A mass problem is a set of Turing oracles. If P and Q are mass problems, we say that P is weakly reducible to Q if every member of Q Turing computes a member of P. We say that P is strongly reducible to Q if every member of Q Turing computes a member of P via a fixed Turing functional. The weak degrees and strong degrees are the equivalence classes of mass problems under weak and strong reducibility, respectively. We focus on the countable distributive lattices ω and s of weak and strong degrees of mass problems given by nonempty subsets of 2ω. Using an abstract Gödel/Rosser incompleteness property, we characterize the subsets of 2ω whose associated mass problems are of top degree in ω and s, respectively Let R be the set of Turing oracles which are random in the sense of Martin-Löf, and let r be the weak degree of R. We show that r is a natural intermediate degree within ω. Namely, we characterize r as the unique largest weak degree of a subset of 2ω of positive measure. Within ω we show that r is meet irreducible, does not join to 1, and is incomparable with all weak degrees of nonempty thin perfect subsets of 2ω. In addition, we present other natural examples of intermediate degrees in ω. We relate these examples to reverse mathematics, computational complexity, and Gentzen-style proof theory.

This is a survey article on algebraic logic. It gives a historical background leading up to a modern perspective. Central problems in algebraic logic (like the representation problem) are discussed in connection to other branches of logic, like modal logic, proof theory, model-theoretic forcing, finite combinatorics, and Gödel's incompleteness results. We focus on cylindric algebras. Relation algebras and polyadic algebras are mostly covered only insofar as they relate to cylindric algebras, and even there we have not told the whole story. We relate the algebraic notion of neat embeddings (a notion special to cylindric algebras) to the metalogical ones of provability, interpolation and omitting types in variants of first logic. Another novelty that occurs here is relating the algebraic notion of atom-canonicity for a class of boolean algebras with operators to the metalogical one of omitting types for the corresponding logic. A hitherto unpublished application of algebraic logic to omitting types of first order logic is given. Proofs are included when they serve to illustrate certain concepts. Several open problems are posed. We have tried as much as possible to avoid exploring territory already explored in the survey articles of Monk [93] and Németi [97] in the subject.

I survey the syntactic technique of tiering which can be used to restrict the power of a recursion scheme. I show how various results can be obtained entirely proof theoretically without the use of a model of computation.

This communication deals with positive model theory, a non first order model theoretic setting which preserves compactness at the cost of giving up negation. Positive model theory deals transparently with hyperimaginaries, and accommodates various analytic structures which defy direct first order treatment. We describe the development of simplicity theory in this setting, and an application to the lovely pairs of models of simple theories without the weak non finite cover property.

Despite some discomfort with this grandly philosophical topic, I do in fact hope to address a venerable pair of philosophical chestnuts: mathematical truth and existence. My plan is to set out three possible stands on these issues, for an exercise in compare and contrast. A word of warning, though, to philosophical purists (and perhaps of comfort to more mathematical readers): I will explore these philosophical positions with an eye to their interconnections with some concrete issues of set theoretic method.

Let me begin with a brief look at what to count as ‘philosophy’. To some extent, this is a matter of usage, and mathematicians sometimes classify as ‘philosophical’ any considerations other than outright proofs. So, for example, discussions of the propriety of particular mathematical methods would fall under this heading: should we prefer analytic or synthetic approaches in geometry? Should elliptic functions be treated in terms of explicit representations (as in Weierstrass) or geometrically (as in Riemann)? Should we allow impredicative definitions? Should we restrict ourselves to a logic without bivalence or the law of the excluded middle? Also included in this category would be the trains of thought that shaped our central concepts: should a function always be defined by a formula? Should a group be required to have an inverse for every element? Should ideal divisors be defined contextually or explicitly, treated computationally or abstractly? In addition, there are more general questions concerning mathematical values, aims and goals: Should we strive for powerful theories or low-risk theories? How much stress should be placed on the fact or promise of physical applications? How important are interconnections between the various branches of mathematics? These philosophical questions of method naturally include several peculiar to set theory: should set theorists focus their efforts on drawing consequences for areas of interest to mathematicians outside mathematical logic? Should exploration of the standard axioms of ZFC be preferred to the exploration and exploitation of new axioms? How should axioms for set theory be chosen? What would a solution to the Continuum Problem look like?

It is shown to be consistent with set theory that every set of reals of size ℵ1 is null yet there are ℵ1 planes in Euclidean 3-space whose union is not null. Similar results will be obtained for other geometric objects. The proof relies on results from harmonic analysis about the boundedness of certain harmonic functions and a measure theoretic pigeonhole principle.

In this paper I will communicate some new consequences of the Proper Forcing Axiom. First, the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom implies that there is a well ordering of ℝ which is Σ1-definable in (H(ω2), ϵ). Second, the Proper Forcing Axiom implies that the class of uncountable linear orders has a five element basis. The elements are X, ω1, , C, C * where X is any suborder of the reals of size ω1 and C is any Countryman line. Third, the Proper Forcing Axiom implies the Singular Cardinals Hypothesis at k unless stationary subsets of reflect. The techniques are expected to be applicable to other open problems concerning the theory ofH(ω2).

