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Convention Quotas and Communal Representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Robert E. Goodin
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Extract

The 1972 Democratic National Convention operated under much-heralded reform rules requiring, in effect, ‘quotas’ of blacks, women and youth in state delegations. The goal of these reforms obviously relates to deep normative concerns – improving representation, ‘democratizing’ conventions, etc. Their success in realizing this goal is obviously an empirical question, and it is one which has attracted considerable academic attention. Among the myriad of commentators, Jeane Kirkpatrick boasts the richest data base and the most subtle theoretical model. Her conclusion is that the reforms were largely a failure, insofar as they did little to improve the representation of Democratic party opinion by Convention delegates. On that point the data speak for themselves. The question to be raised here is simply whether these data really speak to the full range of normative concerns that might motivate quota requirements. This comment will discuss two other goals that convention quotas might serve, quite apart from their impact on representation of opinion.

Type
Notes and Comments
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , April 1977 , pp. 255 - 261
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1977

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References

1 The text of the McGovern-Fraser Commission report, ‘Mandate for Reform’, is reprinted in the Congressional Record, 117 (22 09 1971), 32908–21Google Scholar. Ranney, Austin, Curing the Mischiefs of Faction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975)Google Scholar puts it in historical perspective.

2 Cavala, William, ‘Changing the Rules of the Game: Party Reform and the 1972 California Delegation to the Democratic National Convention’, American Political Science Review, LXVIII (1974), 27–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pressman, Jeffrey L. and Sullivan, Denis G., ‘Convention Reform and Conventional Wisdom: An Empirical Assessment of Democratic Party Reforms’, Political Science Quarterly, LXXXIX (1974), 539–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sullivan, Denis G., Pressman, Jeffrey L., Page, Benjamin I. and Lyons, John J., The Politics of Representation: The Democratic Convention of 1972 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1974), esp. Chap. 2.Google Scholar

3 Kirkpatrick, Jeane, ‘Representation in the American National Conventions: The Case of 1972’ British Journal of Political Science, v (1975), esp. pp. 307–16.Google Scholar

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5 The larger theme of Kirkpatrick's essay is that the 1972 Democratic National Convention was far less representative of Democratic opinion nationally than the 1972 Republican National Convention was of Republican opinion nationally or, for that matter, of rank-and-file Democrats. While this demonstrates that an unreformed (Republican) convention might be more representative than a reformed (Democratic) one, Kirkpatrick is careful to disclaim any implication that this is a necessary link. As she writes, ‘It is impossible to separate out the effects of the new rules on the convention's composition from the effects of the successful McGovern insurgency’ (p. 314). All that can be said with confidence is that ‘quotas did not substantially increase the representation of the political views of women, blacks or youth’ (p. 314).

6 Quoted in White, Theodore H., The Making of the President 1972 (New York: Atheneum, 1973). 29–31.Google Scholar

7 Significantly, the rules must be neutral between individuals, not principles as supposed by Mansfield, Harvey C. Jr., in ‘Impartial Representation’, Representation and Misrepresentation, ed. Goldwin, R. A. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), 91–113Google Scholar. ‘Neutrality’ is itself a frightfully complex notion, as is apparent in Montefiore, Alan, ed., Neutrality and Impartiality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).Google Scholar

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12 Pollard, A. F. discusses ‘The Growth of Representation’ in The Evolution of Parliament (London: Longmans Green, 1920), Chap. 8.Google Scholar

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18 ‘Theories of Group Representation’ are surveyed by Birch, A. H. in Representative and Responsible Government (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964)Google Scholar, Chap. 8. Pitkin, Hanna F. offers a rather lame argument against symbolic representation in The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), Chap. 5Google Scholar: demands for symbolic gratifications are susceptible to demagogic manipulation. So too are demands for material benefits subject to alteration by bribery. It would be as ludicrous for the devout liberal to ignore categorically symbolic demands because they might occasionally have been manipulated as it would for him to ignore all votes because they may have been bought.

19 Lijphart, Arend, The Politics of Accommodation, 2nd edn. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975)Google Scholar; Steiner, Jürg, Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule, trans. , A. and Braendgaard, B. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974)Google Scholar; Lehmbruch, Gerhard, ‘A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon’, in McRae, Kenneth, ed., Consociational Democracy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), pp. 90–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hechter, Michael, ‘The Political Economy of Ethnic Change’, American Journal of Sociology, LXXIX (1974), 1151–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; but see Ragin, Charles's refutation, forthcoming in the American Sociological ReviewGoogle Scholar. Patterson, Orlando, ‘Context and Conflict in Ethnic Allegiance: A Theoretical Framework and Caribbean Case Study’Google Scholar, in Glazer, and Moynihan, , eds., Ethnicity, 305–49.Google Scholar

20 HOC Deb., 13 November 1946, vol. 430, col. 80 and 13 December 1946, vol. 431. cols. 1558–60.

21 Kirkpatrick, , ‘Representation in the American National Conventions’, Table 16, p. 315Google Scholar. On twenty-one major issues, sex never accounts for more than 0·01 per cent of variation in opinion, race never for more than 2·89 per cent and age never for more than 6·76 per cent.

22 Wilson, James Q., Negro Politics (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1960), Chap. 8.Google Scholar

23 White, Theodore, The Making of the President 1972 (New York: Atheneum, 1973), 29–31Google Scholar: Ranney, , Curing the Mischiefs of Faction, p. 190.Google Scholar

24 For salutary examples of how these matters can be studied with survey research see Rose, Richard, Governing Without Consensus (London: Faber, 1971)Google Scholar, esp. the ‘Loyalty Questionaire’ reprinted in the appendix, and, more modestly, Brand, Jack and McCrone, Donald, ‘The SNP: From Protest to Nationalism’, New Society, XXXIV (20 11 1975), 416–18.Google Scholar