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Soft Incentives and Collective Action: Participation in the Anti-Nuclear Movement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Karl-Dieter Opp
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Extract

The standard explanation of collective action in modern political economy can be outlined as follows: a collective (or public) good is only an incentive for a joint contribution to its provision, if those who benefit from the good at least perceive some influence arising from their contribution, the costs of contributing being otherwise greater than the benefits derived from it; otherwise joint efforts for the provision of the collective good will not ensue. If the good itself does not stimulate collective action, contributions will nevertheless occur when selective incentives become effective. These are benefits arising from contributing and/or costs resulting from no contribution being made.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 16 , Issue 1 , January 1986 , pp. 87 - 112
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1986

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References

1 With respect to voting (a particular kind of collective action), the standard references for these propositions are Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957)Google Scholar and Olson, Mancur Jr, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965, second edition 1971)Google Scholar, who outlines a general theory of collective action. For further references see Barry, Brian and Hardin, Russell, eds, Rational Man and Irrational Society (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982)Google Scholar. For a good textbook see Frohlich, Norman and Oppenheimer, Joe A., Modern Political Economy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1978).Google Scholar

2 See, for example, Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), The Economics of Charity (London: Unwin Brothers, 1973)Google Scholar; Johnson, David B., ‘The Free-Rider Principle, the Charity Market and the Economics of Blood’, British Journal of Social Psychology, XXI (1982), 93–106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 See the examples in Olson, , The Logic of Collective Action.Google Scholar

4 Olson, , The Logic of Collective Action, pp. 60–1.Google Scholar

5 Tullock, Gordon, The Social Dilemma (Blacksburg: University Publications, 1974), Chap. V.Google Scholar

6 Breton, Albert and Breton, Raymond, ‘An Economic Theory of Social Movements’, American Economic Review, L (1969), 198–205.Google Scholar

7 Mitchell, Robert Cameron, ‘National Environmental Lobbies and the Apparent Illogic of Collective Action’ in Russell, Clifford S., ed., Collective Decision Making: Applications from Public Choice Theory (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 87–121.Google Scholar

8 See, for example, Riker, William H. and Ordeshook, Peter C., ‘A Theory of the Calculus of Voting’, American Political Science Review, LXII (1968), 25–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also Aldrich, John H., ‘Some Problems of Testing Two Rational Models of Participation’, American Journal of Political Science, XX (1976), 713–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 See, e.g., Muller, Edward N., Aggressive Political Participation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979)Google Scholar; and ‘An Explanatory Model for Differing Types of Participation’, European Journal of Political Research, X (1982), 1–16Google Scholar; Opp, Karl-Dieter, Burow-Auffarth, Käte, Heinrichs, Uwe, ‘Conditions for Conventional and Unconventional Political Participation: An Empirical Test of Economic and Sociological Hypotheses’, European Journal of Political Research, IX (1981), 147–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tillock, Harriet and Morrison, Denton E., ‘Group Size and Contributions to Collective Action: An Examination of Olson's Theory Using Data from Zero Population Growth Inc.’ in Kriesberg, Louis, ed., Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1979), pp. 131–58.Google Scholar

10 Olson, , The Logic of Collective Action, p. 61.Google Scholar

11 For a succinct account see Riker, William H. and Ordeshook, Peter C., An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973), Chap. 3.Google Scholar

12 The term ‘differential’ is taken from Downs, , An Economic Theory of DemocracyGoogle Scholar, in the sense of his term ‘party differential’.

13 See Opp, Karl-Dieter, ‘Economics, Sociology, and Political Protest’ in Raub, Werner, ed., Theoretical Models and Empirical Analyses: Contributions to the Explanation of Individual Actions and Collective Phenomena (Utrecht: E.S. Publications, 1982), pp. 166–85.Google Scholar

14 Opponents of nuclear power also seemed to promote the provision of what may be called secondary collective goods, i.e. goods which are instrumental for ensuring that fewer atomic power stations are in operation. These secondary goods include extending public discussion about nuclear energy, causing distrust against politicians, and disturbing politicians. Since these variables had only a negligible effect on participation in the anti-nuclear movement, they are left out of account in this article.

15 See also the discussion of the ‘ethic of voting’ in Riker, and Ordeshook, , An Introduction to Positive Political Theory, pp. 61–3.Google Scholar

16 Tullock, , The Social Dilemma, p. 37.Google Scholar

17 For this distinction see, e.g., Luce, R. Duncan and Raiffa, Howard, Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley, 1957).Google Scholar

18 We do not deem it useful to compute statistical tests of significance because we have neither a random sample nor an experimental design. As it is common practice, however, to report significance tests for survey data such as ours, we shall conform. In doing so we are being responsive to the soft incentives provided by colleagues who regard a paper with significance tests as more scientific.

19 See Allison, Paul D., ‘Testing for Interaction’, American Journal of Sociology, LXXXII (1977), 144–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20 See, for example, McCarthy, John D. and Zald, Mayer N., The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Corporation, 1975)Google Scholar; McCarthy, John D. and Zald, Mayer N., ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’, American Journal of Sociology, LXXXII (1977), 1212–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21 The general formula for transforming a variable X into a variable X ′, where X ′ ranges from 0 to 1, is: X ′ = (X − lowest value of X)/(highest value of X − lowest value of X).

22 It is striking that the bivariate correlation of the utility variables with protest is rather high. Is this inconsistent with SEU theory? Let us look at Equation (3). Assume that we correlate only the utility differential (U(nAt)−U(At)) with Part. SEU theory does not say anything about the absolute size of a relationship between the utility differential and Part. If, however, the probability differential (p 1−p 2) is included in a regression analysis, utility theory leads us to expect that the correlation of PD, i.e. of the interaction term, will be greater than the relationship of the utility differential taken on its own with Part.

23 A good account of the cognitive theories that are of relevance in this context can be found in Webster, Murray Jr, Actions and Actors: Principles of Social Psychology (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1975)Google Scholar or see other textbooks on social psychology.

24 See Festinger, Leon, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957).Google Scholar

25 See, e.g., Inglehart, Ronald, ‘Value Priorities and Socioeconomic Change’ in Barnes, Samuel H., Kaase, Max et al. , Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979), pp. 305–42.Google Scholar

26 For details of the design see Opp, Karl-Dieter, Burow-Auffarth, Käte, Hartmann, Peter, von Witzleben, Thomazine, Pöhls, Volker and Spitzley, Thomas, Soziale Probleme und Protestverhalten: Eine empirische Konfrontierung des Modells rationalen Verhaltens mit soziologischen Hypothesen am Beispiel von Atomkraftgegnern (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984).CrossRefGoogle Scholar