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Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Michael M. Atkinson  and
William D. Coleman
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Extract

The theme of strong and weak states has recently figured largely in comparative political economy. However, significant variation across sectors in single countries in the degree to which the state is able and willing to intervene in the economy has led to calls for a disaggregated view of the state, with more attention devoted to the different levels – micro, meso, macro – at which the state confronts the economy. The concepts of strength and weakness must pay much greater attention to specific bureaucratic arrangements and the relationships with key societal actors which, in company with bureaucratic agencies, form the core of ‘policy networks’ at the sectoral level. The article uses the concepts of state capacity and societal mobilization to identify six ideal typical policy networks at the sectoral level. It elaborates on the organizational logic associated with these policy networks by examining them in conjunction with industrial policy. After distinguishing between two approaches to industrial policy – anticipatory and reactive – it shows how different policy networks emerge to support alternative approaches and how a disjunction between networks and approaches can produce policy failure.

Type
Research Article
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , January 1989 , pp. 47 - 67
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1989

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References

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