Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 March 2013
International conflict has profoundly influenced election outcomes in some cases, and in other cases has had a minimal impact. This article develops a theory that the increased salience of foreign policy issues following periods of international hostilities increases the variance of government parties’ vote shares. In elections following conflict, the ability to accurately predict election outcomes using traditional economic voting models is reduced. The article provides evidence from advanced democracies in the post-World War II era that being involved in international disputes increases the predictive error of vote shares. More substantively, vote choice models should model the role of exogenous shocks such as international conflict in order to avoid making misleading inferences. The study concludes by discussing the meaningful implications for various theories of voting behavior and international conflict.
Department of Political Science, University of Missouri; Department of Political Science, Purdue University (emails [email protected], [email protected]). The authors would like to thank the four anonymous reviewers as well as Daina Chiba, Cooper Drury, Michael T. Koch, Hoon Lee, Dave Lektzian, Brandon Prins, Toby Rider and Guy D. Whitten for their valuable comments. An online appendix with supplementary materials is available at http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1017/S000712341200083X.