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Varieties of dual-process theory for probabilistic reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

Richard Samuels
Richard Samuels
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, King's College, Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, United Kingdom. [email protected]://www.kcl.ac.uk/kis/schools/hums/philosophy/staff/r_samuels.html
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Abstract

Though Barbey & Sloman (B&S) distinguish various frequentist hypotheses, they opt rapidly for one specific dual-process model of base-rate facilitation. In this commentary, I maintain that there are many distinct but related versions of the dual-process theory, and suggest that there is currently little reason to favor B&S's formulation over the alternatives.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 280 - 281
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

Evans, J. (forthcoming) How many dual process theories do we need? One, two or many? In: In two minds: Dual processes and beyond, Evans, J. & Frankish, K.. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Stanovich, K. E. (2004) The robot's rebellion: Finding meaning in the age of Darwin. University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar