Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gxg78 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-24T02:33:02.937Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Civility and Traditionalism in English Political Culture

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

R. D. Jessop
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Two main themes have been emphasized in recent description and interpretation of English political behaviour. One theme traces the stability of our political system to a widespread attachment to the civic values of submission to authority and an intermittent popular participation. The other theme explains support (at least among the manual working class) for the Conservative party in terms of deference to a traditional elite and/or a pragmatic appraisal of that party's economic and welfare capabilities. Little attention has been paid to the validity of either interpretation or to the relations between them. Accordingly, this paper first reviews the evidence for both themes and attempts to relate them, and then introduces some new survey data to throwfurther light on this problematic subject.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , January 1971 , pp. 1 - 24
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1971

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See, for example, Almond, G. A. and Verba, S., The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 473–505CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Eckstein, H., ‘A Theory of Stable Democracy’, in Eckstein, , Division and Cohesion in Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 225–88Google Scholar; Nordlinger, E. A., The Working-Class Tories (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1967), pp. 210–52Google Scholar; and Shils, E. A., ‘Ideology and Civility: on the Politics of the Intellectual’, Sewanee Review, LXVI (1958), 450–80.Google Scholar

2 The extent to which deference accounts for middle class behaviour is nowhere examined: Parkin's analysis, however, strongly implies that it is applicable to this class; Butler and Stokes suggest it is indeed more relevant to middle class voting behaviour. See Parkin, F., ‘Working Class Conservatism: the Theory of Political Deviance’, British Journal of Sociology, XVIII (1967), 280–90Google Scholar; and Butler, D. E. and Stokes, D. E., Political Change in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1969), PP. 113 –15.Google Scholar

3 See, for example, McKenzie, R. T. and Silver, A., Angels in Marble (London: Heinemann, 1968)Google Scholar; Nordlinger, Working-Class Tories; Parkin, ‘Working Class Conservatism’; Samuel, R., ‘The Deference Voter’, New Left Review I (1960), 9–13.Google Scholar One of the few persons to contest this interpretation is Gilmour, Ian: see his The Body Politic (London: Hutchinson, 1969), pp. 89–92.Google Scholar

4 See, for example, Nordling, , Working-Class Tories, pp. 16–18.Google Scholar

5 See Parkin, ‘Working Class Conservatism’; on traditionalism as a general sociological concept, see Shils, E. A., ‘Tradition and Liberty: Antinomy and Interdependence’, Ethics, LXVIII (1958), 153–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Parkin, ‘Working Class Conservatism’.

7 Compare Anderson's, Perry discussion of corporate consciousness in ‘Origins of the Present Crisis’, in Anderson, P. and Blackburn, R., eds., Towards Socialism (London: Fontana, 1965), esp. pp. 33–9.Google Scholar Parkin's work employs only the simple dichotomy of central value system and contraculture and ignores this possibility.

8 See note 3 above.

9 Samuel's study included both manual and non-manual, male and female respondents, ‘Deference Voter’; McKenzie, and Silver, , however, confine their survey to manual workers and their wives, Angels in Marble, p. 159;Google ScholarNordlinger, considers only male manual workers, Working-Class Tories, pp. 65–6.Google Scholar On McKenzie and Silver's third sample see pp. 227 and 273.

10 McKenzie, and Silver, , Angels in Marble, pp. 159 and 225–8Google Scholar; Nordlinger, , Working-Class Tories, pp. 65–6 and 68Google Scholar; Samuel, ‘Deference Voter’.

11 Milne, R. S. and MacKenzie, H. C., Straight Fight (London: Hansard Society for Parliamentary Reform, 1954), calculated from table 45, p. 120Google Scholar; Milne, R. S. and MacKenzie, H. C., Marginal Seat (London: Hansard Society for Parliamentary Reform, 1958), from table 1, p. 158.Google Scholar

12 Goldthorpe, J. H., Lockwood, D., Bechhofer, F. and Platt, J., The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 18–20.Google Scholar

13 Ingham, G., ‘Plant Size: Political Attitudes and Behaviour’, Sociological Review, XVII (1969), 18–20.Google Scholar

14 McKenzie, and Silver, , Angels in Marble, pp. 207–8 and fn. 25, p. 208Google Scholar; and Nordlinger, , Working-Class Tories, p. 109.Google Scholar

