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The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign-Policy Situations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

David Patrick Houghton
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Extract

A number of scholars have argued that historical analogizing plays an important role in foreign-policy decision making; the extent of that importance, however, remains largely a mystery to us. This article proposes that analogical reasoning is probably even more commonplace than previously thought, since it may play a crucial role even in ‘novel foreign policy situations’ (scenarios which appear largely unprecedented to the decision makers confronting them).

One notable example of a novel foreign-policy situation is provided by the Iranian hostage crisis. Examining the Carter administration's decision-making processes during that crisis, the article concludes that even though many saw the hostage crisis as a unique occurrence, the participants drew upon a wide range of historical analogies in order to make sense of what was occuring and to propose suggested ‘solutions’ to the crisis.

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Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 26 , Issue 4 , October 1996 , pp. 523 - 552
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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