with respect to human color categories, steels & belpaeme's (s&b's) simulations over-emphasize the possible influence of language. in humans, color processing is the result of a long evolutionary process in which categories developed without language. common principles of color processing lead to similar color categories, but interindividual variation in color categories exists. even color-deficiencies, causing large differences in color categories, remain inconspicuous in everyday life, thereby contradicting the hypothesis that language could play a role in color category formation.

the nature and diversity of moral codes can be understood in terms of a few basic propensities honed by diachronic dialectics between what people do and what they are supposed to do in the culture in question. many of the moral heuristics presented by sunstein can be seen as by-products of these processes.

in this commentary i argue for the need of an evolutionary account of lateralized behavior. although one could raise some problems with the explanatory power of the present hypothesis, this is the approach one should pursue. it would be very important to show that the proposed idea of social coordination does indeed lead to selective advantages also when considered within a species.

goldstein (1948) reported multiple cases of failure to categorise colours in patients that he termed amnesic or anomic aphasics. these patients have a particular difficulty in producing perceptual categories in the absence of other aphasic impairments. we hold that neuropsychological evidence supports the view that the task of colour categorisation is logically impossible without labels.

The present response elaborates and defends the main theses advanced in the target article: namely, that in order to provide an evolutionary account of brain lateralization, we should consider advantages and disadvantages associated both with the individual possession of an asymmetrical brain and with the alignment of the direction of lateralization at the population level. We explain why we believe that the hypothesis that directional lateralization evolved as an evolutionarily stable strategy may provide a better account than alternative hypotheses. We also further our discussion of the influence of stimulation and experience in early life on lateralization, and thereby show that our hypothesis is not deterministic. We also consider some novel data and ideas in support of our main thesis.