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Vehicle, process, and hybrid theories of consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2004

Gerard O'Brien  and
Jonathan Opie
Gerard O'Brien*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of Adelaide, South Australia5005, Australiahttp://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/humanities/gobrien/http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/humanities/jopie/
Jonathan Opie*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of Adelaide, South Australia5005, Australiahttp://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/humanities/gobrien/http://www.arts.adelaide.edu.au/humanities/jopie/
*
[email protected]
[email protected]
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Abstract

Martínez-Manrique contends that we overlook a possible nonconnectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. We argue that the position he develops is better understood as a hybrid vehicle/process theory. We assess this theory and in doing so clarify the commitments of both vehicle and process theories of consciousness.

Type
Authors' Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 27 , Issue 2 , April 2004 , pp. 303 - 305
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2004

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