This article attempts to explain why it is that in spite of being exposed to similar economic and social forces, cities in Europe and the United States have followed distinctive patterns of development. In continental Europe core urban areas have remained relatively resilient compared with equivalent areas in Britain and the United States. While economic and demographic factors are important explanatory factors, they cannot account for all of the important differences characteristic of the three urban systems, whether measured in quantitative or qualitative terms. It is argued that Continental cities are better protected because of a long-established elite commitment to specific urban areas which has its roots in the development of the modern state. This commitment is labelled ‘civic community’ which finds political expression through complex representational networks at the local, regional and national levels. In Britain no equivalent networks exist and civic community is low. As a result, elites have little commitment to core urban areas. In the United States, complex representational networks do exist, but they are not linked to a historically established elite commitment to core city areas. Instead, the economic market place determines the fortunes of central cities. It is concluded that these contrasting paths of development place considerable constraints on public policies designed to regenerate central city areas.

A number of writers have drawn upon the republican tradition in political thought to criticize liberals like Rawls and Dworkin for neglecting the importance of public service and civic virtue. In this article, I present and evaluate one version of this critique, which can be found in recent work by Quentin Skinner and Charles Taylor. I argue that their critique, which I term ‘instrumental republicanism’, is caught on the horns of a dilemma. Depending on how the critique is formulated, either there is no interesting disagreement between liberals and republicans, or there is, but not one which should concern liberals. Either way, instrumental republicanism cannot be said to offer an improvement on the liberal attitudes towards public service and civic virtue.

The hypothesis that parties are better able to carry out mandates in Britain than the United States is tested for the Reagan and Thatcher years. A list of specific pledges was compiled and it was determined whether or not the pledges were fulfilled. The primary finding is that more Conservative party pledges were fulfilled, compared to those of the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States. In each country policy took a conservative turn, but because more pledges were fulfilled in Britain, the ‘Conservative revolution’ was more thorough there than in the United States. It is suggested, in contrast to the findings of previous literature, that institutional differences between the two countries are one factor that matters when it comes to bringing about policy change.

The representation of public preferences in public policy is fundamental to most conceptions of democracy. If representation is effectively undertaken, we would expect to find a correspondence between public preferences for policy and policy itself. If representation is dynamic, policy makers should respond to changes in preferences over time. The integrity of the representational connection, however, rests fundamentally on the expectation that the public actually notices and responds to policy decisions. Such a public would adjust its preferences for ‘more’ or ‘less’ policy in response to what policy makers actually do, much like a thermostat. Despite its apparent importance, there is little research that systematically addresses this feedback of policy on preferences over time. Quite simply, we do not know whether the public adjusts its preferences for policy in response to what policy makers do. By implication, we do not fully understand the dynamics of representation. This research begins to address these issues and focuses on the relationships between public preferences and policy in a single, salient domain.

Once dominant and unchallenged throughout the USSR, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union rapidly lost authority in the last two years of Soviet rule. Banned by Russian presidential decree after the failure of the attempted coup of August 1991, it was re-established in February 1993 and soon became the largest of the postcommunist parties. A 1992 survey of current and former party members as well as other Russians found that members were characterized by a relatively high degree of activism. They were disproportionately male, more affluent than non-members, and better provided with consumer goods. Younger respondents and religious believers were more likely to have left the party than their older colleagues. Those who still regarded themselves as party members were the most likely to oppose economic reform and support the collectivist principles of the communist era, particularly if they were activists; but the differences between members and non-members were not substantial, and both were found to hold generally pessimistic views on the postcommunist system. These findings suggest that, although former members will continue to be influential, CPSU membership is by itself likely to play a limited part in shaping the political direction of postcommunist Russia.

The concept of cross-cutting cleavages has provided an influential explanation of why some regions with severe ethnic divisions have been able to establish and maintain political stability, while others have experienced violent conflict. It is suggested that where a deep communal cleavage is cross-cut by other politically salient divisions, a network of overlapping group memberships is created. This generates a series of divided loyalties that reduce the internal cohesiveness of any one group and encourages greater social and political stability. In the absence of such cross pressures, cumulative, reinforcing allegiances create ‘fragmented’ political cultures where all the politically relevant sources of division lie parallel, where group loyalty is paramount and where intercommunal hostility is the norm.

No one who has read either Rawls's Political Liberalism or my An Essay on Rights can fail to profit from the penetrating analysis to which Peter Jones has subjected them.

Disposed to agree with most of what he says about the former, I am also inclined – but as yet unable – to disagree with much of what he says about the latter. However, alongside his many acute criticisms on which I'll need to reflect further, Jones's report of two key moves in my argument requires some revision and may, therefore, warrant this brief early response.