 9–11, 30.

41 Dylan Tromp, ‘Assessing Business Related Impacts on Human Rights: Indicators and Benchmark in Standards and Practice’, INEF-Report 110/2016 (December 2016), https://inef.uni-due.de/?article_id=48&clang=2&pub_id=1735 (accessed 16 November 2017).

42 The Dutch government has recently published a comparative study on duties of care of Dutch business enterprises with respect to international CSR; see Liesbeth Enneking et al, ‘Zorgplichten van Nederlands ondernemingen insake internationaal maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen’ (December 2015), https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2016/04/21/zorgplichten-van-nederlandse-ondernemingen-inzake-internationaal-maatschappelijk-verantwoord-ondernemen (accessed 13 April 2017).

43 See EU Fundamental Rights Agency, note 13, 65.

44 See Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy, note 38, 32.

45 See Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, note 34, 22.

46 See German Government, note 32, 33, 40–1 (‘interministerieller Ausschuss’).

47 Ibid, 40.

48 Corporate Accountability (CorA), Forum Menschenrechte and Verband Entwicklungspolitik und Humanitäre Hilfe (VENRO), ‘No Courage to Commit: Comments of German non-governmental organisations on the German government’s National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights’ (6 February 2017), 14–15.

49 See Italian Government, note 34, 29.

50 Ibid.

51 Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, ‘Advice: Response to the National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights “Knowing and Showing”’ (February 2014), 13, https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/netherlands-nhri-re-national-action-plan.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017).

52 See Government Offices of Sweden, note 36, 19.

53 The German NAP merely envisages a ‘status report’ in preparation of a future review of the NAP. German Government, note 32, 41.

54 UK Government, ‘Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Updated May 2016’ (May 2016), 2, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/522805/Good_Business_Implementing_the_UN_Guiding_Principles_on_Business_and_Human_Rights_updated_May_2016.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017).

55 See UK Parliament, ‘Human Rights and Business Inquiry’, http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/human-rights-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/inquiry/ (accessed 13 April 2017).

56 See UK Government, note 54, 24.

57 See UNWG, note 10, 9–10.

58 See ICAR and ECCJ, note 26, 4.

59 See Danish Government, note 34, 17–18.

60 See ICAR and ECCJ, note 26, 4.

61 See Human Rights Council, ‘Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse’, A/HRC/32/19 (10 May 2016), para 5. See further Gwynne Skinner, Robert McCorquodale and Olivier De Schutter, ‘The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business (December 2013), https://icar.squarespace.com/s/The-Third-Pillar-FINAL1.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017); EU Fundamental Rights Agency, note 13.

62 John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Regulating Multinationals: The UN Guiding Principles, Civil Society, and International Legalization’, Harvard Kennedy School, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, Regulatory Policy Program Working Paper RPP-2015-04 (2015), 4, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/RPP_2015_04_Ruggie.pdf (accessed 16 November 2017).

63 See Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, note 34, 28, 41. Considering access to justice, the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights has urged the Dutch government ‘to remove the procedural inequality between victims of human rights violations and companies who violate human rights.’ Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, note 51, 2.

64 Neglia, Maddalena, ‘The UNGPs – Five Years On: From Consensus to Divergence in Public Regulation on Business and Human Rights’ (2016) 34:4 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 289 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

65 See Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, note 33, 10.

66 Jutta Knopf et al, ‘Unternehmensverantwortung für Menschenrechte: Ableitung von Handlungsempfehlungen auf der Basis von Experteninterviews und internationalen Fallstudien’ (Februar 2013), https://www.adelphi.de/de/publikation/unternehmensverantwortung-f%C3%BCr-menschenrechte (accessed 13 April 2017).

67 See European Parliament, note 29, 41.

68 Several NGOs have expressed concerns that while having been involved in the early development of the NAP, they were largely excluded from the drafting process over the last months prior to its release; see CorA, Forum Menschenrechte and VENRO, note 48, 4; ‘Aktionsplan für Menschenrechte: “Ein Weckruf auch für die deutsche Wirtschaft”’, Deutschlandfunk (21 December 2016), http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/aktionsplan-fuer-menschenrechte-ein-weckruf-auch-fuer-die.694.de.html?dram:article_id=374462 (accessed 13 April 2017).

69 See Christin Gottler and Andreas Maus, ‘Lobbyismus auf Regierungsebene: Profit statt Menschenrechte’, Monitor (8 September 2016), http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/sendungen/lobbyismus-104.html (accessed 13 April 2017).

70 See German Government, note 32. The German Institute for Human Rights described the final NAP as evincing ‘a lack of political will to advance the UNGPs.’ Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, note 33.

