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There is more to thinking than propositions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Derek C. Penn ,
Patricia W. Cheng ,
Keith J. Holyoak ,
John E. Hummel  and
Daniel J. Povinelli
Derek C. Penn
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA [email protected]://www.cognitiveevolutiongroup.org/[email protected]://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/[email protected]://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/
Patricia W. Cheng
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA [email protected]://www.cognitiveevolutiongroup.org/[email protected]://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/[email protected]://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/
Keith J. Holyoak
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA [email protected]://www.cognitiveevolutiongroup.org/[email protected]://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/[email protected]://reasoninglab.psych.ucla.edu/
John E. Hummel
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL [email protected]://www.psych.uiuc.edu/~jehummel/
Daniel J. Povinelli
Affiliation:
Cognitive Evolution Group, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, New Iberia, LA [email protected]://www.cognitiveevolutiongroup.org/
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Abstract

We are big fans of propositions. But we are not big fans of the “propositional approach” proposed by Mitchell et al. The authors ignore the critical role played by implicit, non-inferential processes in biological cognition, overestimate the work that propositions alone can do, and gloss over substantial differences in how different kinds of animals and different kinds of cognitive processes approximate propositional representations.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 221 - 223
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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