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A statistical taxonomy and another “chance” for natural frequencies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2007

Adrien Barton ,
Shabnam Mousavi  and
Jeffrey R. Stevens
Adrien Barton
Affiliation:
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max PlanckInstitute for Human Development, 14195 Berlin, Germany; [email protected]://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/forschung/abc/index.htm Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques, Paris I, and CNRS/ENS – UMR 8590, 75006 Paris, [email protected]@psu.eduhttp://www.stat.psu.edu/people/faculty/smousavi.html/
Shabnam Mousavi
Affiliation:
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max PlanckInstitute for Human Development, 14195 Berlin, Germany; [email protected]://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/forschung/abc/index.htm Department of Statistics, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802. [email protected]://www.abc.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/users/jstevens/
Jeffrey R. Stevens
Affiliation:
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max PlanckInstitute for Human Development, 14195 Berlin, Germany; [email protected]://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/forschung/abc/index.htm
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Abstract

The conclusions of Barbey & Sloman (B&S) crucially depend on evidence for different representations of statistical information. Unfortunately, a muddled distinction made among these representations calls into question the authors' conclusions. We clarify some notions of statistical representations which are often confused in the literature. These clarifications, combined with new empirical evidence, do not support a dual-process model of judgment.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , June 2007 , pp. 255 - 256
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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