Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T20:38:40.514Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Improving Human Rights in the Private Security Industry: Envisioning the Role of ICoCA in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 January 2019

Cristina NARVÁEZ GONZÁLEZ  and
Katharine VALENCIA
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The private security industry in Latin America has been associated with human rights abuses, particularly in the context of extractive operations. Most private security guards in the region are poorly trained and do not undergo adequate vetting. These factors combined with serious deficiencies in the rule of law across the region too often enable private security companies to effectively operate outside state control and engage in human rights abusive practices. This article argues that adoption of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC) by Latin American private security companies and states, coupled with civil society engagement with ICoC’s Association, may help reduce negative human rights impacts arising out of private security services within the extractive industry.

Keywords

certificationextractive industryICoCALatin Americaprivate securityprocurement
Type
Scholarly Articles - Special Issue on Business, Human Rights and Security
Information
Business and Human Rights Journal , Volume 4 , Issue 1: Special Issue: Business, Human Rights and Security , January 2019 , pp. 79 - 107
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Visiting Scholar at The University of Iowa College of Law. Email: [email protected]

**

Program Officer at The Due Process of Law Foundation. Email: [email protected]

References

1 Adam Blackwell, ‘The Unregulated and Threatening Growth of Private Security in Latin America and the Caribbean’, Wilson Center (June, 2015), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Private%20Security%20in%20Latin%20America.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018).

2 Sarah Kinosian and James Bosworth, ‘Security for Sale: Challenges and Good Practices in Regulating Private Military and Security Companies in Latin America’ (2018) Inter-American Dialogue. Available at: https://globalinitiative.net/security-for-sale-challenges-and-good-practices-in-regulating-private-military-and-security-companies-in-latin-america/ (accessed 13 December 2018).

3 Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, ‘The Montreux Document: A Mapping Study on Outreach and Implementation’, 5 (2017), http://www.mdforum.ch/pdf/mapping-study.pdf (hereinafter DCAF Mapping Study).

4 See Anna-Catherine Brigida, ‘Guatemala Security: Those Who Can Afford it Buy Protection’, BBC News (21 July 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-36834477 (accessed 30 April 2018).

5 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, 7.

6 Isa, Felipe Gomez and Berraondo, Mikel, Los Derechos Indígenas tras la Declaración: El Desafío de la Implementación, (Bilbao: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Deusto, 2013), 208 Google Scholar .

7 The extractive industry globally is a growth factor of the PSC industry. DCAF Mapping Study, note 3, 8.

8 In the Americas, megaprojects tend to have a particular impact on the rights of rural indigenous communities (including access to traditional and sacred lands, environmental pollution, and availability of food resources), but such communities are often not adequately consulted by the state before project licenses are granted. Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF) and Oxfam, ‘Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consultation and Consent in Latin America’ (9 September 2015), http://www.dplf.org/en/resources/right-free-prior-and-informed-consultation-and-consent-latin-america (accessed 30 August 2018).

9 The full definition provided by ICoC is as follows: ‘Complex environments’ – ‘any areas experiencing or recovering from unrest or instability, whether due to natural disasters or armed conflicts, where the rule of law has been substantially undermined, and in which the capacity of the state authority to handle the situation is diminished, limited, or non-existent’. ICoC, ‘Definitions’, https://icoca.ch/sites/all/themes/icoca/assets/icoc_english3.pdf (accessed 30 August 2018).

10 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, 5.

11 Human Rights Council ‘Report of The Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination’, A/HRC/36/47 (20 July 2017), paras 49, 52, 54, 56.

12 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, 5.

13 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, 10.

14 Esquirol, Jorge L, ‘The Failed Law of Latin America’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 75 CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

15 Rebecca DeWinter-Schmitt, ‘International Soft Law Initiatives: The Opportunities and Limitations of the Montreux Document, ICoC, and Security Operations Management System Standards’, in H Torroja (ed), Public International Law and Human Rights Violations by Private Military and Security Companies (2017).

16 Anne-Marie Buzatu, ‘Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Provides: A View from Inside a Multistakeholder Process’, DCAF (2015), https://icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/DCAF-SSR-12.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018). Amol Mehra, ‘Submission to the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark by the International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR)’, International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (24 September 2015), https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/ICAR%20Submission%20to%20Consultation%20on%20Corporate%20Human%20Rights%20Benchmark%20%281%29_0.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018).

17 ‘Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) are collaborations between businesses, civil society and other stakeholders that seek to address issues of mutual concern, including human rights and sustainability. To do so, initiatives may work to facilitate dialogue across stakeholder groups, foster cross-sector engagement, or develop and apply standards for corporate or government conduct.’ MSIntegrity, ‘What are MSIs?’, http://www.msi-integrity.org/what-are-msis (accessed 30 April 2018).

18 Important contributions to the study of PSCs in Latin America include Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, and Alan Bryden et al, ‘Armed Private Security in Latin America and the Caribbean. Oversight and Accountability in an Evolving Context’, UNLIREC and DCAF (2016) 51, http://www.unlirec.org/documents/reg_study_prisec_Dec16.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018).

19 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, 10.