15 McKenzie, and Silver, , Angels in Marble, pp. 194–5.Google Scholar

16 Nordlinger, E. A., ‘The Working Class Tory’, New Society, 13 10 1966.Google Scholar

17 Butler, and Stokes, , Political Change, pp. 113–15.Google Scholar

18 See, for example, Bonham, J., The Middle Class Vote (London: Faber, 1954), pp. 72–3Google Scholar; Milne, and Mackenzie, , Straight Fight, p. 129Google Scholar, and Marginal Seat, pp. 55 ff; Benney, M. et al. , How People Vote (London: Routledge, 1956), pp. 116–24Google Scholar; Trenaman, D. and McQuail, J., Television and the Political Image (London: Methuen, 1962), pp. 44–5Google Scholar; and Butler, and Stokes, , Political Change, pp. 359–72.Google Scholar

19 The term, ‘inverse image’, refers to the image of a party held by voters for opposing parties and derives from Trenaman and McQuail, Television.

20 See, for example, Bealey, F. et al. , Constituency Politics (London: Faber, 1965), pp. 212–13;Google ScholarMcKenzie, and Silver, , Angels in Marble, pp. 210–17;Google ScholarNordlinger, , Working-Class Tories, pp. 137–59;Google ScholarTrenaman, and McQuail, , Television, p. 52;Google ScholarAlmond, and Verba, , Civic Culture, pp. 126, 131 and 136–8;Google ScholarBlumler, G. and McQuail, J., Television in Politics (London: Faber, 1968), pp. 190–4;Google Scholar and Benney, M. et al. , ‘Social Class and Politics in Greenwich’, British Journal of Sociology, I (1950), 323.Google Scholar

21 Blumler, and McQuail, , Television in Politics, pp. 190–4.Google Scholar

22 Blumler, and McQuail, , Television in Politics, p. 193, fn. 37, and p. 79.Google Scholar

23 Trenaman, and McQuail, , Television, pp. 52–3;Google ScholarBlumler, and McQuail, , Television in Politics, p. 194;Google ScholarEckstein, H., ‘The British Political System’, in Beer, S. H. and Ulam, A., eds., Patterns of Government (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 266;Google Scholar and Parkin, , ‘Working Class Conservatism’, pp. 280 and 282.Google Scholar

24 Harris, L. M., Long to Reign Over Us? (London: Kimber, 1966),Google Scholarpassim; compare Glock, C. Y. and Stark, R. on religion and politics in Britain in their Religion and Society in Tension (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 190–200.Google Scholar

25 Bonham, Middle Class Vote.

26 On functional groups: Birch, A. H. and Campbell, P., ‘Voting Behaviour in a Lancashire Constituency’, British Journal of Sociology, I (1950), 197–208;CrossRefGoogle ScholarBirch, A. H., Small-Town Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 106;Google ScholarBealey, F. et al. , Constituency Politics, pp. 169–74;Google Scholar and Stacey, M., Tradition and Change: A Study of Banbury (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 38–48.Google Scholar None of the studies cited in earlier references reports a negative finding on status groups; most studies report a positive correlation between subjective middle-class membership and Conservative voting. For a particularly sophisticated analysis, see Runciman, W. G., Relative Deprivation and Social Justice (London: Routledge, 1966), pp. 151–87.Google Scholar

27 See Parkin, ‘Working Class Conservatism’; Nordlinger, , Working-Class Tories, pp. 204–9;Google ScholarStacey, , Tradition and Change, pp. 46–7;Google ScholarButler, and Stokes, , Political Change, pp. 144–50;Google Scholar Ingham, ‘Plant Size’; and Lockwood, D., ‘Sources of Variation in Working-Class Images of Society’, Sociological Review, XVI (1966), 249–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

28 For a general discussion of the elitist theory, see Bachrach, P., The Theory of Democratic Elitism (London: London University Press, 1969)Google Scholar; or Walker, J., ‘A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy’, American Political Science Review, LX (1966), 285–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

29 See note I above and Kornhauser, W., The Politics of Mass Society (London: Routledge, 1959)Google Scholar; Dahl, R. A., Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961)Google Scholar; and Shils, E. A., The Torment of Secrecy (London: Heinemann, 1956).Google Scholar

