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Changing Attitudes Towards War: The Impact of the First World War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

John Mueller
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After the First World War the belief became substantially widespread among developed countries that the venerable institution of war should be abandoned from their affairs. It was an idea whose time had come. Historically, the war does not seem to have been all that unusual in its duration, destructiveness, grimness, political pointlessness, economic consequences or breadth. It does seem to have been unique in that (1) it was the first major war to be preceded by substantial, organized anti-war agitation, and (2) for Europeans, it followed an unprecedentedly peaceful century during which even war enthusiasts began, perhaps unknowingly, to appreciate the virtues of peace. Thus the war served as a necessary catalyst for opinion change. The process through which the change took place owes much to British war aims and to their efforts to get the United States into the war. The article concludes with some reflections on the historical movement of ideas.

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British Journal of Political Science , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , January 1991 , pp. 1 - 28
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1991

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References

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35 Conceivably this receptivity was heightened by the hothouse romanticism, glorifying war, death, annihilation and destruction for their redemptive and cleansing qualities, that was so fashionable among intellectuals before 1914. For example, in ‘Peace’, a poem written as the war began, Rupert Brooke thanks God for having ‘matched us with His hour’, compares the entry into war ‘as swimmers into cleanness leaping’, and finds ‘release’ in war where ‘the worst friend and enemy is but Death’. (For a superb discussion, see Stromberg, , Redemption by WarGoogle Scholar.) Because of this phenomenon, it seems possible Europeans were peculiarly ripe for disillusionment. However, romanticism about war goes back to the origins of the institution. And the famous and pathetic demise of the quintessential romantic, Lord Byron, in the Greek war of independence in 1824 seems to have had no lasting impact on war romanticism.

36 Gilchrist, H. L., A Comparative Study of World War Casualties from Gas and Other Weapons (Edgewood Arsenal, Md: Chemical Warfare School, 1928), p. 48.Google Scholar

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38 Interestingly, in Serge Eisenstein's classic 1938 film, Alexander Nevsky, invading Teutonic knights are made to appear menacing and inhuman precisely because of their helmets.

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42 As Luard points out, however, there were quite a few civil wars in Europe during this time, many of them with international implications (War in International Society, pp. 54–6).Google Scholar

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79 See Patterson, , Toward a Warless World, chap. 6.Google Scholar

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82 See Wank, , ‘The Austrian Peace Movement and the Habsburg Ruling Elite’, pp. 48–52Google Scholar. The National Arbitration and Peace Conference which packed Carnegie Hall in New York in 1907 was supported by eight cabinet officers, two former presidential candidates, ten Senators, four Supreme Court justices, nine governors, ten mayors, twenty-seven millionaires, eighteen college presidents, thirty labour leaders, forty bishops, sixty newspaper editors and representatives of 166 businesses (Patterson, , Toward a Warless World, p. 129).Google Scholar

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88 Chickering, , Imperial Germany and a World Without War, p. 91.Google Scholar

89 James, , Memories and Studies, p. 304.Google Scholar

90 For useful efforts to deal with the phenomenon in the domestic political context, see Kingdon, John W., Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1984)Google Scholar; and Riker, William H., Liberalism Against Populism (San Francisco: Freeman, 1982)Google Scholar. In several respects it seems more productive to think about ideas whose time has come rather than to see the process as one of grand social learning. ‘Learning’ in this sense is, of course, a metaphor, and while the metaphor has some valuable resonances, it is misleading for at least three reasons. Firstly, the metaphor suggests that an idea, once ingested, cannot be undone. An idea whose time has come, on the other hand, can eventually be abandoned. Secondly (and relatedly), the learning analogy implies progress and betterment. But obviously, plenty of ideas that by most accepted standards prove to be bad ones – like state Communism, totalitarianism, trial by combat, genocide, the Spanish inquisition, aeroplane hijacking – also get ‘learned’. Thirdly, the learning metaphor tends to imply that new ideas can only be acquired slowly. The notion of the idea whose time has come is burdened by no such bias. While some ideas grow slowly, others (for example, that it is time for the countries of East Europe to be democratic) can catch on almost overnight.

91 See Mueller, , Retreat from Doomsday.Google Scholar