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We can't fill in answers to philosophical questions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1998

Lloyd Kaufman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003 [email protected]

Abstract

The target article discusses the classic blind spot, scotomas, subjective contours, and other so-called filling-in phenomena. Its purpose is to evaluate the idea that some theories of filling-in amount to tacit acceptance of Cartesian materialism and a form of psychophysical isomorphism. Pessoa et al. reject what is termed structural isomorphism as well as Cartesian materialism, but claim that neural processes adduced as underlying filling-in may be acceptable without implying isomorphism. The article supports the idea of perceiving as an active constructive process. However, the various subthemes are not clearly related to each other. Topological psychophysical isomorphism is indeed untenable, but the tacit assumption that filling-in enjoys any kind of unique status with respect to illuminating philosophical questions is doubtful.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1998 Cambridge University Press

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