Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2plfb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-30T23:54:12.191Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

When Do You Get Economists as Policy Makers?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2018

Mark Hallerberg  and
Joachim Wehner
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'

Keywords

financial crisisfinance ministrycentral bankfinancefiscal policymonetary policypartisanship
Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 50 , Issue 3 , July 2020 , pp. 1193 - 1205
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

*

Hertie School of Governance (email: [email protected]); Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science (email: [email protected]). We thank Jim Alt, Octavio Amorim Neto, Sebastian Barfort, Tim Besley, Christian Breunig, Lawrence Broz, Marco Cangiano, Till Cordes, Jeffrey Chwieroth, William Roberts Clark, David Davis, Torun Dewan, Quoc-Anh Do, Patrick Dunleavy, Robert Franzese, Scott Gehlbach, Emiliano Grossman, Chris Hanretty, Macartan Humphreys, Ethan Ilzetzki, Indridi Indridason, Mark Kayser, Sebastian Koehler, George Krause, David Lake, Valentino Larcinese, David Dreyer Lassen, Martin Lodge, Vincent Martigny, Salvatore Nunnari, John Patty, Shanker Satyanath, Carlos Scartascini, Alistair Smith, David Soskice, Kaare Strøm, Geoff Taylor and Cornelia Woll for helpful comments. Cristina Bodea and Adi Brender generously shared data with us. Luca Giapelli, Claudia Granados, Linnea Kreibohm, Roberto Martinez, Santiago Massons, Linnea Mills and Juan Camilo Taborda provided excellent research assistance. Drafts were prepared for the 2012 EPSA and APSA meetings and presented at the Hertie School of Governance, LSE, Sciences Po Paris, UCSD, and the 2013 Warwick Political Economy Workshop in Venice. Data replication sets are available in Harvard Dataverse at: https://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NVPJK0 and online appendices at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000801.