20 Karska, Elisabeth, ‘Human Rights Violations Committed by Private Military and Security Companies: An International Law Analysis’ (2016) 17 Espaço Jurídico Journal of Law 753 CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

21 Bryden, note 18, 51. Blackwell, note 1.

22 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, 10.

23 Ibid; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Afro-Descendent Communities, and Natural Resources: Human Rights Protection in the Context of Extraction, Exploitation, and Development Activities’ (2015) 62 (hereinafter IACHR Extractives Report).

24 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, 10.

25 Human Rights Watch, ‘On the Margins of Profit’ (18 February 2008), https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/02/18/margins-profit/rights-risk-global-economy (accessed 30 April 2018).

26 Sarah Chayes, ‘When Corruption is the Operating System. The Case of Honduras’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2017), 83 http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Chayes_Corruption_Final_updated.pdf (accessed 19 September 2018).

27 International Land Coalition (COCOCH), ‘Reforma Agraria, Agricultura y Medio Rural en Honduras’, http://bvirtual.infoagro.hn/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/174/08_COCOCH_Reforma_Agraria_en_Honduras.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 30 April 2018).

28 Modernization of Agriculture Act 1994 (Honduras), http://www.ina.hn/userfiles/file/nuevos/ley_para_la_modernizacion_y_desarrollo_del_sector_agricola_lmdsa.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018).

29 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, 11.

30 Human Rights Watch, note 25.

31 IACHR, Precautionary Measure No. 50-14, Resolution No. 11/2014 (8 May 2014) https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/decisiones/pdf/2014/MC50-14-ES.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018).

32 Ibid. Denisse Rodríguez, ‘Regularán a más de 70,000 Guardias de Seguridad Privada’, La Prensa (21 April 2017), http://www.laprensa.hn/honduras/1064336-410/regularán-a-más-de-70000-guardias-de-seguridad-privada (accessed 30 April 2018).

33 In Bajo Aguán, 92 people, most of whom were active in peasant organizations, were killed in the land disputes from 2009 to 2012. Human Rights Watch, note 11. In 2013, the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries ‘expressed concern about the involvement in human rights violations of private security companies hired by landowners’. ‘Lista la Ley Especial que Regula Empresas de Seguridad Privada’, Abriendo Brecha (12 July 2017), http://www.abriendobrecha.tv/lista-ley-especial-regula-empresas-seguridad-privada (accessed 30 April 2018). ‘Con Nueva Ley Apretarían “Tuercas” a Empresas de Seguridad y Policías Municipales’, La Tribuna (12 July 2017), http://www.latribuna.hn/2017/07/12/nueva-ley-apretaran-tuercas-empresas-seguridad-policias-municipales (accessed 30 April 2018). In 2014 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights granted precautionary measures to leaders of peasant organizations, due to the grave human right abuses committed in the Bajo Aguan region. IACHR, ‘Peasant Leaders of Bajo Aguan, Honduras’, Precautionary Measures 50/14.

34 Human Rights Watch, note 25.

35 Dinant has faced audits and investigations from the accountability mechanism of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank Group. Human Rights Watch, note 25. Additionally, there is an ongoing lawsuit in a Federal US Court against the IFC for aiding and abetting gross human rights violations in Bajo Aguan, due to the IFC substantial financial investment provided to Dinant. EarthRights, ‘Honduran Farmers Sue World Bank Group for Human Rights Violations’, https://www.earthrights.org/media/honduran-farmers-sue-world-bank-group-human-rights-violations (accessed 30 April 2018). Chayes, note 26, 69 and 73–74.

36 Claire Provost, ‘Farmers Sue World Bank Lending Arm Over Alleged Violence in Honduras’, The Guardian (8 March 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/mar/08/farmers-sue-world-bank-lending-arm-ifc-over-alleged-violence-in-honduras (accessed 30 April 2018).

37 ‘Reclamo de Tierras Convierte un Fértil Valle de Honduras en Campo de Guerra’, SDP Noticias (23 August 2011), https://www.sdpnoticias.com/notas/2011/08/23/reclamo-de-tierras-convierte-un-fertil-valle-de-honduras-en-campo-de-guerra (accessed 30 April 2018).

38 IACHR, ‘Violence, Inequality, and Impunity in Honduras’ (2016), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/multimedia/2016/honduras/honduras-en.html (accessed 30 April 2018).

39 Human Rights Watch, note 25. In 2014 the Government created the Bajo Aguan Violent Deaths Special Unit for Investigation, in charge of investigating the crimes committed in associated with land disputes and any other violent death in Bajo Aguan. The Government reported to the IACHR that the Special Unit has prosecuted several cases and obtained two convictions against perpetrators of human rights violations. Luis Lemus, ‘Unidad Especial Investiga Muertes Violentas en el Bajo Aguán’, La Prensa (21 May 2014), http://www.laprensa.hn/honduras/regionales/711248-98/unidad-especial-investiga-muertes-violentas-en-el-bajo-aguán (accessed 30 April 2018); Annual Report 2016, Chapter V Follow Up on Recommendations issued by the IACHR in the Report on the Situations of Human Rights in Honduras, IACHR, para 156, http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/docs/anual/2016/indice.asp (accessed 30 April 2018).

