Lee and Schwartz procedures of separation offer a much needed interpretation of the literature on moral cleansing. However, body ownership as a grounded mechanism of separation and connection has been neglected. We argue that embodiment may be employed to connect the self to desirable aspects of cognitive and emotional interactions and disembodiment to disconnect from undesirable elements.

We propose that procedures of separation have two functions, namely first, to establish the integrity of individual parts, and second, to make previously joint entities discreet and therefore countable. This allows taking stock of available resources, including evaluating the use of individual objects, a process that is especially adaptive under conditions of threat of contagious disease and resource scarcity.

Grounded procedures of separation are conceptualized as a learned concept. The simultaneous cultural universality of the general idea and immense diversity of its implementations might be better understood through the lens of dual inheritance theories. By drawing on examples from developmental psychology and emotion theorizing, we argue that an innate blueprint might underlie learned implementations of cleansing that vary widely.

In this commentary we outline perceptual control theory and suggest this as a fruitful way for Lee and Schwarz (L&S) to fully embody their account of cleansing behavior. Moreover, we take issue with the command control approach that L&S have taken seeing this as an unnecessary cognitive commitment within an embodied model of cleansing behavior.

To understand the consequences of cleansing, Lee and Schwarz favor a grounded procedures perspective over recently developed disgust theory. We believe that this position stems from three errors: (1) interpreting cleansing effects as broader than they are; (2) not detailing the proximate mechanisms underlying disgust; and (3) not detailing adaptive function versus system byproducts when developing the grounded procedures perspective.

The proposed theory is broad enough to accommodate the reduction or elimination of prior influences by a variety of acts symbolizing separation (including cleansing). However, it does not account for stability in psychological variables, and is contradicted by widely documented stability in people's actual attitudes and behavior over time, in multiple domains, despite people's pervasive everyday acts of symbolic separation.

Lee and Schwarz propose that grounded procedures can also be related to connection rather than separation. Drawing on consumer behavior research, we point to different grounded procedures of connection – in terms of the motor actions involved, their salient properties, and their motivational conditions – and discuss how procedures of separation may be affected by the procedures of connection that precede them.

This commentary provides an interpretation of the effects of grounded procedures in terms of the goal-generalization processes involved in coping with negative feelings and identifies some implications that might not yet have been considered.

Our commentators explore the operation of grounded procedures across all levels of analysis in the behavioral sciences, from mental to social, developmental, and evolutionary/functional. Building on them, we offer two integrative principles for systematic effects of grounded procedures to occur. We discuss theoretical topics at each level of analysis, address methodological recommendations, and highlight further extensions of grounded procedures.

Most authors who discuss willpower assume that everyone knows what it is, but our assumptions differ to such an extent that we talk past each other. We agree that willpower is the psychological function that resists temptations – variously known as impulses, addictions, or bad habits; that it operates simultaneously with temptations, without prior commitment; and that use of it is limited by its cost, commonly called effort, as well as by the person's skill at executive functioning. However, accounts are usually not clear about how motivation functions during the application of willpower, or how motivation is related to effort. Some accounts depict willpower as the perceiving or formation of motivational contingencies that outweigh the temptation, and some depict it as a continuous use of mechanisms that interfere with re-weighing the temptation. Some others now suggest that impulse control can bypass motivation altogether, although they refer to this route as habit rather than willpower.

It is argued here that willpower should be recognized as either or both of two distinct functions, which can be called resolve and suppression. Resolve is based on interpretation of a current choice as a test case for a broader set of future choices, which puts at stake more than the outcome of the current choice. Suppression is inhibiting valuation of (modulating) and/or keeping attention from (filtering) immediate alternatives to a current intention. Perception of current choices as test cases for broader outcomes may result in reliable preference for these outcomes, which is experienced as an effortless habit – a successful result of resolve, not an alternative method of self-control. Some possible brain imaging correlates are reviewed.

We argue that a closer look at the practices and tools that humans use to support willpower, and the cultural contexts in which they are employed, can broaden the applicability of Ainslie's theory and facilitate the development of more effective self-control techniques. To support our argument, we examine Alcoholics Anonymous's method of temptation resistance known as “playing the tape through” (PTT).

Ainslie advances our understanding of self-control by theoretically unifying multiple forms of willpower. But one crucial question remains unanswered: How do agents pick the right forms of willpower in each situation? I argue that willpower requires tactical skill, which detects willpower-demanding contexts, selects context-appropriate tactics, and monitors their implementation. Research on tactical skill will significantly advance our understanding of willpower.

The continuous revaluation of rewards lies at the core of Ainslie's account of willpower. Yet, he does not explicate the underlying experiential mechanisms. We draw upon theoretical, neuroscientific, and computational evidence to demonstrate that boredom evokes revaluation. By biasing behavior toward exploration, boredom necessitates effortful willpower to balance it against exploitation, thereby rendering suppression a highly adaptive function of willpower.

Ainslie offers an encompassing and compelling account of willpower, although his big-picture view comes occasionally at the cost of low resolution. We comment on ambiguity in the metacognitive and prospective mechanisms of resolve implicated in recursive self-prediction. We hope to show both the necessity and promise of specifying testable cognitive mechanisms of willpower.

We use neural reinforcement learning concepts including Pavlovian versus instrumental control, liking versus wanting, model-based versus model-free control, online versus offline learning and planning, and internal versus external actions and control to reflect on putative conflicts between short-term temptations and long-term goals.

Willpower (as suppression, resolve, and habit) has ramifications for autonomy and mental time-travel. Autonomy presupposes mature powers of volition and the capacity to anticipate future events and consequences of one's actions. Ainslie's study is useful to clarify basic autonomy in addiction and dementia. Furthermore, we show how our study on coping with stress can be applied to suppression and resolve.

For all its popularity as a psychological construct, willpower is irremediably polysemous. A more helpful construct is self-control, defined as the self-regulation of conflicting impulses. We show how the process model of self-control provides a principled framework for examining how undesirable impulses may be weakened and desirable impulses may be strengthened.

Willpower is often conceptualized as incorporating effortful and momentary suppression of immediate but ultimately inferior rewards. Yet, growing evidence instead supports a process of attribute weighting, whereby normatively optimal choices arise from separable evaluation of different attributes (e.g., time and money). Strategic allocation of attention settles conflicts between competing choice-relevant attributes, which could be expanded to include self-referential predictions (“resolve”).

Ainslie identifies two possible motivational sources for resolve: “thinking categorically” and “intertemporal bargaining.” Ainslie opts for intertemporal bargaining, adding that thinking categorically has no motivational power. The most researched instance of willpower is remission from addiction. This literature shows that aspirations for a more desirable identity and comfortable lifestyle motivate remission. In other words, “thinking categorically” drives willpower.

Ainslie does not formally incorporate risk and uncertainty in his framework for modelling impulses and willpower. To provide a complete account of the motivational bases of choice behaviour, Ainslie should extend his framework to incorporate risk attitudes and subjective beliefs.