Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-18T15:29:40.880Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

What's really doing the work here? Knowledge representation or the Higher-Order Thought theory of consciousness?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1999

Gerard O'Brien  and
Jonathan Opie
Gerard O'Brien
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia 5005, Australia{gobrien; jopie}@arts.adelaide.edu.au arts.adelaide.edu.au/Philosophy/{gobrien; jopie}.htm
Jonathan Opie
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia 5005, Australia{gobrien; jopie}@arts.adelaide.edu.au arts.adelaide.edu.au/Philosophy/{gobrien; jopie}.htm
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Dienes & Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the “Higher-Order Thought” theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that consensus on the explicit/implicit knowledge distinction is still a fair way off.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 5 , October 1999 , pp. 778 - 779
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)