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Activist–Leader Relations and the Structure of Political Parties: ‘Exchange’ Models and Vote-Seeking Behaviour in Parties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Alan Ware
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Abstract

This article examines how party organization affects, and is itself affected by, the objectives pursued by parties in liberal democracies; it focuses on vote-seeking behaviour by parties. It argues that it is a mistake to model activist–leader relations in the past as having been primarily the product of particular kinds of ‘exchanges’ between leaders and activists in a party. Such models limit our understanding of intra-party relations in four important respects – by focusing exclusively on the idea of ‘exchange’ and not examining the role of ‘gifts’; by not considering the role of solidary incentives; by omitting an analysis of loyalty; and by not taking account of the role of habit. However, the article also argues that ‘exchange’ is becoming now a far more significant element in intra-party relations and that this development will constrain party leaders and influence the goals pursued by parties. Greater reliance on exchange between leaders and activists may lead to parties becoming generally more policy-seeking in their behaviour and also to their becoming less manageable than in the past.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 22 , Issue 1 , January 1992 , pp. 71 - 92
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1992

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References

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