The Doctrine of the Buddha.

Th. Stcherbatsky

doi:10.1017/S0041977X00123092

The Doctrine of the Buddha.

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 December 2009

Th. Stcherbatsky

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We must be thankful to Professor Berriedale Keith for once more calling attention to the problem of the doctrine preached bythe Buddha. The problem is indeed important for the history of Indian civilization, as well as for the comparative history of philosophy. Was there or was there not a real philosophy, or, to use an expression of the late M. Émile Senart, “ une pensée maàtresse d'ellemêeme,” in the sixth century B.C. in India ? Professor Keith thinks it “ really impracticable to discover with any precision the doctrine which Buddha in fact expounded ”. The reasons for this despair are several. First of all, an extraordinary diversity of doctrine has developed from the teaching of the Buddha in the sixth century B.C.1 Professor Keith apparently thinks that if a doctrine has much developed, it becomes “ undiscoverable ”. I rather feel inclined to disbelieve such an axiom. A rotten seed will have no growth; but a seed strong and healthy may produce luxuriant vegetation. The other reason is more plausible. “ What assurance have we that the Pali Canon really represents the views of the Buddha with any approach to accuracy ? ” But, even if it contained the records of contemporary eyewitnesses, the scepticism of Professor Keith would not be shaken, for “we need”, he says, “ only remember the difficulties presented by the Aristotelian view of the doctrine of Plato ”—in order to disbelieve an eyewitness of the highest authority.

Type: Papers Contributed
Information: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies , Volume 6 , Issue 4 , February 1932 , pp. 867 - 896

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X00123092 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © School of Oriental and African Studies 1932

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^{page 867 note 1} Article in the Bulletin S0S., Vol. 6, Part 2, pp. 393 ft.Google Scholar

^{page 867 note 2} ‘ Das glaubt heute kein Pali Forsher mehr, dass wir im Pali Kanon das Wort des Buddha vor uns haben,’ Winternitz, cf., Studio, Indo-Iranica, p. 66.Google Scholar

^{page 868 note 1} Professor Keith, op. cit., p. 399, seems to have misunderstood my reference to Pāṇini (in my book on Nirvāṇa, p. 23, note), as if it implied that he was a contemporary of Buddha—an Ignoratio Elenchi, I fear.

^{page 869 note 1} Cf. my Central Conception of Buddhism (R.A.S.), p. 2.

^{page 869 note 2} Op. cit., p. 395.

^{page 870 note 1} Ibid., p. 396.

^{page 871 note 1} In order to avoid all misunderstanding I must repeat that I assume that the metrical Upanishads were either preceded by, or were contemporaneous with, the Sānkhya system; and that both preceded, or were contemporaneous with, the rise of the Dharma-theory. Under early Buddhism I understand this theory, not all its details, of course, but its very definite essence as expressed in the Buddhist Credo. There are no precise dates. In the following short summary I omit all references to texts, since they will be found in my two works mentioned above.

^{page 871 note 2} dharmatā.

^{page 872 note 1} According to Przyluski, M. Jean (Le Concile de Rājagrha, p. 369)Google Scholar primitive Buddhism was a religion of joy (une religion de joie). This is established on the authority (very feeble!) of the Chinese patriarch Tsong-mi!

^{page 873 note 1} anātma-vāda.

^{page 873 note 2} sva-lakṣarṇa-dhāraṇād dharmaḥ.

^{page 874 note 1} sat-kāya-dṛṣṭti.

^{page 874 note 2} saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta.

^{page 874 note 3} sāsrava and nāsrava.

^{page 874 note 4} cetanā ═ karma.

^{page 874 note 5} prajňā amalā.

^{page 874 note 6} prthag-jana.

^{page 874 note 7} Nirvāṇa.

^{page 874 note 8} ārya.

^{page 874 note 9} rūpa-citta-viprayuktasaṃskāra.

^{page 874 note 10} utpāda-sthiti-jarā-anityatā.

^{page 875 note 1} indriya-viṣpaya.

^{page 875 note 2} dvādaša-āyatanāni.

^{page 877 note 1} dharma.

^{page 877 note 2} akiṃcit-kara.

^{page 877 note 3} niruyāpāra.

^{page 877 note 4} vījnāna.

^{page 877 note 5} rūpa.

^{page 877 note 6} cakṣur-indriya.

^{page 877 note 7} sparša.

^{page 878 note 1} trayāṇām sannipātaḥ sparšaḥ.

^{page 878 note 2} asmin soli idam bhavati.

^{page 878 note 3} avidyā.

^{page 878 note 4} saṃskāra ═ karma.

^{page 878 note 5} vijnāna.