30 Compare Almond, and Verba, , Civic Culture, pp. 230–1 and passim.Google Scholar

31 Almond, and Verba, , Civic Culture, pp. 480–1.Google Scholar

32 Almond, and Verba, , Civic Culture, p. 31.Google Scholar

33 Almond, and Verba, , Civic Culture, pp. 455–6.Google Scholar

34 Compare Eckstein, ‘Stable Democracy’.

35 The distinction between ‘unconscious’ and ‘conscious’ models is drawn by Levi-Strauss and is usefully employed in this context to contrast the model-building approach of the civic culture theorists and the culturological approach advocated here. For evidence on the conscious affirmation of civic values at the centre, see, for example, the writings of practising politicians such as Amery, L. S., Thoughts on the Constitution (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 15Google Scholar; Stewart, M., The British Approach to Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965), p. 12Google Scholar, or Hailsham, Viscount, The Conservative Case (Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1959), pp. 66 ff.Google Scholar

36 Compare Cassinelli, C. W., The Politics of Freedom (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1961), p. 102Google Scholar; and Lipset, S. M., The First New Nation (London: Heinemann, 1964), passim.Google Scholar

37 Verba, S., ‘Germany: the Remaking of a Political Culture’, in Pye, L. A. and Verba, S., eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 134Google Scholar; compare Almond, and Verba, , Civic Culture, p. 498.Google Scholar

38 Almond, and Verba, , Civic Culture, p. 473.Google Scholar Compare the criticisms of the civic culture model in Barry, B., Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970), pp. 48–52.Google Scholar

39 Thus Almond and Verba consider both Britain (where the different orientations are combined within individual citizens) and the United States (where participant orientations have superseded subject attitudes in many cases) as approximations of the civic culture; while Nordlinger, argues that either ‘ a mixture of acquiescent and directive attitudes within individuals’ or ‘a mixture within certain elements of society… the primary political conflict groups’, Working-Class Tories, pp. 213–15.Google Scholar

40 Rose, R. and Mossawe, H., ‘The Significance of an Election’, Political Studies, xv (1967), p. 188Google Scholar; and McKenzie, and Silver, , Angels in Marble, p. 251.Google Scholar

41 Rose and Mossawe, ‘Significance’; Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, passim; Nordlinger, , Working-Class Tories, pp. 94–136Google Scholar; and the Gallup poll in Weekend Telegraph, 26 10 1969, entitled ‘Is Britain Still Really Democratic?’.Google Scholar

42 Almond, and Verba, , Civic Culture, pp. 221–7.Google Scholar

43 McKenzie and Silver appear to have been worried by their measure of ascriptive sociopolitical deference and subsequently employ a more inclusive method: this is applied only to the analysis of working class Conservatives and includes both socio-cultural and political deferential items. See Angels in Marble, pp. 166–82 and 275–7.

44 An earlier and brief account of the main findings appeared in the Spectator, 10 October 1969, as “The Electorate: who votes Tory and Why?’.

45 The classification of urban types formulated by Moser and Scott was used as the purposive sampling frame: see Moser, C. A. and Scott, W., British Towns (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1961).Google Scholar Unfortunately, it was only later found that the Wood Green constituency differs from the ‘ town ‘ in the inclusion of three wards from Tottenham which are heavily working class: see Allen, A. J., The English Voter (London: English Universities Press, 1964), p. 65.Google Scholar The overall position of constituencies in terms of class composition and general character is unaffected.

46 On the problems involved with this type of sample survey, see, for example, Moser, C. A., Survey Methods of Investigation (London: Heinemann, 1958), pp. 174–85.Google Scholar

47 The actual response rates were 50 per cent in Stepney and 61 per cent in both Wood Green and Wanstead and Woodford. Allowing, however, for removals, deaths, demolitions, language problems among immigrants, and ill-health, these rates were effectively 64 per cent, 71 per cent, and 67 per cent respectively. A one-in-three follow-up of non-respondents showed that about a third of the non-response was accounted for by the elderly. A comparison of the respondents with constituency data from the 1966 Census shows that the middle class are over-represented by 6 per cent in the sample — comprising 49 per cent rather than an expected 43 per cent of the final sample.

