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Why Executive-Legislative Conflict in the United States is Dwindling

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Paul E. Peterson  and
Jay P. Greene
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Extract

An examination of executive-legislative conflict occurring in US congressional committees between 1947 and 1990 reveals that, despite current concerns of gridlock, the overall level of conflict declined during this period. There are two structural sources of inter-branch conflict – constituent and partisan. The constituent basis for conflict in the United States is rooted in the differing manner in which members of the two branches are elected. Because the executive has a national constituency, it is primarily concerned with matters of national policy. Members of Congress, who have smaller, more homogeneous constituencies, are more concerned with the geographically distributive effects of these policies. The authors' evidence suggests that conflict between the executive and legislative in the United States is greatest on issues that are of both national and distributive significance. The partisan basis for conflict, long established in the House and increasingly visible in the Senate, is reinforced by competitive political contests. Yet conflict between members of Congress and executive officials of the opposite party did not increase between 1947 and 1990. And conflict with executive officials of the same party declined, producing an overall drop in executive-legislative conflict.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , January 1994 , pp. 33 - 55
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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References

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20 Since the logit coefficients may not have much meaning to many readers, we are reporting in the text frequencies derived from the logit coefficients, setting all other independent variables to their mean. All frequencies reported in the text have corresponding coefficients in Table 1 and 2.

21 A not dissimilar tripartite classification scheme – foreign, domestic and defence – has been proposed by Rohde, David, ‘Presidential Support in the House of Representatives’, in Peterson, Paul E., ed., The President, the Congress, and the Making of Foreign Policy (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1994).Google Scholar

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