40 Human Rights Watch, note 25.

41 Rules for the Control of Private Security Service 2009 (Honduras), http://www.tsc.gob.hn/leyes/Reglamento%20para%20el%20control%20de%20los%20servicios%20privados%20de%20seguridad.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018).

42 Nincy Arévalo, ‘Unas 70 Mil Armas Están en Manos de Empresas de Seguridad Privada’, Once Noticias (26 April 2017), http://www.oncenoticias.hn/unas-70-mil-armas-estan-en-manos-de-empresas-de-seguridad-privada (accessed 30 April 2018).

43 Denisse Rodriguez, ‘Regularán a Más de 70,000 Guardias de Seguridad Privada’, La Prensa (21 April 2017), http://www.laprensa.hn/honduras/1064336-410/regularán-a-más-de-70000-guardias-de-seguridad-privada (accessed 30 April 2018).

44 ‘La Conflictividad se Reaviva en Bajo Aguan’, Proceso Digital (31 August 2017), http://www.proceso.hn/portadas/10-portada/la-conflictividad-se-reaviva-en-el-aguan.html (accessed 30 April 2018); ‘Asesinan a Campesino en el Bajo Aguan’, La Tribuna (21 September 2017), http://www.latribuna.hn/2017/09/21/asesinan-campesino-aguan (accessed 30 April 2018).

45 Resolve, ‘Tragadero Grande: Land, Human Rights, and International Standards in the Conflict Between the Chaupe Family and Minera Yanacocha’ (28 September 2016), http://www.resolv.org/site-yiffm/files/2015/08/YIFFM-report_280916-Final.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018); GRUFIDES, ‘Police in the Pay of Mining Companies’ (December 2013), http://www.grufides.org/sites/default/files//documentos/documentos/Report%2520Eng.compressed.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018).

46 Ibid.

47 Oxfam, ‘The Politics of Poverty’ (28 September 2016), https://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2016/09/new-report-same-problems-at-peruvian-mine (accessed 30 April 2018).

48 EarthWorks, ‘Newmont’s Own Investigation Shows it Violated International Standards and Its Own’, Mining (28 September 2016), http://www.mining.com/web/worlds-2nd-largest-gold-mining-companys-own-investigation-shows-it-violated-international-standards-and-its-own (accessed 30 April 2018).

49 Comunicadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, ‘Policía Nacional Sí Presta Servicios a Empresas Mineras, Brindándoles Protección y Seguridad’ (3 November 2016), http://derechoshumanos.pe/2016/11/policia-nacional-si-presta-servicios-a-empresas-mineras-brindandoles-proteccion-y-seguridad (accessed 30 April 2018); Red Intersindical, ‘Continúan Ataques Contra Campesinos en el Bajo Aguan’ (6 October 2017), http://www.intersindicalhn.org/sector-campesino/continuan-ataques-contra-campesinos-en-el-bajo-aguan (accessed 30 April 2018).

50 EarthWorks, note 48.

51 Resolve, note 48.

52 EarthWorks, note 48.

53 Securitas, ‘Nuestra Historia’, http://www.securitasperu.com/nosotros/nuestra-historia/nuestra-historia/ (accessed 30 April 2018).

54 Angel Paez, ‘Peru: UN Mission Probes Private Security Groups’, CorpWatch (7 February 2007), http://corpwatch.org/article.php?id=14350 (accessed 30 April 2018); ‘Peru: Una Empresa de Seguridad Privada Expiaba a Organizaciones Sociales’, La Haine (11 March 2009), http://www.lahaine.org/mm_ss_mundo.php/peru-una-empresa-de-seguridad-privada-es (accessed 30 April 2018).

55 ‘Empresa de Seguridad Forza Enfrenta una Investigación Legislativa por Posible Abuso’, El Comercio (9 Febrero 2009), http://archivo.elcomercio.pe/politica/gobierno/supuesto-abuso-empresa-seguridad-forza-enfrenta-investigacion-legislativa-noticia-243703 (accessed 30 April 2018); OCMAL, ‘Que Minera Yanacohca Prescinda de los Servicios de Forza’ (1 July 2009), https://www.ocmal.org/4845 (accessed 30 April 2018).

56 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, ‘Leaders of Peasant Communities of Cajamarca, Peru’, Precautionary Measures 452/11 (5 May 2014).

57 Resolve, note 45.

58 ‘Policía ya no Dará Resguardo a las Empresas Particulares’, La República (25 September 2015), https://larepublica.pe/en-portada/884126-policia-ya-no-dara-resguardo-a-las-empresas-particulares (accessed 30 April 2018).

59 ‘Pasarán al Retiro a Policías que Brinden Seguridad Privada sin Autorización’, RPP (25 September 2015), http://rpp.pe/lima/actualidad/pasaran-al-retiro-a-policias-que-brinden-seguridad-privada-sin-autorizacion-noticia-839048 (accessed 30 April 2018).

60 Observatorio de Conflictos Cajamarca, Conflicto Minera-Familia Chaupe-Minera Yanacocha, http://www.grufides.org/sites/default/files//Documentos/fichas_casos/CONFLICTO%20MINERO%20FAMILIA%20CHAUPE_0.pdf (accessed 10 September 2018).

