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Studying mental states is not a research program for comparative cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

Sara J. Shettleworth
Sara J. Shettleworth
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G3, Canada. [email protected]
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Abstract

The title of the target article suggests an agenda for research on cognitive evolution that is doubly flawed. It implies that we can learn directly about animals' mental states, and its focus on human uniqueness impels a search for an existence proof rather than for understanding what components of given cognitive processes are shared among species and why.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 332 - 333
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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