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Structure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Steven R. Reed
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Extract

Japan uses simple plurality elections with multi-member districts to elect its lower house. This system tends to produce competition among n + 1 candidates per district. This ‘law of simple plurality elections’ is a structural generalization akin to Duverger's Law. Evidence from Japan also indicates that the causal mechanism behind this ‘law’ is not strategic voting, although strategic voting occurs, but elite coalition building. It is further argued that the connection between structure and behaviour is learning and not rationality. Equilibria are reached slowly through trial and error processes. Once reached, the equilibrium is unstable because parties and candidates try to change it. Even without rational actors and stable equilibria, however, this structural generalization accurately describes the dynamics of electoral competition at the district level in Japan.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , July 1990 , pp. 335 - 356
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1990

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References

1 Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties (New York: Wiley, 1963), p. 217.Google Scholar

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7 Since 1955 there has been one single-member district. The redistricting of 1986 created one six-member district and four two-member districts.

8 A minimum percentage of the vote is required and run-off elections have been held, but none have been required since the early postwar years. For the relevant rules see Kōshoku Senkyo-hō (Public Election Law), Article 10, section 95.

9 Taiwan uses the same system with large districts. See Winkler, Edwin A., ‘Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism’, China Quarterly, 89 (1984), 481–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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18 How many voters should be represented? The single-member district offers a clear and defensible answer: the majority. Similarly, proportional representation gives a clear and defensible answer: everyone. The Japanese system gives intermediate answers. In a three-member district threequarters of the voters are represented; in a four-member district, four-fifths; and in a five-member district, five-sixths.

19 The first postwar election in 1946 was held under slightly different rules and in large electoral districts.

20 This calculation is simply the number of seats, 512 in 1986, plus one loser for each of the 130 districts, divided by 512.

21 The Laakso-Taagepera index is where v is the proportion of the vote. One normally sums across parties but here I sum across candidates.

22 The French run-off system produces a similar phenomenon of co-operation and competition among members of a coalition. See Tsebelis, George, ‘Nested Games: The Cohesion of French Coalitions’, British Journal of Political Science, 18 (1988), 145–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Rochon, Thomas R. and Pierce, Roy, ‘Coalitions versus Rivalries: French Socialists and Communists, 1967–78’, Comparative Politics, 18 (1985), 437–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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26 Matching those retiring with their successors is not always obvious. For everyone retiring I coded a successor if someone in the same party ran in his place. Successors were matched first if they shared the retiring person's last name and next if they shared the same faction. If no other criteria applied I matched successors and those retiring by order of finish.

27 For descriptions of each of the opposition parties see Hrebenar, Ronald J., ed., The Japanese Party System (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986).Google Scholar

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30 One quirk is still possible in a competitive district. Maldistribution of a party's vote among its candidates may cause them to lose a seat. However, this quirk has also become rarer. The distribution of votes has become remarkably even in recent elections, a phenomenon deserving further study.

31 See Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984) for an evolutionary use of game theory.Google Scholar

32 A few were forcibly retired by a second round of purges.