48 Respondents were explicitly given the opportunity to state that there was no difference between the two candidates and to write in alternative criteria of evaluation.

49 Parkin, , ‘Working Class Conservatism’, p. 280Google Scholar; a very similar list is given in Thompson's, E. P.analysis of the nineteenth century establishment: ‘The Peculiarities of the English’, Socialist Register, 1965, p. 327.Google Scholar

50 The seven items (with traditionalists response indicated in parenthesis) were as follows: (1) The Royal Family do not play an important part in British life (disagree). (2) Public schools represent the most valuable part of our educational heritage (agree). (3) Christianity is the best basis for government and morality (agree). (4) The Empire gave far more to the colonies than it ever received from them (agree). (5) War is justified when other ways of settling international disputes fail (agree). (6) Private property and private enterprise are essential for the well-being of society and the prosperity of all (agree). (7) The aristocracy should be stripped of their privileges and titles (disagree). Scores were calculated on a cumulative basis and trichotomized on the basis of their distribution into the ranges 0–2 (radical), 3–4 (intermediate), and 5–7 (traditional). Don't know responses were assigned randomly to the agree and disagree categories.

51 Compare the increasing emphasis on modernity in party images and policies: an emphasis associated in the 1964 election with a more favourable evaluation of the Labour Party and one less favourable to the Tories among supporters of both parties. For illustration, see Blumler, and McQuail, , Television in Politics, pp. 7 and 180–90Google Scholar; and Butler, and Stokes, , Political Change, pp. 367–72.Google Scholar

52 Compare McKenzie, and Silver, , Angels in Marble, pp. 48–71Google Scholar; more generally, see Harris, N.Beliefs in Society (London: Watts, 1968), pp. 104–41.Google Scholar

53 Shils, ‘Ideology and Civility’; Torment of Secrecy; ‘Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties’, British Journal of Sociology, VII (1957), 130–45;Google ScholarPolitical Development in the New States (The Hague: Mouton, 1965)Google Scholar; and ‘The Prospects for Lebanese Civility’, in Binder, L., ed., Politics in Lebanon (New York: Wiley, 1963).Google Scholar Also, Geertz, C., ‘The Integrative Revolution’, in Geertz, C., ed., Old Societies and New States (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 156Google Scholar; and Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, passim.

54 The Michigan voting studies include a ‘citizen duty’ scale in their studies: two items were adopted from this scale for inclusion in our civility scale but citizen duty is here taken to be just one aspect of civility. See Campbell, A. et al. ., The Voter Decides (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954), pp. 194–9Google Scholar for a detailed discussion.

55 Inclusion of this aspect does not imply that the public interest is always used in a clear and unambiguous manner, only that it is a central value or democratic myth in British politics. For a discussion of the concept and its uses, as well as a relatively clearcut analytical definition, see Barry, B., Political Argument (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 190–6.Google Scholar

56 Eleven items are included in this scale, as follows: (1) A government should do what it thinks right even if the majority disagree (agree). (2) Only those with a minimum of intelligence and education should be allowed to vote (disagree). (3) It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have a chance of winning (disagree). (4) So many others vote in general elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not (disagree). (5) Everyone should take some interest in the economy and governmental affairs (agree). (6) It is sometimes necessary to put country before party (agree). (7) Our system of government may need some reform but basically it is fair and just (agree). (8) Quite honestly, the majority of people aren't qualified or informed enough to vote on today's problems (disagree). (9) Politics is much more important to me than anything else (disagree). (10) The whole of politics is a fraud and a betrayal of public trust (disagree). (11) Instead of criticizing politicians we should try to understand their problems more (agree). The method of scoring was again cumulative and scores were trichotomized over the ranges 0–6 (incivil), 7–8 (intermediate), and 9–11 (civil). DK responses were again randomly assigned to agree and disagree categories.

57 See Galtung, J., Theory and Methods of Social Research (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), pp. 391–2Google Scholar, on the technical advantages of trichotomization.

58 Rose, among others, has argued that deference will be paid increasingly towards an intellectual elite rather than the traditional ruling class: see Rose, R., Politics in England (London: Faber, 1965), p. 41Google Scholar; see also note 51 above.

