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Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint: Powersharing in the World’s States, 1975–2010

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2015

Kaare W. Strøm ,
Scott Gates ,
Benjamin A.T. Graham  and
Håvard Strand
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Abstract

Arrangements for sharing political power serve three purposes: to give all relevant groups access to important political decisions; to partition the policy process, thereby granting groups relevant autonomy; and to constrain holders of political power from abusing authority. A new global dataset of political power sharing institutions, 1975–2010, is introduced here, disaggregated these along three institutional dimensions: inclusive, dispersive, and constraining. Existing literature associates power sharing with democracy and civil conflict resolution. Unlike the existing literature, this dataset shows inclusive institutions are common in post-conflict states, though least strongly associated with electoral democracy. Conversely, constraining institutions, though comparatively rare in states with current or recent civil conflicts, are highly correlated with electoral democracy.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , January 2017 , pp. 165 - 185
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2015 

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Footnotes

*

UC San Diego and University of Oslo (email: [email protected]); Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and University of Oslo (email: [email protected]); University of Southern California (email: [email protected]); PRIO and University of Oslo (email: [email protected]). The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (Grant No. SES-081950766b; PI: Strøm) and the Norwegian Research Council (196850/F10; PI: Gates). Data replication sets are available at http://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/BJPolS.

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