61 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, 6.

62 Boris Saavedra, ‘Private Security in Guatemala: The Case of Supervision and Control’, Opera (8 October 2014), http://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/opera/article/view/3964/4382 (accessed 30 April 2018).

63 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, 6.

64 Susana C Mijares Peña, ‘Human Rights Violations by Canadian Companies Abroad: Choc v Hudbay Minerals Inc.’ (2014) 5 Western Journal of Legal Studies 1, 11.

65 Ibid.

66 Jion Yi, ‘Holding Canadian Corporations Accountable for Guatemalan Human Rights Violations: Skye Resources and Hudbay’, Council on Hemispheric Affairs (28 June 2016), http://www.coha.org/holding-canadian-corporations-accountable-for-guatemalan-human-rights-violation-skye-resources-and-hudbay (accessed 30 April 2018).

67 Mijares Peña, note 64, 12Google Scholar .

68 Ibid.

69 Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2015: Guatemala’, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/guatemala (accessed 30 April 2018).

70 Private Security Services Act 2010 (Guatemala), http://ww2.oj.gob.gt/es/QueEsOJ/EstructuraOJ/UnidadesAdministrativas/CentroAnalisisDocumentacionJudicial/cds/CDs%20leyes/2010/pdfs/decretos/D052-2010.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018); Governmental Accord No. 417 on Regulation of the Private Security Services Act 2013, http://digessp.gob.gt/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Acuerdo-Gubernativo-417-2013.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018).

71 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, 6.

72 José Patzan, ‘Policías Privadas No Cumplen Ley’, Prensa Libre (5 January 2017), https://www.pressreader.com/guatemala/prensa-libre/20170105/282226600401601 (accessed 30 April 2018); Saavedra, note 62.

73 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, 6.

74 Human Rights Watch, note 25, 12.

75 ‘Profiles: Colombia’s Armed Groups’, BBC News (29 August 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11400950 (accessed 30 April 2018).

76 Drummond, http://www.drummondco.com/our-products/coal/mines (accessed 30 April 2018).

77 PAX, ‘The Dark Side of Coal’ (30 June, 2014), https://www.paxforpeace.nl/publications/all-publications/the-dark-side-of-coal (accessed 30 April 2018); Banktrack, ‘Drummond and Paramilitary Violence in Colombia’ (May 2016), https://www.banktrack.org/download/drummond_human_rights_impact_briefing_160525_pdf_pdf/160525_drummond_case_study_final.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018).

78 PAX, note 77, 72–73.

79 Ibid, 74.

80 Banktrack, note 77.

81 Steven Dudley, ‘Drummond Denies Link to Armed Group’ (24 April 2007), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/article1927976.html (accessed 30 April 2018).

82 Jane Doe v Drummond Company US Ct of App 11th Cir No. 13-15503 (2015).

83 ‘Colombian Judge Convicts Ex-Contractor in Drummond Union Leader Killing’, Fox News (6 February 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/02/06/colombian-judge-convicts-ex-contractor-in-drummond-union-leader-killing.html (accessed 30 April 2018).

84 Emma Rosser, ‘Drummond Executive Arrested Over Paramilitary Murder Charges’, Colombia Reports (26 May 2015), https://colombiareports.com/drummond-executive-arrested-over-paramilitary-murder-charges (accessed 30 April 2018).

85 ‘Melo et al. v. Drummond Company, Inc.’, International Rights Advocates, http://www.iradvocates.org/case/latin-america-colombia/melo-et-al-v-drummond-company-inc (accessed 19 September 2018). Melo et al. v. Drummond Company Inc US Ct of App 11th Cir No. 16-10921 (2016), http://iradvocates.org/sites/iradvocates.org/files/09.27.16%20Opinion%20Issued%20on%20the%20Courts%20own%20Motion%20Opinion.pdf.

86 El Tiempo, ‘El fantasma paramilitar de la Drummond revive’ (28 October 2018), https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/investigacion/le-reviven-a-la-drummond-el-fantasmaparamilitar-en-colombia-286474 (accessed 10 November 2018); Reuters, ‘Colombia calls Drummond coal officials to testify on paramilitaries’ (30 October 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-drummond-court/colombia-calls-drummond-coalofficials-to-testify-on-paramilitaries-source-idUSKCN1N42NI (accessed 10 November 2018).

87 Drummond, ‘Comunicado sobre investigación’, http://www.drummondltd.com/comunicadosobre-investigacion (accessed 10 November 2018).

88 ‘Chiquita Lawsuits (re Colombia)’, Business & Human Rights Resource Center, https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/chiquita-lawsuits-re-colombia (accessed 30 April 2018).

89 Matt Kennard, ‘Chiquita Made a Killing from Colombia’s Civil War’, Pulitzer Center (27 January 2017), http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/chiquita-made-killing-colombias-civil-war (accessed 30 April 2018).

90 ‘Chiquita Admits to Paying Colombia Terrorists’, NBC News (15 March 2007), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/17615143/ns/business-us_business/t/chiquita-admits-paying-colombia-terrorists/#.WaSizK1DnfY (accessed 30 April 2018).

