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What is the point? Concepts, description, and rigid designation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 1998

Bradley Franks  and
Nick Braisby
Bradley Franks
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, United [email protected]
Nick Braisby
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, London Guildhall University, London E1 7NT, United [email protected]
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Abstract

Millikan's nondescriptionist approach applies an account of meaning to concepts in terms of designation. The essentialism that provides the principal grounds for rigid designation, however, receives no empirical support from concepts. Whatever the grounding, this view not only faces the problems of rigid designation in theories of meaning, it also calls for a role for pragmatics more consonant with descriptionist theories of concepts.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 21 , Issue 1 , February 1998 , pp. 70
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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