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What is the point of attempting to make a case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 1999

Boris Crassini ,
Jack Broerse ,
R. H. Day ,
Christopher J. Best  and
W. A. Sparrow
Boris Crassini
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, School of Human Movement, Deakin University, Geelong, VIC 3217, Australiabuc or cjb or [email protected] www.hbs.deakin.edu.au/psychology
Jack Broerse
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, Queensland 4072, [email protected] www.uq.edu.au
R. H. Day
Affiliation:
School of Psychological Science, La Trobe University, Bundoora, VIC 3083, [email protected] www.latrobe.edu.au
Christopher J. Best
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, School of Human Movement, Deakin University, Geelong, VIC 3217, Australiabuc or cjb or [email protected] www.hbs.deakin.edu.au/psychology
W. A. Sparrow
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, School of Human Movement, Deakin University, Geelong, VIC 3217, Australiabuc or cjb or [email protected] www.hbs.deakin.edu.au/psychology
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Abstract

We question the usefulness of Pylyshyn's dichotomy between cognitively penetrable and cognitively impenetrable mechanisms as the basis for his distinction between cognition and early vision. This dichotomy is comparable to others that have been proposed in psychology prompting disputes that by their very nature could not be resolved. This fate is inevitable for Pylyshyn's thesis because of its reliance on internal representations and their interpretation. What is more fruitful in relation to this issue is not a difficult dichotomy, but a different look at perception such as proposed by Gibson (1979).

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 22 , Issue 3 , June 1999 , pp. 372 - 373
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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