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Divided and Governed? Recent Research on Divided Government in the United States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Abstract

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Type
Review Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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References

1 Fiorina, Morris, ‘Divided Government in the States’, in Cox, Gary W. and Kernell, Samuel, eds. The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 179202, Figure 8.1.Google Scholar

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7 I am grateful to Alan Ware for suggesting this possible research agenda.

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18 See Wattenberg, Martin P., The Rise of Candidate Centred Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a discussion of this point.

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27 For a summary of this literature see Fiorina, , Divided Government, chap. 6.Google Scholar

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38 Such measures include bank and savings and loan deposit insurance legislation, the state-federal matching-basis status of the welfare provisions in the 1935 Social Security Act and the 1937 Public Housing Act.

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52 In constant 1982 dollars, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Tables 510 and 698. Of course, federal spending did increase massively in absolute terms during these years, as it did in constant dollars, but in relation to the size of the national economy which was growing rapidly throughout, it fell. Most commentators – and certainly most economists – measure public sector size as a proportion of the total size of the national economy.

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69 Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle discern broadly similar dynamics between the American system under divided government and European multi-party systems under proportional representation, ‘Divided Government: America is not Exceptional’, Governance, 4 (1991), 250–69Google Scholar. However, their analysis is purely theoretical. They certainly entertain the possibility of coalition politics producing ‘effective government’, in both systems, but provide no real world examples either of effective coalition politics (the Netherlands) or transparently ineffective coalition politics (Italy). Crucially, the failure of the Italian system and its subsequent reform was not precipitated so much by policy incoherence – which, it could be argued, was no worse in the 1990s than earlier – but by a crisis of the legitimacy of the political system. For a further discussion of the comparative position of the United States under divided government, see Fiorina, , Divided Government, chap. 7.Google Scholar