Widespread testing is key to controlling the spread of COVID-19. But should we worry about self-selection bias in the testing? The recent literature on willful ignorance says we should – people often avoid health information. In the context of COVID-19, such willful ignorance can bias testing data. Furthermore, willful ignorance often arises when selfish wants conflict with social benefits, which might be particularly likely for potential ‘super-spreaders’ – people with many social interactions – given people who test positive are urged to self-isolate for two weeks. We design a survey in which participants (n = 897) choose whether to take a costless COVID-19 test. We find that 70% would take a test. Surprisingly, the people most likely to widely spread COVID-19 – the extraverts, others who meet more people in their daily lives and younger people – are the most willing to take a test. People's ability to financially or emotionally sustain self-isolation does not matter to their decision. We conclude that people are selfless in their decision to test for COVID-19. Our results are encouraging – they imply that COVOD-19 testing may succeed in targeting those who generate the largest social benefits from self-isolation if infected, which strengthens the case for widespread testing.

In a large study that involved 2637 participants recruited from a representative UK and US sample, we tested the influence of four behavioural interventions (versus control) on a range of behaviours important for reducing the spread of COVID-19 a day after the interventions were administered. Even if people largely complied with social distancing measures, our analyses showed that for certain subgroups of the population the interventions made a positive difference. More specifically, for those who started practising social distancing relatively recently, an information-based intervention increased general compliance with social distancing and reduced both the number of times people went out and the number of hours they spent outside. However, for people who started practising social distancing relatively early, the interventions tended to backfire and, in some cases, reduced compliance with social distancing. Overall, this research has various policy implications and shows that, although behavioural interventions can positively impact compliance with social distancing, their effect may depend on personal circumstances.

One way to reduce waste and to make a system more robust is to allow its components to pool resources. For example, banks might insure each other or share a common capital reserve. Systems whose resources have been pooled in this way are highly prevalent in such diverse domains as finance, infrastructure, health care, emergency response and engineering. However, these systems have a combination of characteristics that leave them vulnerable to poor decision-making: non-linearity of risk; obvious rewards combined with hidden costs; and political and market incentives that encourage inadequate safety margins. Three studies demonstrate a tendency for managers of such systems to underestimate the probability of cascading failures. We describe a series of behaviorally based policy interventions to mitigate the resulting hazards.

To help people make informed decisions, policy-makers often require entities to provide consumers with informational materials known as disclosures. However, it is unclear whether consumers pay attention to disclosures. In two experiments where we manipulate the delivery of disclosures, we find that the mere presence of an observer negatively affects attention to disclosures, while introducing a mandatory waiting period after receiving a disclosure increases attention. In a third study, we analyze more than 3000 surveys answered by recent mortgage borrowers. Borrowers who report receiving disclosures at mortgage closing meetings (which are often attended by multiple stakeholders) are less likely to have questions about their disclosures than those who receive disclosures beforehand, suggesting differential attention. Our findings demonstrate that both mandatory waiting periods and the presence of observers can affect consumers’ attention to disclosures. We discuss implications of our research for policies designed to promote informed consumer decision-making.

Modern consumers typically face complex goods and services. In the interest of customer protection, these companies are asked to disclose information about the products and consumers are typically required to indicate their understanding of the information provided. In truth, consumers seldom consult, even less understand the information provided. I present here the state of evidence about how commercial disclosure actually works (or rather does not work) with consumers characterized with human limitations in information processing. I discuss ways to improve disclosure regulation to improve customer protection.

The move to smart disclosure promises to revitalize disclosure mandates and save them from a fate of ignored verbiage. But by making disclosure relevant and effective, this shift to smart disclosure also raises several concerns. Specifically, simple disclosures like genetically modified food disclosures, restaurant hygiene grades, annual percentage rate disclosures, etc., can result in market distortions and inefficiencies as: (1) consumers might draw false inferences from the disclosure; and (2) disclosing one dimension will elevate this dimension relative to other dimensions, and thus distort demand for the product and even alter the product itself. Relatedly, System 1 disclosures, like graphic cigarette labels, might influence behavior by triggering an emotional response rather than through informed deliberation, thus abandoning traditional justifications for disclosure mandates. In light of these concerns, it is more difficult to view disclosure mandates as minimally paternalistic. Government, by tweaking disclosure design, wields substantial power over markets and consumers.

Finding ways to get consumers engaged in markets is a major current topic of debate. This article examines why consumer engagement is so important in driving effective competition in markets. It then considers some key categories of intervention that can enhance consumer engagement, and in particular the various roles that disclosure can play. Recent examples are provided from the UK, where many such engagement measures have been implemented. The article emphasizes the importance, when policy-makers are designing such interventions, of understanding how real consumers truly behave. It also highlights the relevance to competitive outcomes of two further concepts: relative salience and relative consumer engagement. Finally, the article draws on both the successes and the failures of past interventions to identify some lessons for policy-makers when stepping into this area.