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Absolute Majority Rules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 September 2007

ADRIAN VERMEULE
ADRIAN VERMEULE
Affiliation:
Harvard Law School.
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Abstract

This article considers absolute majority rules, which require the affirmative vote of a majority of all those eligible to vote in the institution. I compare absolute majority rules to simple majority rules under which only those present and voting are counted, and to simple supermajority rules. Under plausible conditions, absolute majority rules prove superior. Absolute majority rules insure majorities against strategic behaviour by minorities and combine supermajoritarian effects with majoritarian symbolism.

Type
Research Article
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 37 , Issue 4 , October 2007 , pp. 643 - 658
Copyright
© 2007 Cambridge University Press

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