What Explains Credible Apologies? A Comment on Yap' ‘Non-Electoral Responsiveness Mechanisms’

Abstract

In a recent issue of this Journal Professor Yap asks whether and how governments in what she calls ‘less-democratic’ countries, that is those where elections are uncompetitive due to a lack of democratic safeguards or opposition parties, are held accountable for the effects of their policies on economic performance. She argues that governments in these countries have an interest in avoiding strife and inducing private actors to provide resources necessary for economic prosperity. Because of this, ‘when their economies are performing less than optimally, these governments tend to offer credible apologies in the same year to attenuate the potential labour disquiet and loss in production investment.’ Yap develops the concept of a credible apology as the joint occurrence of punishment of responsible actors or reparations to injured parties, and an increase in monitoring activity by non-government actors. She then presents evidence for South Korea for 1964–87 and Singapore and Malaysia for 1966–94 showing that, ceteris paribus, the tendency of production investment to decrease and strike activity to increase in years with high unemployment is offset if the government makes a credible apology.

Yap is quite clear that she assumes a causal arrow running from poor economic performance to credible apologies. Indeed, such a causal relationship is necessary for the concept of accountability; the events that Yap classifies as credible apologies must be made in response to unsatisfactory economic performance in order for us to say that these governments are being held (or are holding themselves) accountable for the consequences of their policies.