91 Based on Chiquita Brands’ plea deal with the government, a class-action lawsuit was filed on behalf of 1,500 Colombian victims of AUC operations against Chiquita Brands with a US Federal District Court in Florida under the Alien Tort Statute. After a convoluted start, the Court admitted the case to trial, as the judge found that the victims would not be able to seek redress in Colombian courts safely. EarthRights, ‘Doe v. Chiquita Brands International’, https://www.earthrights.org/legal/doe-v-chiquita-brands-international (accessed 30 April 2018).

92 Sue Reisinger, ‘3 US Execs Indicted in Chiquita Terrorist Funding Probe in Colombia’, Corporate Counsel (10 September 2018), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2018/09/10/three-u-s-execs-indicted-in-chiquita-terrorist-funding-probe-in-colombia/?slreturn=20180815102122 (accessed 19 September 2018); Alejandra Bonilla, ‘Los pagos que Chiquita Brands habría hecho a los paramilitares’, El Espectador (1 September 2018), https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/los-pagos-que-chiquita-brands-habria-hecho-los-paramilitares-articulo-809622 (accessed 19 September 2018).

93 Kinosian, note 2, 6.

94 ICoCA, ‘Promoting Responsible Private Security’, https://www.icoca.ch (accessed 19 September 2018).

95 ICoCA, ‘The ICoC Association’, https://www.icoca.ch/en/icoc-association (accessed 30 April 2018).

96 Jose L Gómez del Prado, ‘A U.N. Convention to Regulate PMSCs’ (2012) 31 Criminal Justice Ethics 262, 264.

97 The Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles in its resolution 17/4 of 6 June 2011; UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4.

98 Human Rights Council, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011) (hereinafter ‘Guiding Principles’).

99 UN HRC, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, paras 17–26.

100 Larry Catá Backer, ‘Moving Forward the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights: Between Enterprises Social Norm, State Domestic Legal Orders, and the Treaty Law That Might Bind Them All’ (2015) 38 Fordham International Law Journal 457, http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2382&context=ilj.

101 UNGPs, note 98, 6 and 15

102 UN HRC A/HRC/8/5, note 98.

103 UNGPs, note 98, 8 and 14–15.

104 Ibid, 8 and 16–17.

105 Ibid, 17.

106 Ibid, 29–31.

107 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group to Elaborate the Content of an International Regulatory Framework, Without Prejudging the Nature Thereof, Relating to the Activities of Private Military and Security Companies’, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGMilitary/Pages/OEIWGMilitaryIndex.aspx (accessed 18 September 2018).

108 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Mercenarism and Private Military and Security Companies’ (2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/MercenarismandPrivateMilitarySecurityCompanies.pdf (accessed 18 September 2018).

109 UN Human Rights Council OEIGWG, note 107.

110 UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, ‘Concept Note on a Possible Legal Binding Instrument,’ 4–8, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Mercenaries/WGMercenaries/Pages/IssuesFocus.aspx (accessed 18 September 2018).

111 Prado, Jose L Gomez del, note 96, 263, 272 Google Scholar .

112 DeWinter-Schmitt, note 15, 2. Wallace, Stuart, ‘Private Security Companies and Human Rights: Are Non-Judicial Remedies Effective?’ (2017) 35 Boston University International Law Journal 69, 85 Google Scholar .

113 Jose L Gomez del Prado, note 111.

114 Compare with the current ‘zero draft’ of the potential binding treaty on business and human rights, which does not mention private security specifically, but many of its provisions would have relevance to this field, including right to remedy (Article 8) and due diligence (Article 9), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf (accessed 12 September 2018).

115 Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, ‘Introduction’, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-voluntary-principles (accessed 12 September 2018). To date, governments of 10 countries, 30 companies, and 11 NGOs around the world have engaged with the Voluntary Principles Initiative. Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/VPs-Fact-Sheet-March-2018.pdf (accessed 12 September 2018).

116 Companies and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/VPs_Companies_Fact_Sheet_-_129742_v1_FHE-DC.pdf (accessed 12 September 2018).

117 Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, ‘For Governments’, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/for-governments (accessed 12 September 2018).

118 Ibid.

119 Ben Collins et al, The New Regulators? Assessing the Landscape of Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives, MSI Integrity (June 2017), 14–16, https://msi-database.org/data/The%20New%20Regulators%20-%20MSI%20Database%20Report.pdf.

120 Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, ‘Interactions between Companies and Private Security’, http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-voluntary-principles (accessed 8 October 2018).

121 Confédération Suisse, ‘The Montreux Document’, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/montreux-document.html (accessed 19 September 2018).

122 Paul Pryce, ‘Making the Most of the Montreux Document’ (12 May 2018), https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=33620 (accessed 25 August 2018).

123 Confédération Suisse, ‘Participating States of the Montreux Document’, https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/international-law/international-humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/participating-states.html (accessed 15 September 2018).

124 Taryn Priadko, ‘Private Forces, Public Harm: Private Security Companies and International Law’, Australian Institute of International Affairs (23 November 2014), http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/news-item/private-forces-public-harm-private-security-companies-and-international-law (accessed 19 September 2018).