We initiate the reverse mathematics of general topology. We show that a certain metrization theorem is equivalent to Π12 comprehension. An MF space is defined to be a topological space of the form MF(P) with the topology generated by {Np ∣ p ϵ P}. Here P is a poset, MF(P) is the set of maximal filters on P, and Np = {F ϵ MF(P) ∣ p ϵ F }. If the poset P is countable, the space MF(P) is said to be countably based. The class of countably based MF spaces can be defined and discussed within the subsystem ACA0 of second order arithmetic. One can prove within ACA0 that every complete separable metric space is homeomorphic to a countably based MF space which is regular. We show that the converse statement, “every countably based MF space which is regular is homeomorphic to a complete separable metric space,” is equivalent to . The equivalence is proved in the weaker system . This is the first example of a theorem of core mathematics which is provable in second order arithmetic and implies Π12 comprehension.

The final two volumes, numbers IV and V, of the Oxford University Press edition of the Collected Works of Kurt Gödel [3]–[7] appeared in 2003, thus completing a project that started over twenty years earlier. What I mainly want to do here is trace, from the vantage point of my personal involvement, the at some times halting and at other times intense development of the Gödel editorial project from the first initiatives following Gödel's death in 1978 to its completion last year. It may be useful to scholars mounting similar editorial projects for other significant figures in our field to learn how and why various decisions were made and how the work was carried out, though of course much is particular to who and what we were dealing with.

My hope here is also to give the reader who is not already familiar with the Gödel Works a sense of what has been gained in the process, and to encourage dipping in according to interest. Given the absolute importance of Gödel for mathematical logic, students should also be pointed to these important source materials to experience first hand the exercise of his genius and the varied ways of his thought and to see how scholarly and critical studies help to expand their significance.

Though indeed much has been gained in our work there is still much that can and should be done; besides some indications below, for that the reader is referred to [2].

We define the notion of ordinal computability by generalizing standard Turing computability on tapes of length ω to computations on tapes of arbitrary ordinal length. We show that a set of ordinals is ordinal computable from a finite set of ordinal parameters if and only if it is an element of Gödel's constructible universe L. This characterization can be used to prove the generalized continuum hypothesis in L.

As initially envisioned, Gödel's Collected Works were to include transcriptions of material from his mathematical workbooks. In the end that material, as well as some other manuscript items from Gödel's Nachlass, had to be left out. This note describes some of the unpublished items in the Nachlass that are likely to attract the notice of scholars and surveys the extent of shorthand transcription efforts undertaken hitherto. Some examples of sources outside Gödel's Nachlass that may be of interest to Gödel scholars are also indicated.

When attempting to generalize recursion theory to admissible ordinals, it may seem as if all classical priority constructions can be lifted to any admissible ordinal satisfying a sufficiently strong fragment of the replacement scheme. We show, however, that this is not always the case. In fact, there are some constructions which make an essential use of the notion of finiteness which cannot be replaced by the generalized notion of α-finiteness. As examples we discuss both codings of models of arithmetic into the recursively enumerable degrees, and non-distributive lattice embeddings into these degrees. We show that if an admissible ordinal α is effectively close to ω (where this closeness can be measured by size or by cofinality) then such constructions may be performed in the α-r.e. degrees, but otherwise they fail. The results of these constructions can be expressed in the first-order language of partially ordered sets, and so these results also show that there are natural elementary differences between the structures of α-r.e. degrees for various classes of admissible ordinals α. Together with coding work which shows that for some α, the theory of the α-r.e. degrees is complicated, we get that for every admissible ordinal α, the α-r.e. degrees and the classical r.e. degrees are not elementarily equivalent.

Two young logicians, whose work had a dramatic impact on the direction of logic, exchanged two letters in early 1931. Jacques Herbrand initiated the correspondence on 7 April and Kurt Gödel responded on 25 July, just two days before Herbrand died in a mountaineering accident at La Bérarde (Isère). Herbrand's letter played a significant role in the development of computability theory. Gödel asserted in his 1934 Princeton Lectures and on later occasions that it suggested to him a crucial part of the definition of a general recursive function. Understanding this role in detail is of great interest as the notion is absolutely central. The full text of the letter had not been available until recently, and its content (as reported by Gödel) was not in accord with Herbrand's contemporaneous published work. Together, the letters reflect broader intellectual currents of the time: they are intimately linked to the discussion of the incompleteness theorems and their potential impact on Hilbert's Program.

The connections between mathematical logic and combinatorics have a rich history. This paper focuses on one aspect of this relationship: understanding the strength, measured using the tools of computability theory and reverse mathematics, of various partition theorems. To set the stage, recall two of the most fundamental combinatorial principles, König's Lemma and Ramsey's Theorem. We denote the set of natural numbers by ω and the set of finite sequences of natural numbers by ω<ω. We also identify each n ∈ ω with its set of predecessors, so n = {0, 1, 2, …, n − 1}.