59 Only in Wanstead and Woodford did a Liberal candidate stand in 1966: this complicates the analysis to some extent but the main points hold for each class in each constituency and the pattern of voting intentions (with respondents in all constituencies free to mention Liberal) also replicates these findings.

60 Other studies show that the Liberal Party serves both as a more congenial party to support than the major alternative when casting a protest vote against one's own party and that it serves as a staging post on the journey from one major party to the other. See, for example, Butler, and Stokes, , Political Change, pp. 337–8.Google Scholar

61 Parkin, , ‘Working Class Conservatism’, esp. p. 289.Google Scholar

62 Radicals contributed 46 per cent of the undecided vote intentions but only 30 per cent of the sample, while traditionals contributed only 17 per cent of DKs although comprising 29 per cent of the total sample.

63 For a consideration of the nature of political culture and its causal significance, see my paper, “The Study of Political Culture’, mimeo, 1969; compare Barry, , Sociologists, pp. 91–2.Google Scholar

64 Egalitarianism was measured by a six-item agree-disagree cumulative scale. The items were: (1) Everyone has enough money nowadays (disagree). (2) There's little or no opportunity for talented people to get on in Britain (agree). (3) The government should take steps to reduce social inequalities (agree). (4) Some people are naturally superior and should be specially respected and rewarded (disagree). (5) The idea of the class struggle has no relevance to our current problems (disagree). (6) There are a few very rich people and the rest are either poor or have trouble managing (agree). The scores were trichotomized on the ranges 0–2 (inegalitarian), 3 only (intermediate), and 4–6 (egalitarian).

65 The measure of accountability employed in this and subsequent multivariate analyses is based on the average of the absolute values of the differences between the extreme values in the same row (and column): see Galtung, , Theory and Methods, pp. 434–5Google Scholar for a description of this measure. For the working class, traditionalism accounted for 30.3 per cent of the variation and egalitarianism for only 8.o per cent.

66 Traditionalism accounted for 55.7 per cent of the variation and egalitarianism for 28.3 per cent.

67 The phi-correlation for traditionalism and egalitarianism is 0.38 for the middle class but only 0.08 for the working class.

68 Compare the inheritance theory put forward in Butler, and Stokes, , Political Change, pp. 45–55.Google Scholar

69 . This is the implication of the deference theorists’ conclusion that deference is decreasing in significance and their inclusion of secularism or pragmatism as a category of Conservative voter: theoretically, one can expect a similar division of the Labour vote into a pragmatic and a radical wing (corresponding to the Labour right and left?). In addition, both parties will gain support from the ‘nature of the times’ voter: see Campbell, A. et al. , The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 124–44.Google Scholar

70 Thus intermediates provided half the reported vote changes and comprised two-fifths of the sample — but see also note 62 above.

71 A more detailed account of these findings is to be found in my dissertation presented as part of doctoral work at Cambridge University, ‘Traditionalism and Civility in English Political Culture with Special Reference to Three Greater London Constituencies’ (1970).

72 Compare Parkin, F., Middle Class Radicalism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968), pp. 34–48.Google Scholar

73 Nordlinger, , Working Class Tories, p. 215.Google Scholar

74 Non-voters are clearly under-represented in the sample, even allowing for the lower turnout of women and the elderly: part of this underrepresentation may well derive from a reluctance of those with a strong sense of citizen duty to admit to non-voting.

75 For a review of evidence on this point, see Blumler, and McQuail, , Television in Politics, pp. 265–72.Google Scholar

76 For example, Shils, , Torment of Secrecy, p p. 231–7.Google Scholar

77 Although the overall distribution of civility by traditionalism is not significant at the 10 per cent level for the working class, the comparison of proportions incivil and moderate among radicals is significant at the 5 per cent level: see Oppenheim, A. N., Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement (London: Heinemann, 1966), pp. 287–9, for a nomograph.Google Scholar

78 Radicals were slightly more likely to disagree that our political system is basically fair and just and more likely to agree that politics is a fraud and a betrayal of public trust: but these differences were not significant at the 10 per cent level. Nor was the slightly greater political efficacy of radicals.

79 Only 7 per cent of middle class radicals and 17 per cent of working class radicals scored high on Lane's four-item F-scale; whereas 28 per cent of middle class traditionals and 47 per cent of working class traditionals did so.

