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Party Identification and Party Stability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Murray Goot
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'Party identification’ has been variously described: as an anchor; as constituting ‘psychological membership’ of, or ‘psychological identification’ with the party; and so on. The compilers of a recent collection of political attitude measures, published under the auspices of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center (where most of the election analyses since 1952 have pivoted about the concept), even describe party identification as ‘probably the most important attitude variable in the field of political behavior’.² But the term itself and its connotations are misleading. Even where they do not suggest a borrowing from the technical vocabulary of psychoanalysisγ they tend to define away a set of questions that need to be answered: a preference for one party compared to what?; an intense preference, in what sense and compared to whom?4

In 1955 Professor H. L. A. Hart put forward the claim that ‘if there are any moral rights at all, it follows that there is at least one natural right, the equal right of all men to be free’, and this thesis and the arguments he adduces in its support have been thought sufficiently important for the article to be reprinted in a recent book of readings on political philosophy for students and general readers. The truth of Hart's thesis as stated is clearly meant to be independent of the moral stance of the asserter. Yet to my mind it is untenable as it stands, and could be modified only at the expense of taking up a particular moral position.

Type
Notes and Comments
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , January 1972 , pp. 121 - 125
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1972

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References

1 See, e.g., Key, V. O. Jr,, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 65Google Scholar; Converse, Philip E. and Dupeux, Georges, ‘Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States’, Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVI (1962)Google Scholar, reprinted in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966), 269–91, p. 277; Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E. and Stokes, Donald E., The American Voter: An Abridgment (New York: Wiley, 1964), p. 67Google Scholar; and Greenstein, Fred I., The American Party System and the American People (Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 36, n. 20.Google Scholar

2 Robinson, John P., Rusk, Jerrold G. and Head, Kendra B., Measures of Political Attitudes (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1968), p. 495.Google Scholar

3 For a sceptical but sustained discussion of the probability of such an identification forming the basis for the development of party preferences, see Connell, R. W., The Child's Construction of Politics (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1971), Chap. 4.Google Scholar

4 Compare, Rae, Douglas W. and Taylor, Michael, The Analysis of Political Cleavages (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 45–7.Google Scholar

5 Campbell, et al. , The American Voter, p. 57.Google Scholar

6 Converse, Philip E., ‘The Concept of the Normal Vote’, in Campbell, et al. , Elections and the Political Order, pp. 9–39, especially p. 26.Google Scholar

7 Converse and Dupeux, ‘Politicization’. See also, e.g., Greenstein, Fred I. and Tarrow, Sidney, ‘The Study of French Political Socialization: Toward the Revocation of Paradox’, World Politics, xxii (1969), 95–137, p. 111 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar; Payne, James L., Patterns of Conflict in Columbia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 112–3Google Scholar; Pulzer, Peter G. J., Political Representation and Elections in Britain (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), p. 130Google Scholar; and Langto, Kenneth P.Political Socialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 53.Google Scholar

8 Notice, however, the strength of the qualification entailed by the admission of what might have been termed ‘negative party identification’, i.e. knowing what party or parties one would not vote for. Thus here, the remark that if the choice were ‘simply’ (sic) between Communist and non-Communist, ‘the proportion of ready self-classifications would advance considerably toward the American figure’. Whether respondents were asked if there were other parties they would not vote for is not made clear. Converse, and Dupeux, , ‘Politicization’, p. 279.Google Scholar

9 The alternatives in (3) differ from the usual Michigan dichotomy of ‘strong’ and ‘not very strong’, with no third alternative. The usage adopted here, however, does correspond to that adopted in the Michigan-style studies in Australia (forthcoming) and the United Kingdom. See, Butler, David and Stokes, Donald, Political Change in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 469Google Scholar; also p. 514 where for ‘party identification’ we are referred to ‘partisan self-image’ though the index of this, not surprisingly given the use of ‘identification’ among social psychologists at least, remains the same.

10 A propos the meaning of intensity, at least two of the respondents thought that the question covering strength of party identification referred to whether or not they were party members! In this regard it is worth noting that no more than 14 of the 56 party members regarded themselves as ‘very strong’ supporters of their party.

1 Hart, H. L. A., ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, Philosophical Review, 64 (1955), 175–91, p. 175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Quinton, Anthony, ed., Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967).Google Scholar

3 Hart, , ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’ p. 175.Google Scholar