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Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 May 2011

Navin A. Bapat
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Abstract

States engage in coercive diplomacy by sponsoring militant violence against their rivals. This gives militant groups’ sponsors bargaining power, but may produce moral hazard, because it can empower groups so much that sponsors cannot control them. This study develops a game theoretic model to explain why states take the risk of sponsoring militant groups. The model demonstrates that sponsorship may be a form of costly signalling that increases the probability both of bargaining failure and of a negotiated settlement favourable to the sponsor. The model further demonstrates that only moderately weak states and major powers are likely to gain coercive power through sponsorship. Data on militant violence during the period 1989–2001 support the model's predictions.

Type
Research Article
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 42 , Issue 1 , 01 December 2011 , pp. 1 - 29
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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23 In the course of the discussion, I refer to G as ‘she’, S as ‘he’ and M as ‘it’.

24 The assumption that S gains no intrinsic value for keeping M operational is included such that M's preferences for survival may diverge from S's preferences for policy concessions. The model allows for the possibility that M and S share very similar preferences. However, if we consider a situation in which both S and M 1 had the same preferences, S would be equally well off if M 1 did not survive and a separate group M 2 accomplished its policy objective, whereas M 1 would prefer to survive and accomplish the policy objective. It is therefore reasonable to assume that S gains no intrinsic value for sustaining any one M, but only gains value if the M that is operational accomplishes his policy objective.

25 A case example of this is the behaviour of the Kashmiris towards Musharraf following his agreement with India to curb militant violence after the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament building.

26 While it may be possible that G is not completely credible, and that G may renege on its commitment to S once M is disarmed, this possibility is left out of the current model set-up. The reason this is the case is because if G were to renege, S could reconstitute the group and begin violence again. This threat to retaliate should ensure that G would fulfil the terms, and deter G from defecting. Again, while it is possible to include this, I do not do so in the presentation for space considerations and in order to simplify the model. The results do not substantively change with this feature included.

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30 Since we solve for x using the quadratic equation, there are two possible solutions. The solution for which x < 0 is again eliminated by assumption. Also, if 1−γ−κM < 0, assume that x* = 0.

31 Since we solve for x using the quadratic equation, there are two possible solutions. The solution for which x < 0 is again eliminated by assumption. Also, if 1−γ−κM < 0, assume that x* = 0.

32 Indicated by a value of κM→0.

33 Proof of this is in the Appendix.

34 As with the previous beliefs, 0 ≤ C*G ≤ 1, so that if C*G < 0, C*G = 0, and if C*G > 1, C*G = 1.

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47 It is certainly the case that in previous periods, and the period following 1989–2001, sponsorship does occur in Latin America. However, in this snapshot, there were no cases that could be conclusively classified as sponsorship, based on the definition.

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56 I do not include measures for the government's Elevation Difference and Ethnic Fractionalization due to multicollinearity. Although the results hold when the sponsor's Elevation Difference and Ethnic Fractionalization scores are dropped, the model presented produces a better fit and allows us to examine the explanatory variable of interest when controlling for these factors.

57 To illustrate with an example, if Syria chose to sponsor Hamas against Israel from 1989 to 2000, this test would only include one observation for Syria in 1989, and would drop Israel/Syria dyads between 1990 and 2000.

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