Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7fkt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T01:42:04.850Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Judgment and the New Morality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 October 2024

Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

This essay is an attempt at a modest diatribe against some of the themes often associated with the ‘new moral theology’. It is my contention that in our enthusiasm for the seeming freedom promised in the new love ethic we have forgotten that the self must be transformed if we are to see the world as it is, and that the transformation into loving persons is not accomplished overnight by declaring our good intentions but by submitting patiently to the suffering that makes us real. We have impoverished our ethics by assuming that our lives can easily embody and reflect the good. In our moral behaviour, we have tacitly accepted existence in a world where God does not exist; in such a world, evil often appears beautiful and even kind. Such a situation is all the more pernicious because we claim to base our self-imposed blindness on love, kindness, justice, and even Jesus Christ. The main purpose of this essay is to try to locate some of the problems that have led us to confuse illusion with reality, for only when we understand the nature of our self-deception can we begin to appreciate how wonderful and yet how painful it is to live in a world where the good is not easily done.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1941 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers

References

page 212 note 1 Louis Monden, Sin, Liberty, and Law (New York: Sheed and Mard, 1965), p. 89.

page 214 note 1 John Milhaven, ‘The Behavioral Sciences and Christian Ethics’, in Projectives: Shaping An American Theology for the Future, edited by O'Meara and Weisser (New York: Doubleday, 1970), p. 138.

page 215 note 1 For a similar argument see Alasdair MacIntyre, The Religious Significance of Atheism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

2 For a suggestive analysis of the relation of language and ethics, see: Herbert McCabe, Law, Love and Language (London: Sheed & Ward, 1969), and my ‘Situation Ethics, Moral Notions, and Theological Ethics’, Irish Theological Quarterly (July, 1971), pp. 242–257.

3 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good (London, 1971).