125 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2. Montreux Document Forum, ‘31 States were Represented at the Regional Meeting of the Montreux Document Forum (MDF) in San José, Costa Rica’, http://www.mdforum.ch/en/first-regional-meeting-lac (accessed 19 September 2018).

126 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict’ (2 May 2011), https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0996-montreux-document-private-military-and-security-companies (accessed 19 September 2018).

127 Ibid, 14.

128 Ibid, 39 2.c, 28.c, 57.c.

129 DCAF Mapping Study, note 3, 27.

130 DeWinter-Schmitt, note 15.

131 DCAF Mapping Study, note 3, 27; DeWinter-Schmitt, note 15.

132 DCAF Mapping Study, note 3, 27.

133 The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, ‘Preamble’, para 2–3, https://www.icoca.ch/en/the_icoc#a-preamble (accessed 19 September 2018) (hereinafter ICoC).

134 Ibid. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), ‘International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers Signed by Close to 60 Companies’ (9 September 2010), https://www.fdfa.admin.ch/eda/en/home/news/news-fdfa.html/content/eda/en/meta/news/2010/11/9/36144 (accessed 19 September 2018).

135 ICoC, note 133, sec D-14.

136 Ibid, sec E-21.

137 Ibid.

138 Ibid, sec F-29-32.

139 Ibid, sec F-35-7.

140 Ibid, sec F-38.

141 Ibid, sec F-39.

142 Ibid, sec F-40.

143 Ibid, sec E-22.

144 Ibid, sec F-42. ‘Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their Personnel do not, discriminate on grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, social origin, social status, indigenous status, disability, or sexual orientation.’

145 Ibid, sec G-50-1, and 55.

146 Ibid, secG-67.

147 Moyakine, Evgeni, ‘From National and International Frustrations to Transnational Triumph? Hybrid Transnational Private Regulatory Regimes in the Industry of Private Military and Security Companies and Their Effectiveness in Ensuring Compliance With Human Rights’ (2015) 28 Pacific McGeorge Global Business and Develpment Law Journal 209, 211 Google Scholar .

148 ICoCA, ‘Promoting Responsible Private Security’ (February 2017), https://www.icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/ICoCA-Overview.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018).

149 ICoCA, ‘Become a Member or Observer’, https://www.icoca.ch/en/become-member-or-observer (accessed 15 September 2018).

150 ICoCA, ‘Observers’, https://www.icoca.ch/en/membership/observers#category-tid-819 (accessed 15 September 2018).

151 ICoCA, ‘Articles of Association’, article 11, https://www.icoca.ch/en/articles_of_association (accessed 19 September 2018). ICoCA, ‘Overview’, https://www.icoca.ch/en/functions (accessed 19 September 2018).

152 ICoCA, ‘Monitoring’, https://www.icoca.ch/en/monitoring (accessed 19 September 2018). ICoCA, ‘Reporting, monitoring and assessing Membership Requirem’, https://www.icoca.ch/sites/default/files/uploads/ICoCA-Procedures-Article-12-Monitoring.pdf (accessed 19 September 2018).

153 Ibid.

154 Centurion (Guatemala), Innovative Security Technologies (Trinidad and Tobago), Yantarni (Guatemala), Interglobal seguridad (Colombia), Siete24 (Colombia), Seguroc SA (Peru). ICoCA, ‘Membership’, https://www.icoca.ch/en/membership (accessed 19 September 2018).

155 ICoCA, ‘Get Involved’, https://icoca.ch/en/get-involved (accessed 30 April 2018).

156 White, Nigel, ‘Regulation of the Private Military and Security Sector: Is the UK Fulfilling its Human Rights Duties?’ (2016) 16 Oxford Human Rights Law Review 585, 594 CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

157 Ibid, 595–596. MacLeod, Sorcha, ‘Private Security Companies and Shared Responsibility: The Turn to Multistakeholder Standard-Setting and Monitoring through Self-Regulation-‘Plus’’, (2015) Netherland International Law Review 120, 131 Google Scholar .

158 ICoCA, ‘Why Join the Association’, https://icoca.ch/en/why-join-association (accessed 30 April 2018).

159 Blecher, Lara, ‘Codes of Conduct: The Trojan Horse of International Human Rights Law?’ (2017) 38 Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal 439 Google Scholar . See also DeWinter-Schmitt, note 15.

160 ‘Membership’, note 154.

161 Compendium, ‘Multistakeholder Governance in the Field of Culture’, http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/multi-stakeholder-governance.php (accessed 19 September 2018).

162 Reema Shah, ‘Beating Blackwater: Using Domestic Legislation to Enforce the International Code of Conduct for Private Military Companies’, Yale Law Journal, 2567. Wallace, note 110.

163 Within ICoCA’s Board of Directors the three stakeholder pillars have equal voting power and, in general, a decision must be adopted by a majority of eight directors including at least two votes from each of the three stakeholder pillars. Articles of association, note 151, para 7.6.

164 ‘Observers’, note 150.

