Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2009
A recent article in this Journal (Patrick Dunleavy and G. W. Jones with others, ‘Leaders, Politics and Institutional Change: The Decline of Prime Ministerial Accountability to the House of Commons, 1868–1990’, 23 (1993), 267–98) demonstrated a clear secular decline in prime ministers' accountability to Parliament. It examined the frequency with which prime ministers from W. E. Gladstone to Margaret Thatcher accounted directly to MPs by answering oral questions and making statements, major speeches and minor interventions in debates. The decline in each of these activities had followed a different pattern. There was a steep fall in prime ministers' participation in oral questions until the late 1950s, but after parliament and Harold Macmillan had agreed that prime ministers would answer questions for 15 minutes on Tuesdays and Thursdays, the fall seemed to have been arrested. The evidence from John Major's premiership, which is presented below, shows that, even within this apparently rigid timetable, there has been further decline. The making of statements, after a period of near absence, had revived in the 1940s, but declined noticeably again in the 1980s. Dunleavy and Jones concluded that increases in the number of prime-ministerial statements were associated with international and domestic crises, summits and the relaxation of procedural rules. Evidence from Major's performance reinforces these findings. The long-term trend towards fewer substantial speeches was found to have accelerated in the 1980s, a development which was mirrored in a fall in the number of debating interventions during the Thatcher years. The evidence on these two activities, presented below, indicates a partial return under Major to pre-Thatcher norms – though this revival may be only a temporary phenomenon.
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2 Statements transgress the fundamental procedural rule of the Commons, which is that the House is always considering a question on which a vote could be taken. Conventions developed after the Second World War, have transformed statements from being ‘irregular’ to being accepted ‘exceptions’, making it easier for prime ministers to make statements, and opposition party leaders and backbenchers to respond in the form of questions to the prime minister. See successive editions of Erskine May; Griffith, J. A. G. and Ryle, M., Parliament (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1989), p. 177.Google Scholar
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6 The evidence was collected during four parliamentary sessions from the day John Major became prime minister to the end of the 1993–94 session, with the exception of the debate on the European Communities (Finance) Bill, referred to below, which took place just outside this period, on 28 November 1994.
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10 Leigh, Andrew and Maynard, Michael, Independent, 11 06 1993.Google Scholar
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12 John Major's replies during the sample period 1993–94 would have been even longer had the speaker not made a special statement to the House, asking MPs and ministers for shorter questions and answers: during the month previous to her statement John Major's three longest replies each day averaged sixteen lines. HC Debates, 238, col. 435, 24 02 1994.Google Scholar
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22 Cf. the standing committees examining European Community legislation each Wednesday which can require ministers to make a statement and then question them, without officials close at hand, for up to an hour.
23 Debate on European Communities (Finance Bill), 28 November 1994. ‘John Major chose not to speak in the debate, though he had let it be known that defeat on the bill would mean the end of his government’ (The Economist, 3 12 1994).Google Scholar
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25 For each activity, the mean and standard deviation of the set of prime ministers' actual percentage scores is calculated. The data are then transformed according to the formula: Z-score = (actual score – mean score)/standard deviation. The ‘activism score’ is the sum of the Z-scores for the four activities.
26 If a prime minister answered questions on PQ days, made at least one speech on SP days, at least one statement on ST days and at least one minor intervention on MI days, and the number of days on which s/he made any intervention at all is I, then the multi-activism ratio is (PQ + SP + ST + MI)II. This ratio is plotted on the vertical axis of Figure 4. Two caveats about the statistics need to be noted for completeness: (i) the data for an activity, such as speeches (SP), record the number of days at least one speech was made; they do not show whether, for example, two speeches were made on the same day; (ii) the multi-activism ratio does not imply that performances of second activities were evenly spread across the number of days I.
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31 See the records from Hansard for four periods of twenty-five days starting with the first Prime Minister's Questions after 1 February 1991,1992, 1993 and 1994. During the 1994 period semi-official pairing arrangements had officially broken down, but in all years Dafydd Wigley often voted when John Major did not.
32 The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this point, which remains a valid underlying principle even if obscured by the apparent reluctance of recent prime ministers to speak in parliament on matters for which they are responsible.
33 For example, written statements or no statements (instead of oral statements) on heads-of-government summits, or on pay and conditions of service of senior appointed officials and judges; failure to speak or vote in the Intelligence Services debate, 22 February 1994 (even though in the House for oral questions that day); no speech in the debate on the European Communities (Finance) Bill, which implements an agreement achieved by the prime minister in his formal capacity as president of the European Council at Edinburgh, and treated by the prime minister as a motion of no-confidence in his government.
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