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Voting Procedures: A Summary Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Hannu Nurmi
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Extract

Roughly two centuries ago the Marquis de Condorcet and Chevalier Jean-Charles de Borda originated a research tradition – by no means a continuous one – that over the decades has produced results casting doubt on many widely used collective decision-making procedures. The phenomenon known as the Condorcet effect or the Condorcet paradox is the well-known problem of the simple majority rule. The paradox bearing the name of Borda is less commonly known, but it also relates to a procedure that is widely used, namely the plurality principle. Either one of these paradoxes is serious enough to make these procedures suspect unless one is convinced that the situations giving rise to these paradoxical features are extremely rare. In this article we review some voting procedures that have been introduced in the literature. We aim at giving a synthesis of the assessments of procedures with respect to various criteria.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 13 , Issue 2 , April 1983 , pp. 181 - 208
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1983

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References

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57 Actually, this amounts to disregarding both implementation criteria as all binary methods can be implemented in a simple way.