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Effective and Ethical Institutional Investment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 June 2011

A. Asher
A. Asher
Affiliation:
Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, Private Bag 3, WITS 2050, South Africa. Tel: +27-11(0)-716-2610; Fax: +27-11(0)-339-6640; E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Those with responsibility for the assets of institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to attempt to earn the best possible risk adjusted returns and to comply with ethical standards. A satisfactory resolution of these, and other, conflicting demands requires a coherent intellectual framework. Such a framework can be based on a traditional scheme that analyses the various components of profit in terms of the requirements of justice. The framework provides a basis for discussing the major challenges facing the institutional investors. These relate to their role in rational asset selection, effective corporate governance, job creation and the minimisation of environmental impact.

Keywords

Socially Acceptable InvestmentStandardsJusticeSocial CriteriaUtility TheoryUtility FunctionsEvaluation of PerformanceManagement RemunerationTrust LawCorporate GovernanceEntrepreneurial RulesEmployee Share Ownership PlansChristian Thoughts
Type
Sessional meetings: papers and abstracts of discussions
Information
British Actuarial Journal , Volume 4 , Issue 5 , 01 December 1998 , pp. 969 - 1027
Copyright
Copyright © Institute and Faculty of Actuaries 1998

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