71 On the history of the OMC, see Dawson, Mark, New Governance and the Transformation of European Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 24–68 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On its more recent evolution, see Barcevičius, Egidijus, Weishaupt, J Timo and Zeitlin, Jonathan, ‘Tracing the Social OMC from its Origins to Europe 2020’, in Egidijus Barcevičius, J Timo Weishaupt and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds), Assessing the Open Method of Coordination: Institutional Design and National Influence of EU Social Policy Coordination (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014) 16 Google Scholar.

72 European Council, ‘Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000: Presidency Conclusions’ (2000), para 37, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm (accessed 13 April 2017).

73 See Scharpf, Fritz W, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’ (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 4 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

74 Ibid.

75 See the limits on social policy measures contained in Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012 OJ C 326/47 (adopted on 13 December 2007, entered into force on 1 December 2009), art 153.

76 Zeitlin, Jonathan, ‘Social Europe and Experimentalist Governance: Towards a New Constitutional Compromise?’ in Gráinne de Búrca (ed), EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 213 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; de Búrca, Gráinne, ‘The Constitutional Challenge of New Governance in the European Union’ (2003) 28 European Law Review 6 Google Scholar.

77 Scharpf, Fritz W, ‘Legitimate Diversity: The New Challenge of European Integration’ in Tanja A Borzel and Rachel A Cichowski (eds), The State of the European Union, Vol. 6: Law, Politics and Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 79 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

78 Sabel, Charles F and Zeitlin, Jonathan, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union’, in Charles F Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist Governance in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 1 Google Scholar; Schutter, Olivier De and Deakin, Simon, ‘Reflexive Governance and the Dilemmas of Social Regulation’ in Olivier De Schutter and Simon Deakin (eds), Social Rights and Market Forces: Is the Open Coordination of Employment and Social Policies the Future of Social Europe? (Brussels: Brulyant, 2005) 3 Google Scholar.

79 Human Rights Council, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’, A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) para 3.

80 An early failed attempt in this regard were the 2003 UN Draft Norms that proposed to directly impose international human rights obligations on corporations; see UN Economic and Social Council, ‘Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12 (26 August 2003). In 2014, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution establishing a working group tasked with drafting an international human rights and business treaty; Human Rights Council, ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’, A/HRC/RES/26/9 (14 July 2014).

81 See UNWG, note 10, 4.

82 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this observation.

83 See, e.g., Eckhardt, Martina, ‘The Open Method of Coordination on Pensions: an Economic Analysis of its Effects on Pension Reforms’ (2005) 15 Journal of European Social Policy 247 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lodge, Martin, ‘Comparing Non-Hierarchical Governance in Action: The Open Method of Coordination in Pensions and Information Society’ (2007) 45 Journal of Common Market Studies 2 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Buchs, Milena, New Governance in European Social Policy: The Open Method of Coordination (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan: 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

84 See Wim Kok, Chair of the High Level Group, ‘Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment’ (2004), https://ec.europa.eu/research/evaluations/pdf/archive/fp6-evidence-base/evaluation_studies_and_reports/evaluation_studies_and_reports_2004/the_lisbon_strategy_for_growth_and_employment__report_from_the_high_level_group.pdf (accessed 13 April 2017).

85 The UNWG has highlighted a similar problem with regard to the UNGP NAP process: ‘The experience of ongoing processes points to the challenges in marrying together dedicated leadership and ownership of national action plans through cross-Government cooperation.’ UN General Assembly, note 31, para 13.

86 See ICAR and ECCJ, note 26.

87 On the OMC’s national effects, see Dawson, note 71, 164–234; Heidenreich, Martin and Zeitlin, Jonathan, Changing European Employment and Welfare Regimes: The Influence of the OMC on National Reforms (London: Routledge, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

88 Heidenreich and Zeitlin, ibid, at 221.

89 See, e.g., the importance of evidence based tools in the 2008 re-launch of the Social Protection and Inclusion OMC. Commission Communication, ‘A Renewed Commitment to Social Europe: Re-enforcing the Open Method of Coordination for Social Protectiona and Social Inclusion’, COM (2008) 418 final.

90 This is a key rationale behind the coordination of national budgets in the European semester – significant economic imbalances could de-stabilize the Eurozone, putting pressure on the financial stability of others; see the explanations in European Commission, ‘European Semester: A New Architecture for the New EU Economic Governance – Q&A’, MEMO/11/14 (12 January 2011).