^{page 878 note 6} nāma-rūpa panca-skandha in the embryonic condition.

^{page 878 note 7} ṣaḍ-āyatana.

^{page 878 note 8} sparša, it is not at all “ contact ”, it is a caitasika-dharma, one of the 46; this fact alone must have suggested looking in the tables of the Elements for the meaning of all the terms.

^{page 878 note 9} vedanā.

^{page 878 note 10} tṛšṇā.

^{page 878 note 11} upādāna.

^{page 879 note 1} bhava.

^{page 879 note 2} jāti.

^{page 879 note 3} jarā-maraṇa.

^{page 880 note 1} sat-kārya-vāda ═ sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi.

^{page 880 note 2} There is a difference between the elaboration of the theory in the Abhidharma and its simple form in the Sūtras, but the idea is quite the same.

^{page 880 note 3} cetanā cetayitvā ca karaṇam.

^{page 880 note 4} dharma-saṃetana.

^{page 880 note 5} saṃskāra.

^{page 881 note 1} saṃskāra ═ sambhūya-kārin.

^{page 881 note 2} utpāda-sthiti-anityatā ═ utpāda-nirodha.

^{page 881 note 3} rūpa-citta-viprayukta.

^{page 881 note 4} saṃskṛta.

^{page 881 note 5} saṃskāra.

^{page 883 note 1} pudgala.

^{page 884 note 1} mali ═ prajnā.

^{page 885 note 1} samādhi.

^{page 885 note 2} prajnā amalā.

^{page 885 note 3} dṛṣṭti-heya.

^{page 885 note 4} bhāvanā-heya.

^{page 887 note 1} Ibid., p. 396.

^{page 887 note 2} Ibid., p. 402.

^{page 887 note 3} Ibid., p. 403.

^{page 887 note 4} Buddh. Phil., p. 147.

^{page 887 note 5} Ibid., p. 26.

^{page 887 note 6} Ibid., p. 29.

^{page 887 note 7} Ibid., p. 14.

^{page 888 note 1} In his account of the Vinaya (pp. 119 ff.), Professor Keith does not scruple to ascribe to the Buddha himself the rules of conduct of the monastic order and of the layman. However, if he had had an opportunity to look into the review of the Vinayas of all other schools compiled by the late Professor Wassilieff from Chinese sources (the MS. is preserved in our library, and has never been published), he would have seen that the vinaya was much more shifting ground than the dharma. This is alsoeasy to understand a priori. A consistent philosophical doctrine is a much moresolid basis than the rules of conduct, which are supplemented according to circumstances.

^{page 888 note 2} Bulletin, 4, pp. 403–4.Google Scholar

^{page 888 note 3} Buddh. Phil., p. 73.

^{page 888 note 4} samjnā.

^{page 888 note 5} vedanā.

^{page 888 note 6} vijnāna ═ citta ═ manas; the equation is emphasized evidently in contrast to the Sāṅkhya triplet buddhi, ahaṃkāra, manas, which are different faculties. The Nyāya later on answered by the equation buddhir ═ upa-labdhir ═ jnānam, N.S., 1, 1, 15.Google Scholar

^{page 889 note 1} It is the dharma-āyatana, the āyatana No. 12.

^{page 889 note 2} Buddh. Phil., p. 73.

^{page 889 note 3} Cf. above, p. 875.

^{page 889 note 4} Buddh. Phil., p. 60.

^{page 889 note 5} cetanā ═ karma ═ saṃskara.

^{page 889 note 6} caitasika-dharma.

^{page 890 note 1} Ibid., p. 60.

^{page 890 note 2} utpāda-sthiti-jarā-anityatd.

^{page 890 note 3} Ibid., p. 50.

^{page 890 note 4} Ibid., p. 86.

^{page 890 note 5} citta-samprayukta.

^{page 890 note 6} cilta-viprayukta.

^{page 890 note 7} It is curious that, pp. 201–2, the Sarvāstivādin classification of the seventy-five dharmas is called “ a not very happy attempt at an objective description ”, whereas the redistribution of exactly the same seventy-five dharmas in skandha-āyatanadhātu's is called a “ subjective ” [sic] classification! This is accompanied by the remark “ in the whole scheme we find little of philosophic insight or importance in this, clearly a very important side, in its own eyes, of the activity of the school ”. The sarcasm would have been more effective if it had been better grounded. Professor Keith ascribes to the Sarvāstivādin school what is common to all schools, and the āyatana and dhātu divisions, which are found everywhere in the Pali Canon, he ascribes to the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivadins! If we add to this the double account of the “ chain of causation ” and the double account of the “ skandha-division, we see how the “ history ” of Buddhism is written by him.