References

Abbas, S. Ali, Belhocine, Nazim, El-Ganainy, Asmaa, and Horton, Mark. 2010. A Historical Public Debt Database. IMF Working Paper WP/10/245.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Abrams, Burton A., and Iossifov, Plamen. 2006. Does the Fed Contribute to a Political Business Cycle? Public Choice 129 (3–4):249–262.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Adolph, Christopher. 2013. Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics: The Myth of Neutrality. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ahamed, Liaquat. 2009. Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the World. New York: Penguin Press.Google Scholar
Alesina, Alberto, and Drazen, Allan. 1991. Why Are Stabilizations Delayed? American Economic Review 81 (5):1170–1188.Google Scholar
Alesina, Alberto, and Tabellini, Guido. 2007. Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task. American Economic Review 97 (1):169–179.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alexiadou, Despina. 2016. Ideologues, Partisans, and Loyalists: Ministers and Policy-Making in Parliamentary Cabinets. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Amorim Neto, Octavio, and Strøm, Kaare. 2006. Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-Partisan Cabinet Ministers in European Democracies. British Journal of Political Science 36 (4):619–643.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderson, Perry. 2011. Lula’s Brazil. London Review of Books 33 (7):3–12.Google Scholar
Beck, Thorsten, Clarke, George, Groff, Alberto, Keefer, Philip, and Walsh, Patrick. 2001. New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. World Bank Economic Review 15 (1):165–176.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Benoit, Kenneth, and Laver, Michael. 2006. Party Policy in Modern Democracies. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernhard, William. 2002. Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank Independence in the Industrial Democracies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernhard, William, and LeBlang, David. 2006. Democratic Processes and Financial Markets: Pricing Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Besley, Tim. 2005. Political Selection. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (3):43–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Besley, Tim, and Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2011. Do Democracies Select More Educated Leaders? American Political Science Review 105 (3):552–566.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blondel, Jean. 1991. Ministers of Finance in Western Europe: A Special Career? European University Institute Working Paper SPS 91/11. Florence: European University Institute.Google Scholar
Blondel, Jean. 1985. Government Ministers in the Contemporary World. London: Sage.Google Scholar
Bodea, Cristina, and Hicks, Raymond. 2015. Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions. International Organization 69 (1):35–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brender, Adi, and Drazen, Allan. 2009. Do Leaders Affect Government Spending Priorities? Working Paper 15368. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brooks, Sarah, Cunha, Raphael, and Mosley, Layna. 2015. Categories, Creditworthiness, and Contagion: How Investors’ Shortcuts Affect Sovereign Debt Markets. International Studies Quarterly 59 (3):587–601.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broz, Lawrence J. 2013. Partisan Financial Cycles. In Politics in the New Hard Times: The Great Recession in Comparative Perspective, edited by David A. Lake and Miles Kahler, 75–101. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Chinn, Menzie D., and Ito, Hiro. 2006. What Matters for Financial Development? Capital Controls, Institutions, and Interactions. Journal of Development Economics 81 (1):163–192.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, William Roberts, and Arel-Bundock, Vincent. 2013. Independent but Not Indifferent: Partisan Bias in Monetary Policy at the Fed. Economics and Politics 25 (1):1–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, William Roberts. 2003. Capitalism, Not Globalism. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cho, Hye Jee. 2014. Impact of IMF Programs on Perceived Creditworthiness of Emerging Market Counties: Is There a ‘Nixon-Goes-to-China’ Effect? International Studies Quarterly 58 (2):308–321.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chwieroth, Jeff. 2007. Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets. International Organization 61 (2):443–463.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chwieroth, Jeff. 2010. Shrinking the State: Neoliberal Economists and Social Spending in Latin America. In Constructing the International Economy, edited by Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth and Craig Parsons, 23–46. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Cukierman, Alex. 1992. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Dogan, Mattei. 1989. Pathways to Power: Selecting Rulers in Pluralist Democracies. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Domínguez, Juan I., ed. 1997. Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.Google Scholar
Dreher, Axel, Lamla, Michael J., Lein, Sarah M., and Somogyi, Frank. 2009. The Impact of Political Leaders’ Profession and Education on Reforms. Journal of Comparative Economics 37 (1):169–193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Funke, Manuel, Schularick, Moritz, and Trebesch, Christoph. 2016. Going to Extremes: Politics After Financial Crises, 1870-1914. European Economic Review 88:227–260.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Galasso, Vincenzo, and Nannicini, Tommaso. 2011. Competing on Good Politicians. American Political Science Review 105 (1):79–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Geithner, Timothy. 2014. Stress Tests: Reflections on Financial Crises. London: Random House.Google Scholar
Göhlmann, Silja, and Vaubel, Roland. 2007. The Educational and Occupational Background of Central Bankers and Its Effect on Inflation: An Empirical Analysis. European Economic Review 51 (4):925–941.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., LeVeck, Brad L., Victor, David G., and Fowler, James H.. 2014. Decision Maker Preferences for International Legal Cooperation. International Organization 68 (4):845–876.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hallerberg, Mark, and Wehner, Joachim. 2017. Replication Data for When Do You Get Economists as Policy Makers?, doi: 10.7910/DVN/NVPJK0, Harvard Dataverse, V1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hallerberg, Mark, Strauch, Rolf, and von Hagen, Jürgen. 2009. Fiscal Governance in Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hayo, Bernd, and Neumeier, Florian. 2014. Political Leaders’ Socioeconomic Background and Fiscal Performance in Germany. European Journal of Political Economy 34:184–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henisz, Witold. 2002. The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment. Industrial and Corporate Change 11 (2):355–389.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hibbs, Douglas. 1977. Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review 71 (4):1467–1487.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hirano, Shigeo, and Snyder, James Jr. 2014. Primary Elections and the Quality of Elected Officials. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 9 (4):473–500.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jochimsen, Beate, and Thomasius, Sebastian. 2014. The Perfect Finance Minister: Whom To Appoint as Finance Minister to Balance the Budget. European Journal of Political Economy 34:390–408.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jones, Benjamin F., and Olken, Benjamin A.. 2005. Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (3):835–864.Google Scholar
Kaplan, Steven N., Klebanov, Mark M., and Sorensen, Morten. 2012. Which CEO Characteristics and Abilities Matter? Journal of Finance 67 (3):973–1007.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kayser, Mark, and Peress, Michael. 2012. Benchmarking across Borders: Electoral Accountability and the Necessity of Comparison. American Political Science Review 106 (3):661–684.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laeven, Luc, and Valencia, Fabián. 2012. Systemic Banking Crisis: An Update. IMF Working Paper WP/12/163.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Laeven, Luc, and Valencia, Fabián. 2010. Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. IMF Working Paper WP/10/146.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lindvall, Johannes. 2014. The Electoral Consequences of Two Great Crises. European Journal of Political Research 53 (4):747–765.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Malmendier, Ulrike, Tate, Geoffrey, and Yan, Jon. 2011. Overconfidence and Early-life Experiences: The Impact of Managerial Traits on Corporate Financial Policies. Journal of Finance 66 (5):1687–1733.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Markoff, John, and Montecinos, Verónica. 1993. The Ubiquitous Rise of Economists. Journal of Public Policy 13 (1):37–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mosley, Layna. 2003. Global Capital and National Governments. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Reinhart, Carmen, and Rogoff, Kenneth. 2009. This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Sattler, Thomas. 2013. Do Markets Punish Left Governments? Journal of Politics 75 (2):343–356.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: Link

Hallerberg and Wehner Dataset

Dataset

https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NVPJK0
Link
Supplementary material: PDF

Hallerberg and Wehner supplementary material

Hallerberg and Wehner supplementary material
Download Hallerberg and Wehner supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 463.8 KB