165 The PSCs joining fee is $1000 USD and the CSOs joining fee is $100, which can be waived. ICoCA, ‘The Association’, https://www.icoca.ch/en/association (accessed 19 September 2018).

166 ICoCA, ‘2017–2018 Budget’, https://www.icoca.ch/sites/default/files/uploads/Budget%202017%20and%202018.pdf (accessed 15 September 2018).

167 ICoCA, ‘2016–2017 Annual Report’, https://icoca.li/sites/default/files/uploads/ICoCA%20Annual%20Report%202016-2017.pdf (accessed 15 September 2018).

168 ‘Become a Member or Observer’, note 149.

169 ICoCA, ‘Q2 2018 Board Meeting Minute’ (22 and 23 May 2018), https://icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/ICoCA%20Q2%202018%20Board%20Meeting%20Minutes.pdf (accessed 15 September 2018).

170 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2. A/HRC/36/47, note 11, sec V-62.

171 Blackwell, note 1.

172 Karska, note 20.

173 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, 8.

174 Ibid, 14.

175 Telephone interview with Molly Gray, Law and Policy Manager, ICoCA (20 April 2018).

176 ‘Membership’, note 154.

177 While the certification procedure was developed and implemented, 102 PSCs signed the ICoC and they are currently deemed as Transitional Member PSCs and have maximum of two years to obtain ICoCA certification and become ICoCA Certified Members. Articles of Association, note 149, art 3.3.1; ICoCA, ‘Certification’, https://icoca.ch/en/en/mandate/faq#Certification (accessed 30 April 2018).

178 ICoCA, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, https://www.icoca.ch/en/frequently-asked-questions#Membership (accessed 19 September 2018).

179 ‘Membership’, note 151.

180 ICoC, note 131, Preamble paras 2 and 3.

181 MacLeod, note 157, 135.

182 Wallace, note 112, 89.

183 ICoC, note 133, Preamble para 6(d).

184 The current Board-recognized standards are ISO 28007, PSC.1-2012, and ISO 18788. ‘Certification’, note 175.

185 ICoCA, ‘Principles & Procedures Article 11: ‘Certification’, https://www.icoca.ch/sites/default/files/uploads/ICoCA-Procedures-Article-11-Certification.pdf (accessed 19 September 2018). ICoCA, ‘Apply for ICoCA Certification’, https://www.icoca.ch/en/apply-icoca-certification (accessed 30 April 2018).

186 Gómez, note 96.

187 Antonie Perret, ‘Private Security Trends and Challenges in Latin America [Student’s Paper Series]’ (2011) 37 Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, 6.

188 Gómez, note 96.

189 Buzatu, note 16; Perret, note 187.

190 ICoC, note 133, sec G.

191 Belisarion Betancur, ‘From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador’ (26 January 2001), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ElSalvador-Report.pdf (accessed 19 September 2018). Commission for Historical Clarification, ‘Guatemala: Memory of Silence’, https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/mos_en.pdf (accessed 19 September 2018). Never Again: The National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, http://www.desaparecidos.org/nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_000.htm.

192 Kinosian and Bosworth, note 2, 7.

193 Gray, note 175.

194 Ibid.

195 Ibid.

196 Ibid.

197 Moyakine, note 147, 217.

198 Ibid, 222.

199 Articles of Association, note 151, art 12. ICoCA,‘Procedures Article 12: Reporting, Monitoring and Assessing Performance and Compliance’, https://icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/ICoCAt-Procedures-Article-12-Monitoring.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018).

200 Ibid.

201 Ibid.

202 Ibid.

203 Gray, note 175.

204 Procedures Article 12: Reporting, Monitoring and Assessing Performance and Compliance, note 199.

205 Gray, note 175.

206 Procedures Article 12: Reporting, Monitoring, and Assessing Performance and Compliance, note 199.

207 Ibid.

208 MacLeod, note 157, 136.

209 Wallace, note 112, 97. White, note 156, 591.

210 Richemond-Barak, Dapgné, ‘Can Self-Regulation Work? Lessons From the Private Security and Military Industry’ (2014) 35 Michigan Journal of International Law 773, 800 Google Scholar .

211 Blackwell, note 1.

212 Bryden, note 18, 51.

213 Gómez, note 96; Blackwell, note 1.

214 Blackwell, note 1.

215 ‘Outsourcing to Private Security Contractors Threatens Rights, UN Panel Warns’, UN News (14 September 2011), https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/09/386572-outsourcing-private-security-contractors-threatens-rights-un-panel-warns (accessed 30 April 2018).

216 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Afro-Descendent Communities, and Natural Resources: Human Rights Protection in the Context of Extraction, Exploitation, and Development Activities’ (2015), para 15, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/extractiveindustries2016.pdf.

217 Ibid, para 123, 124. White, note 156.

218 Gray, note 175; https://www.icoca.ch/en/register-a-complaint.

219 Comment of Meg Roggensack, ICoCA Board Member, at public event ‘The Explosive Growth of Private Security in Latin America’, 27 March 2018; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsZm5fGh92o&t=1635s (1:17) (accessed 11 August 2018). See also ICoC Preamble.

