Political participation has long been a puzzle for political science analysis. The logic of collective action suggests that activity to achieve collective goals is irrational; yet citizens are active. In this article, we approach the subject from the point of view of political activists, using survey data to consider their own interpretations of why they took part. The data show that participants recall many gratifications from their activity and that the patterns differ substantially across modes of participation. These rewards tend to be ‘political’ in that activists cite both civic gratifications and the desire to achieve collective goals more frequently than would be expected on the basis of rational choice approaches. The variations among acts with respect to the nature of the retrospective interpretations of the rewards they provide – in conjunction with open-ended responses about the issues behind activity – lend credence to respondents' accounts. The results call into question the applicability of narrow rational choice approaches to political activity.

The pursuit of high ideals in politics is often scorned as unrealistic and, therefore, undesirable. This article considers two new ways in which this might be true. One allegation is that ideals might be so highly idealized as to be inaccessible to ordinary agents and hence incapable of guiding their actions. The other notes that the full and simultaneous implementation of all of our ideals is typically unrealistic, and that first-best ideal desiderata may well be imperfect guides to choice among second-best worlds.

The recent politics of South Asia has been dominated by separatist movements that have waged violent struggles to assert their control over parts of existing national states. The precise moment of the outbreak of these movements is influenced by the perception of the geopolitical context by their leaders and the stability of the central state against which they rebel. But their main driving force originates from a shared belief in their unique and distinct cultural identity, which, in their eyes, justifies their right to an exclusive homeland. This article examines subnationalism in South Asia as a special case of cultural nationalism. Subnationalism has long been an anomaly for both liberal and Marxist social theorists, who concede its existence but cannot explain it adequately. The analysis undertaken here moves beyond the sociological and historical accounts of the origins and evolution of subnationalism in South Asia by formulating a political explanation drawing on theories of rational choice and collective action. The article argues that (a) leaders of subnationalist movements draw on both sentiments and interests, and (b) the direction and pace of these movements are influenced by the political resources that they are able to mobilize. Though the case studies on which the article draws are mainly from South Asia, the model that underpins them is applicable to other cultural and temporal contexts as well.

Existing models of the political business cycle have performed poorly in empirical tests because they have misspecified the interests of their primary actors – the incumbent politicians. While these models assume that governments face similar incentives to manipulate the economy at each election, governments' incentives can in fact vary from election to election depending upon their political needs at the time. The more likely the government is to be re-elected, the less it can gain by inducing cycles that are costly because of their impact on both the government's reputation and future macroeconomic performance. The degree to which the government manipulates the economy should thus be negatively correlated with its political security going into the election.

This prediction is tested by examining transfer payments in Great Britain, 1961–92. While a traditional model that is insensitive to the government's political needs finds no evidence of politically-motivated manipulations, a model which takes these factors into account reveals a robust, and at times sizeable, electoral-economic cycle.

This article investigates the decision-making process in the French bicameral legislature: the navette system. In this system, the legislation shuttles between the two houses until agreement is reached or until a stopping rule is applied. We examine the interaction between upper and lower houses as a bargaining game with complete and one-sided incomplete information.

The complete information model permits us to evaluate the political implications of the navette's various institutional features (where the bill is first introduced, number of iterations, final veto power, etc.). The incomplete information approach permits us to predict the duration of the navette process. Data from the French Fifth Republic in the 1959–86 period corroborate the conclusions of the model. Because the navette system is the most commonly used method of decision making in bicameral legislatures, the model can be usefully generalized to other countries.

Popular support for the British government's privatization programme has never exceeded 40 per cent of the electorate, and by the end of the 1980s, huge public flotations of industries like water and the electricity suppliers and generators were taking place in the teeth of widespread popular opposition. The evidence on voting behaviour suggests, however, that it was the Labour party rather than the Conservatives which lost electoral support as a result of the privatization programme. This Research Note offers an explanation for this apparent paradox.

Political folk wisdom has long suggested that the electoral fortunes of left-of-centre political parties are affected by the rate of turnout. As is so often the case, the conventional wisdom has yet to be subjected to wide empirical scrutiny. In this Note, we attempt such an examination in the context of national elections in industrial democracies.