91 Visser, Jelle, ‘The OMC as Selective Amplifier for National Strategies for Reform’ in Jonathan Zeitlin and Philippe Pochet (eds), The Open Method of Coordination in Action: The European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2005) 173 Google Scholar; Kroger, Sandra, Soft Governance in Hard Politics: European Coordination of Anti-Poverty Policies in France and Germany (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2008) 44–46 Google Scholar.

92 On learning under the OMC, see Claudio M Radaelli, ‘Europeanization, Policy Learning and New Modes of Governance’ (2008) 10 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 3.

93 European Commission, Social Protection Committee, ‘Social Protection Performance Monitor (SPPM) – Methodological Report by the Indicators Sub-group of the Social Protection Committee’ (17 October 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=9235& (accessed 13 April 2017).

94 Büchs, Milena, ‘How Legitimate is the Open Method of Coordination?’ (2008) 46 Journal of Common Market Studies 4 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kröger, Sandra, ‘The End of Democracy as we know it? The Legitimacy Deficits of Bureaucratic Social Policy Governance’ (2007) 29 Journal of European Integration 5 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

95 See Kok, note 82; Dawson, note 71, 199–206.

96 See, e.g., Government Offices of Sweden, note 36, 27; Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy, note 38, 16–19.

97 See European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document on Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – State of Play’, SWD(2015) 144 final (14 July 2015).

98 See Olivier De Schutter, ‘The Implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights through the Open Method of Coordination’, NYU School of Law, Jean Monnet Working Paper 07/04 (2007) 4, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/04/040701.rtf (accessed 13 April 2017); Smismans, Stijn, ‘How to be Fundamental with Soft Procedures? The OMC and Fundamental Social Rights’, in Gráinne de Búrca and Bruno de Witte (eds), Social Rights in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 217 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

99 On this historical problem see Alston, Philip and Weiler, J H H, ‘An “Ever Closer Union” in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights’, in Philip Alston (ed), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 2, 22–27 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

100 See, e.g., the resistance to (and temporary abolition of) the social inclusion OMC from 2010 to 2012, described in Mary Daly and Paul Copeland, ‘Poverty and Social Policy in Europe 2020: Ungovernable and Ungoverned’ (2014) 42:3 Policy and Politics (2014) 351.

101 See the duty contained in EU accounting directives for the Commission to review national implementation prior to 2018; see Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, OJ L 182/19 (26 June 2013).

102 See European Commission, note 93, 8.

103 This is a long-standing issue in EU human rights law – that regulatory competition between EU member states could lead to a race to the bottom in social or other standards, demanding EU intervention that sets ‘minimum’ baseline rules for inter-state competition; see Simon Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition after Laval’ (2007–8) 10 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 581.

104 On this argument in relation to a broader OMC in fundamental rights, see De Schutter, note 94.

105 A 2013 UK-based peer review of national CSR strategies offers some examples of critical scrutiny by government officials concerning plans of other States; see European Commission, ‘Peer Review Report: Peer Review on Corporate Social Responsibility’ (18 June 2013), ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=11471&langId=en (accessed 13 April 2017).

106 See Dawson, note 71, 192–5; K Jacobsson, ‘Trying to Reform the “Best Pupils in the Class”? The Open Method of Coordination in Sweden and Denmark’, in Zeitlin and Pochet (eds), note 87, 107.

107 This is one of the goals highlighted in the EU’s 2011 CSR strategy, see European Commission, note 8.

108 See European Commission, note 103.

109 See European Commission, note 93, 34.

110 See Brigid Laffan and Colin Shaw, ‘Classifying and Mapping OMC in Different Policy Areas’, NEW-GOV Working Paper (2005) 2.

111 See, e.g., the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) methodology for CSR country-level assessment, see Magdalena Kostulska, ‘UNDP Develops New Measurement Tools for Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2011), https://business.un.org/en/documents/9472 (accessed 13 April 2017). See also Global Reporting Initiative, ‘GRI Standards’, https://www.globalreporting.org/standards (accessed 13 April 2017); International Organization for Standardization, ‘ISO 26000 Social Responsibility’, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm (accessed 13 April 2017).

112 See Thielbörger and Ackermann, note 3.

113 See EU Fundamental Rights Agency, note 13, 24–53.

114 See Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, A/HRC/Res/26/9 (14 July 2014).

115 European Union, Submission to the First Session of the Intergovernmental Working Group (6–10 July 2015), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session1/Pages/Session1.aspx (accessed 13 April 2017).

116 See, e.g., Jacobsson, Kerstin and Vifell, Åsa, ‘Integration by Deliberation? On the Role of Committees in the Open Method of Coordination’, in Erik O Eriksen, Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer (eds), European Governance, Deliberation and the Quest for Democratisation (Oslo: Arena, 2003) 411 Google Scholar.