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Choice: Its Increase and its Value

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2009

Keith Dowding
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Extract

Much has been made in recent years of increasing the choice of the citizen-consumer. This article argues that the concept of ‘increasing choice’ is far more problematic than at first appears and has little intrinsic value in itself. Choice is only to be valued in itself in the sense that the process of choice or decision-making plays a part in our discovery of our own preferences. To justify the introduction of the market process on the grounds of increasing choice is doubly wrong; first, increasing choice is not in itself valuable and, secondly, what is valuable about the market has little to do with choice.

Type
Articles
Information
British Journal of Political Science , Volume 22 , Issue 3 , July 1992 , pp. 301 - 314
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1992

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References

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8 The significance of choice for Scanlon, who recognizes the different ways in which the term can be used, arises from the fact that individuals have this faculty. See Scanlon, T. M., ‘The Significance of Choice’, in McMurrin, S. M., ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values VIII (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988), pp. 151–216.Google Scholar

9 Reeve (‘Individual choice’, p. 116Google Scholar) identifies four meanings of ‘choice’ but I do not see any difference between his first use – ‘There is a set of options’ – and his third – ‘the opportunity to choose’ – for we would hardly describe a set of options as a choice for a person if that person were not going to have the opportunity to choose between them.

10 We should note in passing that the term ‘option’ is more wide-ranging than that of ‘alternative’. Saying that one has a choice amongst several alternatives entails that choosing one excludes choosing the others. Alternatives are mutually exclusive. However, no such implication is contained in the term ‘option’. Generally speaking, for ease of presentation, I will be concentrating on ‘alternatives’ although I occasionally use the term option. Everything I say about alternatives can be extended, with a little revision, to options.

11 I owe this formulation of the possible intrinsic value of this notion of choice to Bob Goodin.

12 Dworkin, Gerald, ‘Is More Choice Better Than Less?’ in French, P., Uehling, T. and Wettstein, H., eds, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. VII (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 47–61, at p. 60.Google Scholar

13 Hence the almost universal condemnation of plans in 1985 to abolish SERPS. See Weale, Albert, ‘Social Policy’, in Dunleavy, Patrick, Gamble, Andrew and Peele, Gillian, eds, Developments in British Politics 3 (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 205–7.Google Scholar

14 This caveat is important and will be returned to in the final section.

15 For further arguments, see Dworkin, , ‘More Choice’, pp. 47–62Google Scholar and Barry, B., ‘Does Society Exist? The Case for Socialism’, Fabian Tract, 536 (London: Fabian Society, 1989), pp. 18–20.Google Scholar

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17 I might consider the reasons that sway others to be daft or almost unintelligible, but they count as reasons if we can recognize them as such. For example, when I was a student at Keele University, the Chancellor, Princess Margaret, came to the students' ball and soon reached for her cigarettes. The President of the Students' Union rushed forward with a lit match, but the Princess refused to suck. An aide then came forward with a lighter informing the hapless student that ‘the Princess does not have her cigarettes lit with matches.’ I can understand that someone may think themselves too grand to have their cigarettes lit with a match, even if I think their reasons are daft.

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19 Sen, Amartya, ‘Behaviour and the Concept of Preference’, in his Choice, Welfare and Measurement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), pp. 61–2.Google Scholar

20 This point was forcefully made by McPherson, Klim on the BBC programme Brass Tacks, 02 1989.Google Scholar

21 See Dowding, Keith M., Rational Choice and Political Power (Aldershot, Hants.: Edward Elgar, 1991), chap. 3.Google Scholar

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24 Dworkin, , ‘More Choice’, p. 59.Google Scholar

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26 Bob Goodin brought this aspect to my attention.

27 Scanlon, , ‘The Significance of Choice’, p. 179.Google Scholar