Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 April 2001
Applying insights from social-choice theory to illuminate the functioning of pluralitarian Westminster institutions, this article develops a coherent political answer to four puzzling questions about the economic liberalization that transformed New Zealand in 1984–93: why an anti-statist programme was initiated (and largely accomplished) by a labour party, why restructuring was more radical in New Zealand than in other democracies, why reformers were able to prevail through two elections and a change of government, and why they committed costly policy-sequencing errors. Understanding this remarkable case has implications for empirically grounded social-choice theory, the political theory of policy reform, and the evaluation of pluralitarian democracy – which New Zealanders themselves repudiated in 1993 by adopting proportional representation.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in 1994. For comments on that draft, the author thanks Jonathan Boston, Christopher Clague, Brian Easton, Keith Jackson, Alan McRobie, Richard Mulgan, Herman Schwartz, Graham Scott, Jack Vowles and Albert Weale. He is grateful to the many New Zealanders who generously shared their knowledge, insights and hospitality. Special thanks are due Margaret Clark and the Politics Department at Victoria University of Wellington for providing a base for research. This publication was made possible through support provided by the US Agency for International Development under Cooperative Agreement No. DHR-0015-A-00-0031-00 to the Center on Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) and administered by the Office of Economic and Institutional Reform, Center for Economic Growth, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support and Research. Additional support was provided by the University of Pennsylvania through the Daniel J. Brodsky Term Chair and a grant from the University's Research Foundation.