220 Gómez, note 96; Blackwell, note 1. Articles of Association, note 151, art 13.

221 ICoCA, ‘Procedures Article 13: Receiving and Processing Complaints’, https://icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/ICoCA-Procedures-Article-13-Complaints.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018).

222 ICoC, note 133, art 67.

223 Gray, note 175.

224 Procedures Article 13: Receiving and Processing Complaints, note 121.

225 Ibid.

226 Human Rights Council, ‘Summary of the Third Session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group to Consider the Possibility of Elaborating an International Regulatory Framework on the Regulation, Monitoring and Oversight of the Activities of Private Military and Security Companies’, A/HRC/WG.10/3/2 (2 September 2014), para 41.

227 Ibid.

228 Wallace, note 112, 74.

229 Global Witness, ‘At What Cost? Irresponsible Business and the Murder of Land and Environmental Defenders in 2017’ (July 2018).

230 American Bar Association et al, ‘Tilted Scales: Social Conflict and Criminal Justice in Guatemala’ (2012); IACHR Extractives Report, paras 297–301, note 23.

231 UNGPs, note 98, 28–29.

232 Procedures Article 13: Receiving and Processing Complaints, note 121.

233 Arnpriester, Natasha, ‘Combating Impunity: the Private Military Industry, Human Rights, and the “Legal Gap”’ (2017) 28 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1189, 1226–1228 Google Scholar .

234 ICoCA, ‘Guidance on Company Grievance Mechanisms – Code paragraphs 66 to 68’, https://icoca.ch/en/guidance (accessed 16 September 2018)

235 Gray, note 175.

236 Wallace, note 112, 77.

237 A/HRC/36/47, note 7, para 46.

238 A/HRC/WG.10/3/2, note 114, para 82.

239 Gray, note 175.

240 Ibid.

241 ICoC, note 133, sec E.18.

242 ICoCA, ‘Promoting Responsible Private Security’ (February 2017), https://www.icoca.ch/sites/default/files/resources/ICoCA-Overview.pdf (accessed 30 April 2018).

243 Procurement regulations of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade require that PSCs must be ICoCA members or be willing to become as a condition to tender, in addition to demonstrating compliance with requirements on vetting and training of personnel, operating procedures, and redress and accountability mechanisms consistent with the ICoC. Buzatu, note 16.

244 White, note 156, 586.

245 Buzatu, note 16.

246 SCEG, ‘Joining the SCEG’, https://www.sceguk.org.uk/joining-the-sceg (accessed 19 September 2018).

247 FDFA, ‘Federal Act on Private Security Services Provided Abroad’ (11 April 2018), https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/security-policy/bundesgesetz-ueber-die-im-ausland-erbrachten-privaten-sicherheit.html (accessed 19 September 2018). FDFA, ‘2017 Annual Report on the Implementation of the Federal Act on Private Security Services Provided Abroad’ (11 April 2018), https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/sicherheitspolitik/taetigkeitsbericht-2017_EN.pdf (accessed 19 September 2018).

248 2016–2017 Annual Report, note 165. DCAF Mapping Study, note 3. US Department of State, ‘The Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) 2 Program Provides Comprehensive Protective Security Services to Support U.S. Department of State Operations Around the World’ (8 July 2015), https://www.govcb.com/government-bids/The-Worldwide-Protective-Services-ADP14363630860000927.htm (accessed 19 September 2018). However, the Department of Defense (DoD) will not require membership, certification and oversight by the ICoCA as a condition of any DoD contracts. Neither can DoD show the ICoCA any preferential treatment. ‘Private Security Companies-International Efforts’, https://www.acq.osd.mil/log/ps/psc_International_Efforts.html (accessed 19 September 2018). US Department of State, ‘2016 Annual Report of the Government of the United States of America for the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Initiative’ (31 May 2017), https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/vprpt/2016/278232.htm (accessed 19 September 2018).

249 Moyakine, note 147, 220. DeWinter-Schmitt, note 15.

250 White, note 156, 589.

251 Wallace, note 112, 97.

252 Ibid, 97.

253 José L Gómez, ‘The Role of Private Military and Security Companies in Modern Warfare – Impacts on Human Rights’, Global Policy Forum (11 August 2012), https://www.globalpolicy.org/pmscs/51834-the-role-of-private-military-and-security-companies-in-modern-warfare-impacts-on-human-rights.html (accessed 30 April 2018).

254 ICoC, note 133.

255 Blecher, note 159, 439.

256 Gray, note 175.

257 White, note 156, 596-96.

258 ‘Why Join the Association’, note 158.

259 Given that ICoCA’s work has focused in Africa and the Middle East, ICoCA could organize or sponsor a regional meeting for Latin America PSCs, CSOs and states to become familiar with its mission. Compare with Montreux Document Forum, ‘31 States were Represented at the Regional Meeting of the Montreux Document Forum (MDF) in San José, Costa Rica’, http://www.mdforum.ch/en/first-regional-meeting-lac (6 April 2018).

260 Human Rights Council, ‘Summary of the fifth session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group to consider the possibility of elaborating an international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and oversight of the activities of private military and security companies’, A/HRC/WG.10/5/2 (20 February 2017).