^{page 891 note 1} Ibid., p. 107.

^{page 891 note 2} Ibid., p. 86.

^{page 891 note 3} Ibid., p. 84.

^{page 891 note 4} viz., citta-samprayukta-saṃskāra.

^{page 891 note 5} caitta.

^{page 891 note 6} citta.

^{page 891 note 7} In order to appreciate this classification of mental phenomena in the Buddhist “ Psychology without a Soul” into Feelings, Ideas, Volitions, and Pure Sensation, it is sufficient to follow the ever-changing and inconclusive attempts which manifest themselves in European psychology, beginning from the times when the Soul was divided into “ parts ” up to modern times, when the greatest indecision continues to reign regarding the places to be assigned to some important items. Bain's division into Feeling, Volition, and Intellect (vedanā, cetanā ═ saṃskāra, saṃjnā) has no place for sensation (vijnāna); he says sensations are partly feelings and partly intellectual states ”. On the contrary, Warren and a number of other psychologists declare “ sensation and ideation ” to be the fundamental types of experience. This would correspond to the difference of vijnāna and saṃjnā-skandha (it is the same as nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka-pratyakṣa). But this classification has no separate place for feeling and will; and besides, what is most important is this: when I divide consciousness into sensation and ideation I should not mix them up. I should have a sensation without ideation, i.e. pure sensation, i.e. sensation without the slightest ideation. Brentano's division into representation, judgment and emotional phenomena, distributes the intellect into two items and has no separate place either for sensation, or for will. It comes near to the Buddhist division in this respect, that the will is united in the same item with all emotional phenomena of hatred and love (saṃskāra-skandha). No European classification has any separate place for pure sensation (vijnāna-skandha), although W. James discusses its possibility. Thus the Buddhist classification into (1) pure sensation, (2) feeling, (3) intellect, and (4) will, compares not unfavourably with the indecision of European psychology. The critique which Professor Keith applies to saṃskāra-skandha is quite unintelligible, saṃskāraskandha means, just as in Brentano's classification, “ Phānomene von Hass und Liebe,” including the will as the chief phenomenon or force (cetanā, rāga, dveṣa, etc.).

^{page 892 note 1} Ibid., p. 113.

^{page 892 note 2} Cf. my Conception of Nirvāna, p. 17.

^{page 892 note 3} Keith, Professor, Buddh. Phil., p. 100Google Scholar, gives vent to his “ amazement ” at “ the creation of two curious bodily complexes alone by ignorance ” (! ?). He remarks that “ the confusion is significant of the lack of skill of the interpreters ”. It has escaped his attention that the element of ignorance means in this context the counterpart of Nirvāṇa. When Nirvāna is attained, there is no ignorance and no rebirth; the saṃskāras, and among them ignorance, are brought to a standstill. The doctrine is by no means exclusively Buddhistic.

^{page 892 note 4} i.e., belongs to the class of sanidaršana-elements (! ?).

^{page 893 note 1} Baddh. Phil, p. 109.

^{page 893 note 2} Ibid., p. 47.

^{page 894 note 1} Buddh. Phil., p. 63—it is suggested that Buddha's agnosticism means that he really knew nothing about Nirvāṇa, “ he allowed men to frame their own conceptions.” “ From the general poverty of philosophical constructive power exhibited by such parts of the system as appear essentially Buddha's (?!), one is inclined to prefer this explanation.”

^{page 894 note 2} Cf. article in the Bulletin, p. 398.

^{page 894 note 3} Professor Keith, op. cit., p. 92 ff., apparently confounds the meaning of rāpa, by throwing into the same bag the rūpas or rūpa-skandha, rūpa-āyatana, and rūpadhātu. That the meaning of rāpa is quite different in all the three combinations is clearly seen from the table appended to my Central Conception. To what confusion this want of discrimination leads is seen from the fact that the Buddhist heavens are thus converted, p. 92, into a “world of Matter ”(!).

^{page 895 note 1} Professor Keith translates asaṃskṛta as “ uncompound” Element. This is quite wrong. All elements are uncompound; not a single one is compound. The term “element” and the term “ uucompound ” are convertible.

^{page 895 note 2} The dhātus, Nos. 6, 12, and 18.

^{page 895 note 3} saṃskṛta.

^{page 895 note 4} duḥkha.

^{page 896 note 1} Bulletin, I.e., p. 394. Cf. Religion and Philosophy of the Veda by the same author, on p. 494 the characteristic utterance “ … even for India such a thought is absurd ” (viz. that Ksatriyas gave instruction on Brahman)!

^{page 896 note 2} Ibid., p. 395.

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