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What are the foundations of normative theories about human reasoning?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2010

L. Jonathan Cohen
L. Jonathan Cohen
Affiliation:
The Queen's College, University of Oxford, Oxford 0X1 4AW, England
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Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , June 1987 , pp. 312 - 313
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1987

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References

Cohen, L. J. (1981) Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4:317–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, L. J. (1982) Are people programmed to commit fallacies? Further thoughts about the interpretation of experimental data on probability judgement. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 12:251–74. [rLJC]CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, L. J. (1986) The dialogue of reason. Clarendon Press. [rLJC]Google Scholar
Goodman, N. (1954) Fact, fiction and forecast. Athlone Press. [rLJC]Google Scholar