Political parties that wish to exercise executive power in parliamentary democracies are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. Parties can either form a pre-electoral coalition prior to election or they can compete independently and form a government coalition afterwards. While there is a vast literature on government coalitions, little is known about pre-electoral coalitions. A systematic analysis of these coalitions using a new dataset constructed by the author and presented here contains information on all potential pre-electoral coalition dyads in twenty industrialized parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998. Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Finally, they are more likely to form if the party system is ideologically polarized and the electoral rules are disproportional.

Complaints are common about the arbitrary and conservative bias of special-majority rules. Such complaints, however, apply to asymmetrical versions of those rules alone. Symmetrical special-majority rules remedy that defect, albeit at the cost of often rendering no determinate verdict. Here what is formally at stake, both procedurally and epistemically, is explored in the choice between those two forms of special-majority rule and simple-majority rule; and practical ways are suggested of resolving matters left open by symmetrical special-majority rules – such as ‘judicial extrapolation’ or ‘subsidiarity’ in a federal system.

Biotechnology policy in the United States promotes the commercial development of genetically modified crops, yet adopts a precautionary approach when it comes to stem cells and cloning. In this article, the evolution of this bifurcated policy domain is traced. A detailed analysis of congressional hearings shows how distinctions between the products of biotechnology came to be reflected in the character of committees holding hearings, the attention to risks and benefits, and the pattern of interest-group activity in different biotechnology applications. It is argued that many of the differences that separate the United States and Europe in biotechnology reflect the way institutions reinforce past policy choices.

Scholars have invested a great deal of effort in trying to estimate the impact of political campaigns on the public. While progress has been made, one fundamental problem continues to plague our attempts to study campaigns: the lack of good, detailed data about the behaviour of candidates. In the United States, for instance, the presidential battle is a national struggle that unfolds locally on the stages of fifty states, yet most data collection efforts have treated presidential elections as if they were national contests, conducted (implicitly) in an identical manner across the entire country. Using available (national) data as a baseline and theory to predict plausible variations from that baseline, the authors devise a method for simulating variation in presidential campaigns across states and over election years—one of the crucial missing pieces of the puzzle. Their method generates a range of plausible effects, which is often narrow enough to shed light on important hypotheses. It can be employed whenever data are available at a more aggregate level than is desirable. This method is then applied to assess the debate over the impact of attack advertising on turnout. This approach suggests that campaign negativism stimulated (rather than demobilized) turnout in presidential elections from 1980 through 2000.

A sophisticated research tradition has explored theoretically and empirically the consequences of election laws for vote–seat disproportionality and, more recently, for the distance between citizen and legislative left–right medians. In contemporary parliamentary systems, policy making tends to be dominated by governments, not legislatures. This article extends election law theory to its expected effects on the left–right representativeness of governing parties and examines whether these are realized after eighty-two elections in fifteen mature parliamentary systems. The analysis shows how the legislative median party, the legislative plurality party and pre-election coalition agreements between parties shape these connections between citizens, legislatures and governments. The article also develops more nuanced measures of party influence on policy making and re-examines the governmental findings using these. Governments and policy-making configurations emerging from bargaining after PR elections are in net significantly closer to their citizens than those created by SMD elections.

There is ongoing controversy as to whether political democracy inhibits or facilitates national economic growth. It is argued here that the answer to this question depends greatly on the regional political context within which democracy functions. In regions where social groups clamour for redistribution, as in Latin America, democracy may lead to populism and poor economic performance. Similarly, in regions where state elites are generally committed to promoting rapid industrialization, as in parts of Asia, democratic pressures may impede effective economic policy. However, in regions where patrimonialism is chronic, as in Sub-Saharan Africa, democracy may provide a useful mechanism for evicting grossly corrupt politicians and may therefore facilitate higher rates of economic growth. These regional arguments are tested statistically here and show that democratic governance constrains growth in Latin America and Asia yet facilitates growth in Africa. Sensitivity analyses indicate that these findings are fairly robust.

Immigration has become a highly salient political issue in many of the world's affluent democracies. Yet, the electoral dynamics of anti-immigrant sentiment remain barely understood. We distinguish two dimensions of concern about immigrants: material threat and cultural threat, and hold that the influence of both on the right-wing populist party vote is critically mediated by policy preferences to restrict immigration and to isolate Australia from foreign influence. The result is a path model of voting that allows material and cultural threat to influence policy preferences about how to deal with the ‘immigrant problem’, and allows both threat and policy preferences to affect voting for the far-right One Nation party in Australia. Our results confirm that popular concern about immigrants is multi-dimensional and that its two dimensions have different sources. We also demonstrate that anti-immigrant sentiment works indirectly through policy orientations to influence vote choice. Feelings about immigrants, in other words, have an electoral effect only when there is a good fit between the policy stances of voters and the policies promoted by the parties on offer.

The ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature identifies the labour market and labour relations system as an institutional feature by which liberal market economies (LMEs) and co-ordinated market economies (CMEs) of advanced countries may be distinguished. This literature argues for the resilience of CME institutional features to the allegedly convergence-inducing or homogenizing effects of globalization. Resilience to convergence has also revealed different patterns of institutional adaptation to globalizing pressures among CMEs. This article examines the adaptation of labour institutions to globalization using the Northeast Asian Newly Industrialized Countries of South Korea (hereafter Korea) and Taiwan as case studies. Examples are given of how Korea and Taiwan have pursued labour market liberalization, but within institutional conditions (policies and politics) distinct from those associated with transitions to the LME. The origins of this distinctive pattern of response are explained, pointing out the need for explanations based on globalization to be supplemented by ones that emphasize economic legacies and political logics.