Edward Nelson published in 1986 a book defending an extreme formalist view of mathematics according to which there is an impassable barrier in the totality of exponentiation. On the positive side, Nelson embarks on a program of investigating how much mathematics can be interpreted in Raphael Robinson's theory of arithmetic . In the shadow of this program, some very nice logical investigations and results were produced by a number of people, not only regarding what can be interpreted in but also what cannot be so interpreted. We explain some of these results and rely on them to discuss Nelson's position.

The construction of a systematic philosophical foundation for logic is a notoriously difficult problem. In Part One I suggest that the problem is in large part methodological, having to do with the common philosophical conception of “providing a foundation”. I offer an alternative to the common methodology which combines a strong foundational requirement (veridical justification) with the use of non-traditional, holistic tools to achieve this result. In Part Two I delineate an outline of a foundation for logic, employing the new methodology. The outline is based on an investigation of why logic requires a veridical justification, i.e., a justification which involves the world and not just the mind, and what features or aspect of the world logic is grounded in. Logic, the investigation suggests, is grounded in the formal aspect of reality, and the outline proposes an account of this aspect, the way it both constrains and enables logic (gives rise to logical truths and consequences), logic's role in our overall system of knowledge, the relation between logic and mathematics, the normativity of logic, the characteristic traits of logic, and error and revision in logic.

The purpose of this paper is to outline some recent progress in descriptive inner model theory, a branch of set theory which studies descriptive set theoretic and inner model theoretic objects using tools from both areas. There are several interlaced problems that lie on the border of these two areas of set theory, but one that has been rather central for almost two decades is the conjecture known as the Mouse Set Conjecture (MSC). One particular motivation for resolving MSC is that it provides grounds for solving the inner model problem which dates back to 1960s. There have been some new partial results on MSC and the methods used to prove the new instances suggest a general program for solving the full conjecture. It is then our goal to communicate the ideas of this program to the community at large.

In historical discussions of twentieth-century logic, it is typically assumed that model theory emerged within the tradition that adopted first-order logic as the standard framework. Work within the type-theoretic tradition, in the style of Principia Mathematica, tends to be downplayed or ignored in this connection. Indeed, the shift from type theory to first-order logic is sometimes seen as involving a radical break that first made possible the rise of modern model theory. While comparing several early attempts to develop the semantics of axiomatic theories in the 1930s, by two proponents of the type-theoretic tradition (Carnap and Tarski) and two proponents of the first-order tradition (Gödel and Hilbert), we argue that, instead, the move from type theory to first-order logic is better understood as a gradual transformation, and further, that the contributions to semantics made in the type-theoretic tradition should be seen as central to the evolution of model theory.

A Martin-Löf random sequence is an infinite binary sequence with the property that every initial segment σ has prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity K(σ) at least ∣σ∣ − c, for some constant c ϵ ω. Informally, initial segments of Martin-Löf randoms are highly complex in the sense that they are not compressible by more than a constant number of bits. However, all Martin-Löf randoms necessarily have contiguous substrings of arbitrarily low complexity. If we demand that all substrings of a sequence be uniformly complex, then we arrive at the notion of shift-complex sequences. In this paper, we collect some of the existing results on these sequences and contribute two new ones. Rumyantsev showed that the measure of oracles that compute shift-complex sequences is zero. We strengthen this result by proving that the Martin-Löf random sequences that do not compute shift-complex sequences are exactly the incomplete ones, in other words, the ones that do not compute the halting problem. In order to do so, we make use of the characterization by Franklin and Ng of the class of incomplete Martin-Löf randoms via a notion of randomness called difference randomness. Turning to the power of shift-complex sequences as oracles, we show that there are shift-complex sequences that do not compute Martin-Löf random (or even Kurtz random) sequences.

We survey recent advances on the interface between computability theory and algorithmic randomness, with special attention on measures of relative complexity. We focus on (weak) reducibilities that measure (a) the initial segment complexity of reals and (b) the power of reals to compress strings, when they are used as oracles. The results are put into context and several connections are made with various central issues in modern algorithmic randomness and computability.

We describe a recent program from the study of definable groups in certain o-minimal structures. A central notion of this program is that of a (geometric) lattice. We propose a definition of a lattice in an arbitrary first-order structure. We then use it to describe, uniformly, various structure theorems for o-minimal groups, each time recovering a lattice that captures some significant invariant of the group at hand. The analysis first goes through a local level, where a pertinent notion of pregeometry and generic elements is each time introduced.

I describe several ways in which forcing arguments can be used to yield clean and conceptual proofs of nonreducibility, ergodicity and other results in the theory of analytic equivalence relations. In particular, I present simple Borel equivalence relations E, F such that a natural proof of nonreducibility of E to F uses the independence of the Singular Cardinal Hypothesis at ℵω.

The Hyperuniverse Program is a new approach to set-theoretic truth which is based on justifiable principles and leads to the resolution of many questions independent from ZFC. The purpose of this paper is to present this program, to illustrate its mathematical content and implications, and to discuss its philosophical assumptions.

In this paper we isolate a notion that we call “formalism freeness” from Gödel's 1946 Princeton Bicentennial Lecture, which asks for a transfer of the Turing analysis of computability to the cases of definability and provability. We suggest an implementation of Gödel's idea in the case of definability, via versions of the constructible hierarchy based on fragments of second order logic. We also trace the notion of formalism freeness in the very wide context of developments in mathematical logic in the 20th century.

This paper augments Hailperin's substantial efforts (1976/1986) to place Boole's algebra of logic on a solid footing. Namely Horn sentences are used to give a modern formulation of the principle that Boole adopted in 1854 as the foundation for his algebra of logic—we call this principle The Rule of 0 and 1.