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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2009
In ‘Arms Races: External Security or Domestic Pressure?’ (this Journal, x, 121–8), Willem Saris and Cees Middendorp advance a compelling argument for the preponderance of domestic forces in driving arms races. However, the weight of the argument must be borne by the well-reasoned explanation of industrial forces and saturation levels, since the empirical analysis is fundamentally flawed in three ways. Definitions are lacking, data sources are ambiguous, and the application and interpretation of statistical procedures are inappropriate.
1 See Appendix 1B, p. 25, ‘US and Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces 1965–1977’, in SIPRI, World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1977 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977).Google Scholar
2 Cf. for example Hibbs, C. A., ‘Problems of Statistical Estimation and Causal Inference in Time Series Regression Models’, in Costner, H. L., Statistical Methodology 1973–74 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974)Google Scholar; Malinvaud, E., Statistical Methods of Econometrics (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1966).Google Scholar
3 Cf. Theil, Henri, ‘A Simple Modification of the Two-Stage Least Squares Procedure for Undersized Samples’ in Goldberger, Arthur S. and Duncan, Otis Dudley, eds., Structural Equation Models in the Social Sciences (New York: Seminar Press Division of Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973).Google Scholar