The theories of cerebellar function presented in this BBS special issue cannot be reconciled with the established induction properties of cerebellar LTD. At the same time, the authors presenting their research on cerebellar LTD do not appear very interested in function.

The correspondence view of memory is not a metaphor. However, correspondence is the essential feature of the archaeology metaphor, which harks back to Freud and Neisser. A modern version of this metaphor and some of its implications are briefly described. The archaeology metaphor integrates the idea of stored traces in a nonmechanistic framework.

Koehler's call for a reanalysis of the base rate fallacy is particularly important in the applied domain of accounting, since base rate data appear to be an important input for many accounting tasks. In this commentary I discuss the use of base rates in accounting and explain why more flexible standards of performance are important when judging the use of base rates.

Heyman makes a convincing case that a melioration choice strategy is sufficient to produce addictive behavior. But given a plethora of addiction theories, the question is whether melioration theory is superior to rivals more sophisticated than a simple disease model or operant conditioning account. Heyman offers little direct evidence that melioration actually causes the addictions we observe.

The underutilization of base rates is a consistent finding. The strong claim that base rates are ignored has been rejected and this needs no further emphasis. Following the path of “normal science,” research examines the conditions predicting changes in the degree of underutilization. A scientific revolution that might dethrone the heuristics and biases paradigm is not in sight.

The value of accuracy and quantity as memory measures is assessed. It is argued that (1) accuracy does not measure correspondence (monitoring) because it ignores omissions and correct rejections, (2) quantity is confounded with monitoring in recall, and (3) in recognition, if targets and foils are unequal, both measures, even together, still ignore correct rejections.

Numerous individual differences determine the effectiveness of the multiple external reinforcement contingencies that control drug seeking behavior. Differences in the capacity to frame reinforcement and also the toxic effects of drugs modulate susceptibility to addiction. As a result, not all individuals are at the same degree of risk for addiction.

The adjustable pattern generator (APG) model addresses physiological detail in a manner that renders it eminently testable. However, the problem for which the APG was developed, namely, limb control, may be computationally too complex for this purpose. Instead, it is proposed that recent empirical and theoretical advances in understanding the role of the cerebellum in low-level saccadic control could be used to refine and extend the APG. [HOUK et al.]

Two distinct issues are sometimes confused in the base rate literature: Why do people make logical mistakes in the assessment of probabilities? and why do subjects not use base rates the way experimenters do? The latter problem may often reflect differences in an implicit reference class rather than a disinclination to update a base rate by Bayes' theorem. Also important are considerations concerning the interaction of several potentially relevant base rates.

This study examines how a Purkinje cell receives its appropriate olivary error signal during the learning of compound movements. We suggest that the Purkinje cell only reinforces those target pyramidal cells which already participate in the movement, subsequently reducing any repeated error signal, such as its own climbing fiber input, [simpson et al.; smith]

This commentary deals with criteria for assigning truth values to memory contents. A parallel with perception shows how truth values can be assigned by considering subjects' beliefs about the truth state of the memory content. This topic is also relevant to the study of processes of control over retrieval.

Addictive behavior has never seemed rational because it persists in spite of drastic aversive consequences. This is a particular problem for models of addiction such as operant psychology which hold that behavior is controlled by its consequences. Inspite of claims to the contrary, Heymans target article illustrates how operant psychology resolves this contradiction. By using the matching law, Heyman suggests a mechanism that explains why delayed aversive events may not control behavior, and a conceptual framework in which we can understand successful therapies.

Koehler's target article attempts a balanced view of the relevance of knowledge of base rates to judgments of subjective or credal probability, but he is not sensitive enough to the difference between requiring and permitting the equation of probability judgments with base rates, the interaction between precision of base rate and reference class information, and the possibility of indeterminate probability judgment.

Koriat & Goldsmith's thesis is provocative but has three problems: First, quantity and accuracy are not simply related, they are complementary. Second, the storehouse metaphor is not the driving force behind contemporary theories of memory and may not be viable. Third, the taxonomy is incomplete, leaving unclassified several extremely influential methods and measures, such as priming and response latency.

Knowledge of specific instances of melioration does not imply knowledge of the variables controlling behavior. Drug self-administration has been successfully analyzed in terms of standard variables such as the immediacy and magnitude of the drug reinforcer. An appeal to melioration may not be necessary.

The cerebellum probably obeys the rules of sensorimotor integration common in the nervous system. One such a rule is formulated: the nervous system organizes spatial frames of reference for the sensorimotor apparatus and produces voluntary movements by shifting their origin points. We give examples of spatial frames of reference for different single- and multi-joint movements including locomotion and also illustrate that the process of motor development and learning may depend critically on the formation of appropriate frames of reference and the organism's ability to manage them. We suggest that a solution to the problem of sensorimotor integration may not be trivial and may actually change the mental and experimental paradigms used in the understanding of the cerebellum and other brain structures, [HOUK et al.; SIMPSON et al.; SMITH; TIIACH]

Koehler is right to argue for more nuanced interpretation of base rate anomalies. These anomalies are best understood in relation to a broader class of cognitive anomalies, which are important for theory and practice. Recognizing a need for more nuanced analysis should not be taken as a license for treating the effects as “explained away.”

Heyman's model, paradoxically, predicts that whereas a maximizing approach to drug choice will prevent escalation of drug use it will never yield complete abstinence. We suggest an alternative model that overcomes this difficulty by focusing on changes in drug tolerance. A small modification allows maximization to predict either abstinence or moderation (e.g., social drinking).

A major theme of the systems physiologists is the critical timing function of the cerebellum. However, the biophysicists do not appear to directly address the biophysical basis of the adaptive timing competence implicated in the physiological and behavioral data. Thus, the bridge between the macroscopic and microscopic data bases seems to be incomplete in a critical area. We report successful results from an attempt to add the missing part of the bridge. It comes in the form of a model of how the second messenger system activated by parallel fiber inputs - the mGluR channel - can literally bridge the temporal gap between CS and CR, both in standard conditioning tasks and more generally, [CRÉPEL et al.; HOUK et al.; KANO; LINDEN; SIMPSON et al.; SMITH; THACH; VINCENT]

Koriat & Goldsmith are right in their claim that the “ecological” and “traditional” approaches to memory rely on different metaphors. But the underlying ecological metaphor is not correspondence (which in any case is not a metaphorical notion): it is action. Remembering is a kind of doing; like most other forms of action it is purposive, personal, and particular.