80 Compare Thornton, A. P., The Habit of Authority (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), passimGoogle Scholar; Almond, and Verba, , Civic Culture, pp. 222–3Google Scholar; and Rose, ‘England: a traditionally modern political culture’, in Pye, and Verba, , Political Culture, pp. 83–129.Google Scholar

81 Eckstein, ‘British Political System’; Nordlinger, also provides some empirical evidence for this in his book on working class deferentials, Working Class Tories, pp. 100–4.Google Scholar

82 That actual participation is a reflection of civic values is shown in the greater tendency, within the middle class only, of the civil to have attempted to influence a government decision — 9 per cent of the incivil, 13 per cent of those intermediate on civility, and 23 per cent of the civil, had made such an attempt. There were no significant differences in the working class: it had an average of 7 per cent attempted influence.

83 See previous note.

84 Compare Parkin, , ‘Working Class Conservatism’, p. 280.Google Scholar

85 Parkin, ‘Working Class Conservatism’, and Jessop, R. D., ‘Exchange and Power in Structural Analysis’, Sociological Review, XVII (1969), pp. 415–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for a consideration of these factors as they affect working-class consciousness, see Lockwood, ‘Sources of Diversity’.

86 As one would expect in a culture that emphasizes evolution and assimilation rather than revolution and disjunction.

87 As can be seen from examining the Ns in Table 3,31 per cent of the middle class are radical in comparison with 27 per cent of the working class; the latter were more prone to egalitarianism, however, with 34 per cent of the middle class, and 45 per cent of the working class, scoring high on egalitarianism.

88 Union membership accounts for 14.5 per cent of the variation and class for only 8.5 per cent.

89 There is considerable migration from working class to middle class areas within Greater London: for data on Woodford in the 1950s, see Willmott, P. and Young, M., Family and Class in a London Suburb (London: New English Library, 1967), p. 14.Google Scholar Cox finds evidence for a transplantation effect through selective migration but reports that the conversion of migrants to Conservative voting has declined with the spread of Labour voting outwards from central London: see Cox, K. R., ‘Voting in the London Suburbs’, in Dogan, M. and Rokkan, S., eds., Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass: MET, 1969), 343–69, at pp. 365–8.Google Scholar Unfortunately, no questions were included in this survey on length of residence or town of origin.

90 Stepney had only 8 per cent of white-collar respondents as union members in comparison with 26 per cent in Wood Green and 12 per cent in Woodford.

91 Union membership accounts for 13 per cent, residence for 34 per cent of the variation.

92 See, for example, Goldthorpe, J. H. and Lockwood, D., ‘Affluence and the British Class Structure’, Sociological Review, XI (1963).Google Scholar

93 Compare Parkin, F., ‘Middle Class Radicals’, New Society, 21 03 1968.Google Scholar

94 Compare Greenstein, F. I., ‘The Need for Systematic Inquiry into Personality and Politics’, Journal of Social Issues, XXIV (1968), 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

95 Thus of those aged under 45 years 42 per cent are civil among committee members in comparison with 37 per cent non-members; and, of those aged 45 years and over, 31 percent of committee members and 23 per cent of non-members are civil.

96 Kornhauser, Politics of Mass Society, passim.

97 Whether authoritarianism is a cause or effect of non-involvement is not certain, but see Stewart, D. and Hoult, T., ‘A Social Psychological Theory of the Authoritarian Personality’, American Journal of Sociology, LXV (1959–1960), 274–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

98 The phi-correlation between political efficacy and civility is 0.38 for the middle class and 0.33 for the working class respondents.

99 Compare Almond, and Verba, , Civic Culture, pp. 230–57.Google Scholar

100 Almond, and Verba, , Civic Culture, pp. 284–94.Google Scholar

101 Compare Runciman, W. G., ‘Some Recent Contributions to the Theory of Democracy’, European Journal of Sociology, VI (1965), 174–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar: ‘(t)o explain the differences in national attitudes which they document, Almond and Verba would have to adduce much more historical interpretation, and to relate them to a theory of democracy they would have to discuss the notions of legitimacy and acculturation at a much deeper, if less ostensibly “systematic”, level’ (p.180).